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ABSTRACT
INSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND MONETARY POLICY
TRANSMISSION
By
LUCIANA TEAGNO LOPES
AUGUST, 2014
Committee Chair: Dr. Andrew Feltenstein
Major Department: Economics
This dissertation states that the behavior of banks and investors varies
according to the rules of the game and demonstrates that the level of
institutional development may have an important role on the effectiveness of
monetary policies. The level of institutional development is measured by the
quality of contract enforcement, the level of corruption, the extent of political
stability, the level of government’s transparency and accountability and the
quality of the implemented policies and regulations. This research presents a
framework to explain how the traditional channels of monetary policy
transmission are altered by the level of institutional development, allowing the
construction of three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that institutional
development matters for the effects of monetary policies on output. The
second hypothesis is that contractionary policies have more adverse effects on
output in countries with low institutional development than in countries with
high institutional development. The third hypothesis is that expansionary
policies are more effective in terms of output promotion in countries with
high institutional development than in countries with low institutional
development. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first time that research
has established a relationship between the level of institutional development
and the asymmetric effects of monetary policies on output. Two country
examples are presented: the case of Nigeria illustrates the third hypothesis
and the case of Brazil illustrates the second hypothesis. Several econometric
models and six institutional development indicators are used to evaluate the
three hypotheses. This dissertation provides strong empirical support for the
hypotheses 1 and 2, sustaining the argument that the asymmetric effects of
monetary policies on output may have deep institutional causes. Rule of law
and government effectiveness are the indicators that matter most for the
effectiveness of monetary policies. Particular consideration should be given to
the rule of law indicator because of its clear connection with the theoretical
arguments and country examples, suggesting that fundamental institutional
improvements should be focused on the efficiency of the judiciary system and
the quality of law enforcement.
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1 Introduction
This research evaluates whether the effects of monetary policies on real output are
dependent upon institutional development. The level of institutional development in a
country depends on the quality of contract enforcement, the protection of property rights,
the protection against the use of public power for private gains, the government’s
capability to implement sound policies and regulations, the citizens’ participation in
selecting the government, the government’s transparency and accountability, and political
stability.
The agents involved in the transmission of monetary policies to real output will
respond to changes in central bank interest rates in different ways, depending on the
incentives and constraints imposed by the set of institutions. Banks and investors, the
main agents participating in the transmission of monetary policies, will make choices to
maximize profits and these choices will be shaped by the opportunities offered by the
institutional environment. As a result, institutions may affect economic performance
through their impact on the effectiveness of monetary policies.
Section 2 describes the objectives of this dissertation. Section 3 highlights the
importance of this study and its main policy implications. Section 4 reviews the associated
literature and identifies the contributions of this research. Section 5 presents a theoretical
framework that allows the development of three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that
the effect of changes in central bank discount rates on real output is altered by the
institutional quality. The second hypothesis is that positive changes in interest rates have a
greater negative impact on output in low institutional development countries than in high
institutional development countries. The third hypothesis is that negative changes in
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interest rates are more effective in terms of output promotion in countries with high
institutional development than in countries with low institutional development. Section 6
presents two case studies that illustrate institutional quality as a factor that changes the
behavior of the agents and the effectiveness of monetary policies. Section 7 describes the
data that will be used in the empirical part of this research. We use quarterly real GDP
growth rates and central bank discount rates from the International Financial Statistics
(IFS) of the International Monetary Fund for the years 2002 to 2011. The Worldwide
Governance Indicators from The World Bank are used as measures of institutional
development. Our sample is composed of 52 countries and comprises a wide variety of
institutional development levels. Section 8 focuses on the empirical evaluation of
hypothesis 1. Section 9 empirically evaluates the three hypotheses developed in this
dissertation through a series of panel linear models using fixed-effects and Prais-Winsten
assumptions. Section 10 presents an alternative methodology to deal with the endogeneity
of discount rates with respect to the real GDP growth. Section 11 presents the conclusions.
2
2 Objectives
First, this research aims to understand how the traditional monetary policy transmission
channels are altered by the level of institutional development found in each country. This
understanding will provide the rationale for the development of the hypotheses that will be
tested in this study. The first hypothesis is that the effect of changes in central bank
discount rates on real output is altered by a country’s institutional quality. In addition, we
treat expansionary and contractionary monetary policies as two different phenomena. This
is due to the fact that some monetary policy transmission channels work only for positive
changes in interest rates or for negative changes in interest rates. Or, some channels work
for both cases but have qualitatively different effects for negative changes in interest rates
and for positive changes in interest rates. The second hypothesis is that positive changes
in interest rates have a greater negative impact on output in low institutional development
countries than in high institutional development countries. The reason is that banks
constrain the supply of loans and increase interest rates with more intensity and investors
are more bank-dependent in low institutional development countries compared to high
institutional development countries. We present institutional development as the deepest
explanation for the development of capital markets. The third hypothesis is that negative
changes in interest rates are more effective in terms of output promotion in countries with
high institutional development than in countries with low institutional development. The
reason is that banks transmit less of the reduction in central bank discount rates to the
public and investors have a less willingness to invest in low institutional development
countries compared to high institutional development countries.
Second, this study aims to illustrate these hypotheses with some case studies. The
3
objective is the presentation of examples that demonstrate that institutional quality can
work as a factor that changes the behavior of the agents and the effectiveness of monetary
policies.
Third, this research aims to empirically test whether institutional development
matters for the transmission of monetary policies from central bank discount rates to real
output. More specifically, the third objective of this study is to empirically evaluate the
first hypothesis developed in the subsection 5.4 of this research. The arguments presented
in subsection 5.2 indicate that the transmission does seem to be dependent on the
institutional development. However, this dependence may be important or unimportant.
Therefore, this becomes an empirical question to be answered by this dissertation.
Fourth, this research aims to empirically test whether institutional development
matters for the transmission of monetary policies when positive and negative changes in
central bank discount rates are treated as two different phenomena that interact in different
ways with the institutional environment. More specifically, this research aims to
empirically evaluate the second and third hypotheses developed in the subsection 5.4 of
this research.
Finally, this research aims to empirically determine which aspects of institutional
development are more relevant for the effectiveness of monetary policies. A set of features
determines the quality of the incentives and constraints in a country: the political stability,
the government’s accountability and transparency, the level of corruption, the protection
of property rights, among others. The empirical tests will shed some light on the
importance of each one of these characteristics for the outcome of monetary policies,
indicating the specific institutional improvements that would be more relevant. In
4
addition, the use of a variety of indicators may also be a way of feeding a nascent theory
that associates monetary policies and institutional development.
5
3 Importance of this Study and Policy Implications
Empirical and theoretical works have demonstrated that institutions matter for economic
performance. This research tests one of the channels through which institutions may affect
economic performance: changing the effectiveness of monetary policies. Also, the
theoretical arguments and the case studies shed some light on how institutions may affect
the results of monetary policies on output. This study investigates the interactions between
institutions and an economic variable; therefore, this study offers a contribution to the
institutional economics literature. In the next section, we will detail our contributions and
show how this research will extend the existing literature.
This study also offers a contribution to the literature on monetary policy
transmission. The fact that institutions may matter for the results of monetary policies on
output has important implications, especially for developing countries. This means that
the goals of monetary policy in these countries should include increasing the quality of
regulations, improving contract enforcement, among other institutional improvements.
Alternatively, this means that making monetary policy in these countries means accepting
the weakness of the institutional environment as a given and incorporating its effects. All
this means that the economic science of monetary policy transmission is not easily
imported from developed to developing countries.
This study has policy implications. First, the empirical results will show whether
central bankers should care about their institutional environment while determining policy
rates. As a first example, suppose that the research provides empirical evidence that an
expansionary monetary policy is more effective in terms of output promotion in countries
with high institutional development than in countries with low institutional development.
6
This result can be interpreted as evidence that the effectiveness of expansionary monetary
policies will be partially reduced by a poor institutional environment. Consequently,
central bankers will have to decrease interest rates even more to compensate the negative
effects that come from the institutional environment; otherwise, they will not achieve the
desired output level. We should mention, however, that this solution is limited due to the
central banks’ price-stabilization objective.
It is important to emphasize the relevance of this first policy implication because it
means that institutions may be the key to understanding some monetary policy failures.
Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) argues that financial globalization did not promote
growth in many developing countries because these economies are investment-constrained
due to the poor institutional environment. Thus, an expansionary monetary policy in these
economies has a potential to be a failure in terms of output promotion due to the same
reasons mentioned by Rodrik. Also, a decrease in central bank discount rates may be a
failure in terms of output promotion simply because banks are allowed to operate in
non-competitive ways and will not necessarily transmit the interest rate reduction to the
public.
Suppose now, as a second example, that the research provides empirical evidence
that a contractionary monetary policy has more negative effects on output in countries with
low institutional development than in countries with high institutional development. This
result can be interpreted as evidence that the adverse effects of contractionary policies are
exacerbated by a poor institutional environment. Consequently, central bankers in
countries with low institutional development should avoid excessively tight policies due to
the relative severity of these policies on real output. Avoiding excessively tight policies,
7
however, may not be in accordance with the central banks’ price-stabilization objective.
In fact, if there is empirical support for our hypotheses, the main policy implication
for central bankers is the necessity of understanding the distortions caused by the specific
set of incentives and constraints that is present in each country. Central bankers should
understand the impact that these distortions have on the outcome of monetary policies,
accepting and incorporating them in policy decisions and actions. It seems that there is not
a macroeconomic response, in terms of changes in interest rates, for an institutional
development issue. Apparently, institutional weaknesses can only be addressed by
improvements in the set of incentives and constraints that shapes the behavior of the
economic agents and characterizes the country’s institutional environment.
Second, the research has broad policy implications, which are not limited to central
banks’ actions. If the results indicate that institutional development does not matter for
monetary policy transmission, monetary policymakers should not care about banking
competition, quality of law enforcement and other institutional questions, even though
they may be important for other reasons. On the other hand, if the results indicate that
institutional development matters for monetary policy transmission, policymakers should
care about those institutional questions. Therefore, policymakers should work to stimulate
competition in the banking sector, increase the willingness of agents to invest after a
decrease in interest rates, stimulate the development of capital markets and mitigate moral
hazard problems in lending activities. The terminology used in Acemoglu, Johnson,
Robinson, and Thaicharoen (2003) seems to apply to this research as well because we can
realize that all the mentioned things that the government should care about are actually
symptoms of a weak institutional development. Consequently, policymakers should act on
8
the institutional causes of these symptoms.
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4 Literature Review and Contributions
The purpose of this section is to review the literature associated with the objectives of this
research and identify the main contributions of this dissertation.
4.1 Institutional Development and Economic Performance
The argument that economic performance depends on institutional development has been
presented in several studies. Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2005) presents a theory
of institutions and economic growth. A series of historical examples illustrates the
proposed theoretical framework. North (1990) states that institutions, as constraints that
shape human interactions and determine the set of incentives in a society, change the costs
of transformation and exchange and, as a result, change the economic performance.
There is also a literature providing empirical evidence on the subject. Acemoglu,
Johnson, and Robinson (2001) uses settler’s mortality rates in European colonies as an
instrument for current institutions and estimates significant effects of institutions on
income per capita. The idea is that colonizers were more likely to set up extractive
institutions in places where they could not stay due to the high mortality rates. Thus, there
is a negative relationship between settler’s mortality rates and the quality of current
institutions. As settler’s mortality rates do not lead to changes in current income per
capita, except indirectly via current institutions, the variable solves the endogeneity of
institutions with respect to the income per capita. Keefer and Knack (1997) provides
empirical evidence that poor countries do not catch up to richer countries as expected by
early neoclassical theory due to, in large part, their institutional weakness. Redek and
Susjan (2005) shows that the legal system quality, the property rights protection, among
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other institutional factors, have an important role on economic growth for a set of 24
transition economies. Kagundu and Martinez-Vazquez (2011) uses a broader sample of 89
countries and also provides evidence that institutional quality matters for GDP per capita
growth.
4.2 Institutions as the Cause of Policies
Macroeconomic policies and institutional economics are put together in Acemoglu et al.
(2003). The paper presents the idea that macroeconomic variables are symptoms instead
of causes of poor economic performance. Slow growth in countries with high inflation,
large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates is not caused by these macroeconomic
issues. Actually, these macroeconomic issues are produced by the poor institutional
environment found in these countries. As a result, what ultimately causes the reduced
growth is the poor institutional development and not the mentioned macroeconomic
variables. In a panel of countries with growth rate of GDP per capita as the dependent
variable, the variables representing macroeconomic policies (government consumption,
average inflation rates and real exchange rate overvaluation) lose their significance once a
measure of institutional quality is included in the models. The authors reinforce the notion
that the empirical findings do not imply that macroeconomic policies are unimportant.
Macroeconomic policies matter for economic performance; however, they have deep
institutional causes.
Persson and Tabellini (2005) and Bernhard and Leblang (2002) also associate
institutions with macroeconomics. Persson and Tabellini (2005) study the effects of
electoral rules and forms of government on state spending and budget deficits. Among
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many other interesting empirical results, they found that presidential systems are
associated with smaller government spending as a fraction of GDP and smaller budget
deficits than parliamentary systems. Presidential regimes have a stronger separation of
powers between the executive and the legislative branches than parliamentary regimes. It
seems that this separation of powers intensifies the checks and balances between the two
branches, increasing accountability, constraining politicians from abusing their powers
and justifying the estimated results. Finally, Bernhard and Leblang (2002) provides
empirical evidence that fixed exchange rates and central bank independence are caused by
the level of economic openness, but also by the configuration of domestic political
institutions. While, in general, single-party majority governments do not benefit from the
choice of these policies, coalition governments, on the other hand, can benefit from it1.
Thus, fixed exchange rates and central bank independence will emerge as the choices that
maximize cabinet durability under specific institutional configurations.
4.3 Institutions as a Factor that Changes the Effectiveness of Policies
As in this research, in Acemoglu, Johnson, Querubin, and Robinson (2008) and
Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) institutions appear as a factor that can change the
effectiveness of other variables. Acemoglu et al. (2008) presents evidence that the
effectiveness of central bank independence reforms is related to the overall institutional
development of a country. More specifically, central bank independence reforms are
ineffective in countries with weak and strong constraints on the executive, which is the
1The idea is that fixed exchange rates and central bank independence, as monetary commitments, remove a
potential source of conflict over monetary policy and facilitate the management of intra-coalition conflicts,
helping political parties to remain in office. The benefit of solving conflicts seems to overcome the losses
that come from these monetary commitments (the party loses the ability to manipulate policy for short-term
electoral or partisan gain).
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main measure of institutional quality used in the research. Reforms work better in
countries with medium constraints on the executive, that is, medium institutional quality
levels2. The effectiveness of the reforms is measured in terms of the reduction in inflation
rates. Inflation rates are regressed on lagged inflation and multiplicative terms composed
by the interaction between the central bank independence measure and dummies for weak,
medium and strong constraints on the executive. Gollwitzer and Quintyn (2010) also tests
whether the effect of central bank independence on inflation rates is differential by
institutions. The paper provides evidence that central bank independence reduces inflation
irrespective of the overall institutional environment. None of the interaction terms
between institutional quality and central bank independence are significant. The analyses
included a sample of low and middle income countries.
4.4 Institutional Development and Monetary Policy
There is relatively little work relating monetary policy to institutional development. Mihal
(2009) presents a theoretical model that includes the fiscal authority setting tax levels,
government spending and debt levels, the monetary authority setting the actual level of
inflation and the private sector setting the expected inflation. The government uses taxes,
seigniorage and newly issued debt to finance itself. A parameter for the degree of tax
leakage due to corruption is included in the model as the measure of institutional quality.
The model predicts that an increase in corruption leads to higher inflation rates, meaning
that the revenue that comes from seigniorage depends on the institutional quality. Another
result is that, for countries with low institutional quality, a decrease in corruption leads to
2The authors explain that the result that central bank independence reforms are ineffective in countries with
high institutional development may be due to level effects, that is, inflation rates are already very reduced
in these countries.
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an increase in taxes, because now taxes are collected more efficiently, and a decrease in
output3. And finally, for countries with moderate to high institutional quality, a decrease in
corruption leads to a decrease in taxes and an increase in output4. The paper also presents
a VAR analysis for Chile, Colombia, Indonesia and Philippines including industrial
production, inflation, exchange rates, interest rates and a measure of institutional quality.
The author concludes that a monetary policy shock has only a significant impact on output
for countries with low institutional quality. Also, a positive institutional quality shock5
stimulates more the output in countries with low institutional quality than in countries
with high institutional quality6. The idea presented in the paper is that institutions affect
output through its effect on seigniorage and taxes, that is, institutions may affect monetary
policies through seigniorage. This research focuses on the relationship between monetary
policies and institutions in a different way because here the objective is to test whether the
effectiveness of monetary policies is differential by the level of institutions. Another
difference is that this research aims to explain the interactions between monetary policies
and institutions through multiple channels and multiple institutional variables rather than
focusing on corruption and its effect on seigniorage.
Another research linking institutions and monetary policy is presented in Duncan
(2011). The paper argues that the positive correlations between output and interest rates
found in developed countries and the negative correlations between output and interest
rates found in developing countries are explained by institutional quality differences
3The author explains that central banks are not truly independent in countries with low institutional
development. Thus, when there is an increase in corruption in these countries, the government will shift the
burden to the monetary authority, increasing seignorage and decreasing taxes. Alternatively, when there is a
decrease in corruption, the government will increase tax collection due to smaller tax leakages.
4The author explains that a larger percent of the tax revenues will be transmitted to the government because
the tax leakage was reduced. This fact will allow a reduction in tax rates.
5An institutional quality shock is a change in the exogenous component of institutional quality.
6This empirical result is unexpected, considering the predictions derived from the theoretical model.
14
between developed and developing countries. Empirical evidence on these associations is
provided by regressions including interest rates as the dependent variable and output as
the independent variable that interacts with institutional quality. The explanation for the
mentioned correlations is that positive external demand shocks of home goods increase
the output and are inflationary in countries with high institutional quality and increase the
output and are deflationary in countries with low institutional quality. Also, central banks
increase interest rates when inflation goes up and decrease interest rates when inflation
goes down.7. These explanations were predicted by a DSGE model calibrated for
Indonesia and Switzerland. The paper is about how institutions affect the response of
monetary policies. Again, this dissertation has a different objective. The goal of this
research is to study how and whether institutions affect the effectiveness or the
transmission of monetary policies, instead of how institutions cause the monetary policies.
Despite not being papers about monetary policy transmission, Rodrik and
Subramanian (2009) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) present a rationale that is closely
associated with the ideas presented in this dissertation. Rodrik and Subramanian (2009)
examines the effects of financial globalization on output growth and Burnside and Dollar
(2000) evaluates the effects of foreign aid on output growth. The institutional
development of the country plays a central role in both papers, explaining the final impact
of the mentioned policies on economic performance. The liberalization of capital accounts
7The author explains that the positive external demand shock causes a real appreciation. The real
appreciation will have two opposite effects. On one hand, the nominal appreciation reduces the consumer
price level and generates a higher opportunity cost of leisure, creating an incentive to increase the supply of
labor. On the other hand, it reduces the value of debt in foreign currency, stimulating consumption and
leisure and reducing the supply of labor. Economies with weak institutional quality will attract fewer loans
and the first effect will be bigger than the second, increasing the labor supply and decreasing inflation rates.
Institutional quality will affect foreign investors and lending in foreign currency. For economies with
stronger institutional quality, the second effect will be bigger than the first, the labor supply will decrease
and inflation will go up.
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and the receipt of foreign aid, like an expansionary monetary policy, inject money into the
system. Thus, the two mentioned works and this research are closely associated because
all of them analyze the effects of money injections on output under different levels of
institutional development. Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) argues that the liberalization
of capital accounts and the consequent reduction in domestic interest rates have not been
contributing to output growth because many countries do not have an adequate demand for
investments. These economies are investment-constrained mainly because of poor
property-rights, weak contract enforcement, and fear of expropriation. Burnside and
Dollar (2000) presents evidence that foreign aid has a positive impact on output growth
under good fiscal, monetary and trade policies. Aid has little effect under poor policies.
However, Easterly, Levine, and Roodman (2004) update Burnside and Dollar’s dataset and
claim that their results are not robust to the use of an extended period of time.
Also, this research has a strong relationship with the ideas presented in Mishra,
Montiel, and Spilimbergo (2010). The paper studies the monetary policy transmission in
low income countries and provides empirical evidence that central bank discount rates are
less transmitted to bank lending rates in countries with a more concentrated banking
sector and smaller scores in a transparency index. According to the authors, the traditional
channels of monetary policy transmission are impaired in these countries mainly due to
the weak institutional frameworks and the imperfect competition in the banking sector. An
important consideration is that Mishra et al. (2010) does not investigate whether the
effectiveness of monetary policies on real output is dependent upon institutions. This
research will answer this question because we focus on the effects of monetary policies on
real output rather than on bank lending rates. In addition, this research expands the
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arguments used in Mishra et al. (2010) because we claim that institutions are also
important for the transmission of monetary policies from bank lending rates to the real
output. We add to the arguments found in Mishra et al. (2010) the idea that investors have
a smaller willingness to invest in countries with low institutional development, as
presented in Rodrik and Subramanian (2009). This is important because we highlight that
not only the financial sector’s agents, but also the investors, behave in different ways
depending on the constraints and incentives imposed by the institutional environment. It is
also relevant to mention that Mishra et al. (2010) is essentially a monetary policy research,
without a clear association with the institutional economics literature and its main authors
(North, Acemoglu, Rodrik, among others). This research, on the contrary, brings together
the two strains of the literature, institutional economics and monetary policy, making a
contribution to both of them. Finally, this research will treat positive and negative changes
in interest rates as two different phenomena. Such treatment is important since
expansionary and contractionary policies produce different behavioral changes, and
consequently, asymmetrical effects on output (Cover (1992) and Garibaldi (1997)). This
important differentiation is not presented in Mishra et al. (2010).
Hardt (2011) is another paper that studies how institutions affect the transmission
or the effectiveness of monetary policies. The author argues that the most significant way
institutions impact the transmission of monetary policies is through their effect on the
elasticity of investment demand to changes in interest rates. Economies with low
institutional quality tend to be more investment constrained than economies with high
institutional quality. As a consequence, the elasticity of the investment demand with
respect to interest rates is more elastic in countries with good institutional quality than in
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countries with low institutional quality. The paper provides some examples on how an
institutional change can affect the transmission of monetary policies to output, however,
the paper does not provide any empirical evaluation and also does not mention the other
channels presented in this paper through which institutions may affect monetary policies’
outcomes.
Aysun, Brady, and Honig (2013) describe themselves as the first attempt at
examining the relationship between financial frictions and the strength of monetary policy
across a broad group of countries. Financial frictions are measured by bankruptcy
recovery rates, the proportion of a firm’s value creditors can recover from a defaulting
firm. The sample used in the study is composed of 56 developed and developing countries.
First, SVAR models are used to estimate the output response to monetary policies for each
country. Second, the absolute value of the measure of monetary policy impact8 generated
in the first step is regressed on the measure of financial frictions, the bankruptcy recovery
rates. There is one observation per country and the model is estimated using OLS with
robust standard errors. The results indicate that recovery rates have a negative and
statistically significant effect on the impact of monetary policies, that is monetary policies
are less effective under higher recovery rates. As control variables, dummies for the
countries’ legal origin (German, English, Scandinavian and Socialist) are included in the
regression. The results indicate that the legal origin can impact the effectiveness of
monetary policies. Countries with German legal origin, which has stronger creditor rights,
have significantly weaker monetary policy transmission than countries with French legal
origin. A measure of overall institutional quality was also included in the investigation.
8The monetary policy impact measure is the maximum amplitude of output responses to an exogenous
increase in interest rates, in absolute value.
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The institutional quality variable was built as an average of law and order, corruption and
bureaucratic quality. The regression of monetary policy impact on institutional quality
provided evidence that institutional quality has a negative and statistically significant
effect on the strength of monetary policies, meaning that the effectiveness of monetary
policies diminishes with increases in institutional quality. However, institutional quality
becomes insignificant after the inclusion of recovery rates, meaning that institutional
quality does not have an independent impact on the effectiveness of monetary policies.
According to the authors, this can be interpreted as evidence that an improvement in
institutional quality may reduce the effectiveness of monetary policies only if this
improvement centers on increasing recovery rates. Despite including institutional quality
in the empirical tests, the study is based on a theoretical framework that describes the
effects of monetary policies on real variables in the presence of financial frictions.
Financial frictions, such as the cost of monitoring borrowers, affect the premium for
external funds and may have an impact on the effects of monetary policies. In this
research, institutional quality, and not financial frictions, is the ultimate explanation for
different degrees of monetary policy effectiveness. Another important difference is that
Aysun et al. (2013) does not differentiate between money expansions and money
contractions, as proposed by this dissertation.
Finally, Cecchetti (1999) provides empirical evidence that the transmission to
output of a positive interest rate shock is stronger in countries with less developed
financial structures than in countries with more developed financial structures, using the
quality of the legal system as an instrument for the financial structure variable. The author
builds a theory stating that the quality of the legal system determines the quality of
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investors’ protection and, consequently, the development of the financial system. Weaker
legal rules produce smaller capital markets and reduce the financial structure quality
(measured by the concentration and health of national banking systems). As a result, a
positive shock in interest rates will have a more negative effect on output in countries with
weaker legal systems because investors are more limited in terms of findings alternative
sources for funding investments and because the financial structure has less quality in
these countries than in countries with stronger legal systems. Using a sample of eleven
developed countries, the author estimates SVAR models including output, inflation,
interest rates and exchange rates. Impulse response functions are estimated to extract the
impact of a positive shock in interest rates on output. Finally, these impact measures are
regressed on a measure of financial structure quality, using three measures of legal quality
(shareholder rights, creditor rights and law enforcement) as instruments for financial
structure quality. One difference between Cecchetti (1999) and this research is that the
sample used in the first includes only developed countries and this research aims to use a
broader sample, including developing countries. The use of a broad sample is essential
because this study seems to be especially important for developing countries. Another
difference is that in this research the focus is on institutional quality, which includes also
the quality of the legal system but is not limited to it. Also, in this research poor
institutions may affect the effectiveness of monetary policies through more channels than
the ones mentioned in Cecchetti (1999), including the demand for investment, which will
reflect a reduced willingness to invest. Finally, in this research we make the fundamental
differentiation between money expansions and money contractions, a separation that does
not appear in Cecchetti (1999).
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4.5 Contributions of this Study
The previous subsection demonstrated that there is a theoretical and empirical literature
providing evidence that institutional development has a positive impact on economic
performance. In addition, there is a literature showing that institutions determine
macroeconomic variables as government spending, inflation and exchange rates. In Mihal
(2009) and Duncan (2011) institutions determine monetary policies. In the first,
corruption determines seigniorage and taxes. In the second paper, output movements
interact with institutional quality determining central bank discount rates.
This research has a strong association with the literature that poses institutional
development as a factor that changes the effectiveness of monetary policies. This is the
case of Hardt (2011), who claims that economies with low institutional development tend
to be investment constrained, a characteristic that alters the effectiveness of monetary
policies. However, the paper does not present any empirical evaluation. Mishra et al.
(2010) is another paper included in that literature. However, they investigate only whether
the transmission from central bank discount rates to bank lending rates is dependent upon
institutions. They do not investigate the effects on output and they do not study positive
and negative changes in interest rates separately.
Cecchetti (1999) and Aysun et al. (2013) are the only papers that somehow test
whether the effectiveness of monetary policies on output is dependent upon a measure of
institutional development. However, there are many reasons to believe that this research
will certainly move our understanding of the role played by institutional development in
the transmission of monetary policies forward.
First, as the most important contribution, we will test whether the effectiveness of
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monetary policies on output is dependent upon institutional development, considering
positive and negative changes in interest rates as two different phenomena. This
discrimination was never used in the literature on monetary policy and institutions and can
enhance the quality of our empirical results, given the evidence that monetary policies
have asymmetrical effects on output (Cover (1992), Rhee and Rich (1995), Garibaldi
(1997), Karras and Stokes (1999), among others), meaning that expansionary policies
have smaller and less statistically significant effects on output than contractionary
policies. This fundamental differentiation also appears in the motivational theory
presented in this research, which provides a unique perception of the role played by
institutional development in the transmission of expansionary and contractionary policies.
Hypothesis 2 of this dissertation states that monetary contractions have more
adverse effects on output in countries with low institutional development than in countries
with high institutional development. Hypothesis 3 of this dissertation states that monetary
expansions are more effective in terms of output promotion in countries with high
institutional development than in countries with low institutional development. These
hypotheses imply that the degree of asymmetry of monetary policies on output increases
with the worsening of the institutional development. Thus, as a very relevant contribution,
this dissertation provides a potential explanation for the asymmetric effects of monetary
policies on output: the degree of institutional development.
Second, we propose a panel methodology, which is appropriate for comparative
analysis across countries and for understanding the effects of common monetary policies,
as opposed to monetary shocks. In Cecchetti (1999) and Aysun et al. (2013) the empirical
tests are based on impulse response functions, being more appropriate to test the impact of
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monetary policy shocks rather than the impact of common monetary policies. In addition,
the time series methodology used in these two papers is also not very suitable for
comparative analysis across countries.
Third, we will test whether the effectiveness of monetary policies on output is
dependent upon institutional development using a larger sample of countries than the one
presented in Cecchetti (1999). Cecchetti’s paper studies only developed countries
(Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Denmark, Sweden, United
Kingdom and United States). This contribution is valuable because the question proposed
in this research is especially important for developing countries, where the lack of
institutional development may explain some monetary policy failures, for example. Thus,
the presence of emerging and developing economies in our sample is an important feature
of this research.
Fourth, a larger set of institutional development indicators is used in our empirical
analysis than in Aysun et al. (2013) and Cecchetti (1999). Aysun et al. (2013) uses in the
empirical analysis the countries’ legal origin and a measure of institutional quality built as
an average of law and order, corruption and bureaucratic quality and Cecchetti (1999)
focuses on the quality of the legal system. In this research, we will investigate separately
the effect on the strength of monetary policies of six aspects that characterize institutional
development: quality of the legal system, level of corruption, political stability,
government’s accountability and transparency, regulatory quality and government
effectiveness. This is an important contribution because it will indicate the specific
features of the institutional development that matter most for the effectiveness of
monetary policies.
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Fifth, we propose the development of a comprehensive theoretical framework. The
literature review showed that the theoretical framework presented in Cecchetti (1999) to
support his empirical evaluation is based on the idea that institutions determine the
financial structure quality, thus determining the effectiveness of monetary policies. His
theoretical framework is limited to explain how institutions affect the supply of financial
resources, not including the fact that low institutional development countries may be
investment constrained, as proposed by Rodrik and Subramanian (2009). On the contrary,
the theoretical framework presented in Hardt (2011) is limited to explain how institutions
affect the demand for financial resources. Finally, the theoretical framework presented in
Mishra et al. (2010) is the only one also expressed in terms of mathematical equations
with banks maximizing a profit function. The model shows that the optimal response in
bank lending rates after a change in central bank discount rates is a function of
institutional quality. However, the theoretical framework presented in Mishra et al. (2010)
is limited to explain how institutions affect the supply of financial resources. The
theoretical framework presented in Aysun et al. (2013) is focused on the role of financial
frictions rather than on the role of institutional development. We can realize that the
papers about monetary policy transmission and institutional development focus only on
the supply of financial resources or on the demand for financial resources, that is, they
focus on the financial constraints (Cecchetti (1999) and Mishra et al. (2010)) or on the
demand for investments (Hardt (2011)). These non-competing explanations will be put
together for the first time in a more complete theoretical framework proposed by this
research, that is, in this research we consider that institutions affect the supply and the
demand for financial resources.
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And finally, it is also relevant to mention that Cecchetti (1999) and Aysun et al.
(2013) are essentially monetary policy papers, without a clear association with the
institutional economics literature and its main authors (North, Acemoglu, Rodrik, among
others). This research, on the contrary, brings together the two strains of the literature,
institutional economics and monetary policy, making a contribution to both of them. In
Cecchetti (1999), a measure of monetary policy impact is regressed on a measure of
financial structure quality, using three measures of legal quality (shareholder rights,
creditor rights and law enforcement) as instruments for financial structure quality.
According to Rodrik (2004), a good econometric instrument does not provide a good
explanation, meaning that it is not appropriate to build a theory stating that the differences
in the dependent variable are explained by the differences in the instrumental variable.
This means the empirical analysis in Cecchetti (1999) does not evaluate the relationship
between institutions and monetary policies, being limited to evaluate the relationship
between the exogenous component of the financial structure and monetary policies. And
in Aysun et al. (2013), the theoretical focus is on the financial frictions (the cost of
monitoring borrowers or the bankruptcy recovery rate - the percentage of the value of a
loan that banks can recover when there is default) rather than on institutional development.
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5 Theoretical Framework
In this section we explain how some of the traditional channels of monetary policy
transmission can be altered by the level of institutional development. We present some
important definitions and detail which aspects of the institutional development matter for
monetary policy diffusion. Finally, we develop the three hypotheses that will be tested in
the following sections.
5.1 Some Definitions
First, we will follow North (1990) and define institutions as the formal and informal rules
that determine the incentives and constraints in a society, shaping human economic
behavior.
Second, institutional development is a measure that evaluates the quality of the
rules or the quality of incentives and constraints in a society. We will follow Kaufmann,
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (2010) and argue that the quality of the institutions in a society
depends on the following characteristics: the respect of citizens and the state for the
institutions that govern economic and social interactions, the capacity of government to
effectively formulate and implement sound policies, and how governments are selected,
monitored and replaced.
Thus, the level of institutional development increases with: the quality of contract
enforcement, the protection of property rights, the level of protection against the use of
public power for private gains, the government’s capability to implement sound policies
and regulations that promote private sector development, the citizens’ participation in
selecting the government, the government’s transparency and accountability, and the
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government’s stability.
Finally, in this study monetary policies will be represented by central bank
discount rates and, as a consequence, monetary policy transmission refers to the process
through which changes in central bank discount rates influence the real output.
The choice of an interest rate over some monetary aggregate as the instrument of
monetary policy finds support in the literature on monetary economics. According to
Friedman and Kuttner (2011), the idea that central banks make monetary policy through
the set of some interest rate is clear enough and broadly accepted. First, most central banks
abandoned the money growth targets, which were used mostly during the 1980s. Second,
differently from what is presented in conventional economics textbooks, Friedman and
Kuttner (2011) demonstrates that, currently, the practical set of short-term interest rates by
central banks involves little or no variation in the supply of reserves. This means that it is
the announcement effect and not the liquidity effect that matters most for the set of central
bank interest rates. In addition, Bernanke and Blinder (1992) concludes that the federal
funds rate is a better indicator of monetary policy and a better forecaster of real variables
than money growth rates for the United States. Finally, Ball (2011) states that most central
banks in emerging and advanced economies pay little attention to monetary aggregates.
The central bank discount rate is the rate at which the central banks lend or
discount eligible paper for deposit money banks. We select the central bank discount rate
as the relevant monetary policy instrument because, in general, the monetary authority has
direct control over this rate. The selection of the central bank discount rate as the
appropriate instrument of monetary policy applies both to the theoretical motivation in
this section and to the data choice in the empirical sections that follow.
27
5.2 Institutional Development and the Channels of Monetary Policy
Transmission
The institutional development of a country may change the effectiveness of monetary
policies due to its effect on the behavior of the agents involved in the macro economy.
These agents are mainly banks and investors and they respond in different ways to the
same policy, depending on the constraints imposed by the institutional environment. The
traditional channels of monetary transmission are described in Boivin, Kiley, and Mishkin
(2010). In this subsection, we identify which channels have a potential to be altered by the
institutional environment.
The interest-rate channel is the main channel of monetary policy transmission.
Interest rates affect the cost of capital and, as a consequence, investment spending. The
institutional environment may affect this channel because the investors’ responses to
changes in interest rates depend on the constraints imposed by the institutional
environment. Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) argues that the liberalization of capital
accounts and the consequent reduction in domestic interest rates have not been
contributing to output growth because many economies do not have an adequate demand
for investments. The authors claim that the low investment demand found in many
countries is the result of low private appropriability or low social returns. Poor
property-rights, weak contract enforcement, and fear of expropriation are among the
causes of low perceived returns of private investments by investors. As a consequence, the
expansion of financial resources does not promote an increase in investments and
economic growth.
Rodrik and Subramanian (2009) presents the case of El Salvador. The remittances
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received from abroad increased by 4 percent of GDP from 1994 to 2004. However,
investment declined 16 percent over the same period. The explanation proposed by the
authors is that El Salvador clearly was not a saving-constrained economy. On the contrary,
banks had to expand internationally in order to find clients to lend the excess of liquidity.
The country was an investment-constrained economy because the capital flows and the
decrease in interest rates did not stimulate the investment demand. Defining poor
institutions as rules whose outcomes are mainly weak contract enforcement and protection
of property rights, corruption, policies and regulations that do not promote private sector
development and government instability, thus, we can say that the low investment demand
in El Salvador was caused by the poor institutions found in this country.
An expansionary monetary policy, like an increase in the flow of capital that comes
from abroad, also raises the quantity of financial resources available in the economy. In
this research, we use Rodrik’s argument and claim that an expansionary monetary policy
will be less effective in terms of output promotion in countries with poor institutions than
in countries with better institutions. Nations with low institutional development, like El
Salvador, tend to be investment-constrained due to the low perceived returns of private
investments, thus an expansionary monetary policy will not necessarily increase the
demand for investments and the output.
The bank lending channel is also subject to institutional development interference.
According to this mechanism, an expansionary monetary policy increases the supply of
bank loans, increasing investment spending and output. A potential impact of the
institutional environment on this channel can be found in Mishra et al. (2010). The
authors explain that imperfect competition in the banking sector can change the
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effectiveness of this channel. The poor institutional development of a country may be
associated with poor regulatory quality, which can result in poor protection of markets’
competition. As a result, the market power of banks tends to be stimulated by weak
institutional environments, producing constraints in the supply of loans and higher interest
rates. The transmission of monetary policies through the bank lending channel will
depend on the institutional environment. A reduction in central bank discount rates may
be not effective in terms of growth promotion because this stimulus can be converted to
greater interest margins for the banking sector instead of being transmitted to the public.
The case of Guyana illustrates the potential role played by institutions in the bank
lending channel. Khemraj (2008) argues that the financial liberalization that started in
Guyana in 1989 did not produce growth because the banking sector operates in a
non-competitive way in that country, constraining investments. Guyana’s regulatory
quality indicator for the year 1996, the first year for which Kaufmann et al. (2010)
released The Worldwide Governance Indicators, is -0.19, in a scale that goes from -2.5 for
the weakest regulatory quality to 2.5 for the strongest regulatory quality. Thus, we claim
that there may exist a relationship between the relatively weak regulatory quality in
Guyana and the banking sector non-competitive behavior found in the country. As a
consequence, an expansionary monetary policy, as the financial liberalization that took
place in Guyana, may also not have the expected effects on growth due to the poor
institutions and the non-competitive banking sector behavior.
The balance sheet channel comes from the presence of asymmetric information in
credit markets. A contractionary monetary policy reduces the agents’ net worth,
increasing adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets. The increase in
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policy rates will be transmitted to the real economy through this channel because lenders
will be more reluctant to supply funds, increasing interest rates or reducing the supply of
loans. Mishra et al. (2010) explain that banks can constrain the supply of loans or set
higher lending interest rates due to the poor contract enforcement found in some
countries. As a result, we can say that the balance sheet channel may have different
intensities depending on the institutional environment.
Finally, La Porta, Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny (1997) provides evidence that
countries with poorer investor protection, due to the character of legal rules and the quality
of contract enforcement, have smaller capital markets (equity and debt markets) than
countries with stronger investor protection. According to the authors, French civil law
countries (Argentina, Brazil, Egypt, France, Greece, Italy, and Turkey, for example) have
the weakest investor protection and the least developed capital markets. English common
law countries (Australia, Canada, US, UK, South Africa, Singapore, and Malaysia, for
example) have the strongest investor protection and the most developed capital markets.
In addition, Cecchetti (1999) shows that an increase in interest rates has the smallest
impact on output in English common law countries and the biggest impact on output in
French and German civil law countries, establishing a relationship between the quality of
legal rules, the development of capital markets and the effectiveness of monetary policies.
As a result, we can say that an increase in central bank discount rates tends to have more
negative effects on output in countries with weaker institutional development because
firms are more bank-dependent in these countries, that is, they are more limited in terms of
finding alternative ways for capturing funds. Low institutional development seems to be
the ultimate explanation for the reduced development of capital markets.
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There is empirical support for the argument that, in general, countries with more
institutional development tend to rely relatively less on bank loans. Demirgüç-Kunt,
Feyen, and Levine (2011) suggests the financial structure ratio as the appropriate measure
to assess the relative importance of banks and securities markets in a country. The
financial structure ratio equals the private credit by deposit money banks divided by the
stock value traded9. We calculate the financial structure ratio proposed by Demirgüç-Kunt
et al. (2011) using the Financial Development and Structure Dataset from the World Bank
(Beck, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Levine (2000)). The variables private credit by deposit money
banks divided by GDP and stock market total value traded divided by GDP were used for
the year 2006. Data availability allows the calculation of the financial structure ratio for
105 countries. Finally, we calculate the correlation between the financial structure ratio
and the rule of law indicator (see table A.1 for a detailed description of this indicator)
provided by the Worldwide Governance Indicators from the World Bank for the year
2006. We find a correlation of -0.125410 between the two indicators, meaning that, in
general, the relative importance of banks with respect to securities decreases as the quality
of the legal framework increases11.
In addition, Roxburgh, Lund, and Piotrowski (2011) highlights that the absence of
private bond markets in developing countries is one of the reasons for the lower financial
9According to Demirgüç-Kunt et al. (2011), their empirical results suggest that the demand for the services
provided by securities markets increases relative to the demand for those provided by banks as economies
develop (economic development is measured by the real GDP per capita).
10This correlation was also calculated for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010: -0.0496 (year 2007, sample
of 95 countries), -0.0730 (year 2008, sample of 94 countries), -0.1074 (year 2009, sample of 90 countries)
and -0.1704 (year 2010, sample of 86 countries).
11The correlation between rule of law and private credit by deposit money banks divided by GDP is 0.7659
for the year 2006, including a sample of 171 countries. The correlation between rule of law and stock
market total value traded divided by GDP is 0.5098 for the year 2006, including a sample of 106 countries.
This means that both the private credit provided by banks and the securities markets increase relative to
the overall size of the economy as institutional development increases, even though, securities market
increases faster than banks market.
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depth found in these countries compared to developed countries. We use the Financial
Development and Structure Dataset from the World Bank (Beck et al. (2000)) to calculate
the ratio of private credit by deposit money banks to private bond market capitalization for
the year 2006, using the data available for 45 countries. Then, we calculate that the
correlation between this ratio and the rule of law indicator is -0.417112, meaning that, in
general, the relative importance of private bonds compared to bank loans increases with
institutional development13.
5.3 Which Aspects of the Institutional Development Matter for the
Transmission of Monetary Policies?
In the previous subsection we presented the channels of monetary policy transmission that
may be altered by the level of institutional development. After presenting a precise
definition of institutional development in the subsection 5.1, we are now able to specify
which institutions or which aspects of the institutional development affect monetary
policy diffusion.
First, the interest-rate channel is potentially altered by all aspects of the
institutional development. Weak contract enforcement and protection of property rights,
high levels of corruption, low government’s capability to implement sound policies,
reduced government’s transparency and accountability, and lack of political stability are
institutional characteristics that have a potential to reduce the willingness to invest,
12This correlation was also calculated for the years 2007, 2008, 2009 and 2010: -0.1809 (year 2007, sample
of 44 countries), -0.1926 (year 2008, sample of 43 countries), -0.1588 (year 2009, sample of 38 countries)
and -0.1516 (year 2010, sample of 39 countries).
13The correlation between private bond market capitalization divided by GDP and rule of law for a sample
of 45 countries for the year 2006 is 0.4554, meaning that private bond markets become larger relative to
the overall size of the economy as institutions develop.
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producing a more constrained demand for investments in countries with low institutional
development than in countries with high institutional development, as stated by Rodrik
and Subramanian (2009).
Second, the bank lending channel has a potential to be altered by the presence of
imperfect competition in the banking sector, which may be associated with poor
regulations, corruption and lack of government’s accountability and transparency. A weak
regulatory quality does not restrict the non-competitive behavior in the banking sector,
thus a decrease in central bank discount rates may not be transmitted to the lending rates.
If the weak regulatory quality is not a technical or administrative problem, then,
corruption can explain the poor regulatory quality and the prevalence of non-competitive
behavior. In this case, if the use of public power for private gains is favored by the lack of
government’s accountability and transparency, thus, these institutional features will also
play a role in the effectiveness of the bank lending channel.
Third, the intensity of the balance sheet channel depends on the respect of citizens
and the state for the rules that govern economic interactions. Low quality of contract
enforcement and weak protection of property rights will exacerbate adverse selection and
moral hazard problems in credit markets, pressuring bank lending rates up or constraining
the supply of loans after a contractionary monetary policy more than what would be
expected under a higher quality contract enforcement.
Finally, the development of capital markets will also depend on the respect of
citizens and the state for the rules that govern economic interactions. Weak property rights
or weak contract enforcement will shrink the development of these markets, reducing the
number of substitutes for bank loans and increasing the negative effects on output
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produced by an increase in interest rates.
In sum, all aspects of the institutional development may matter for the transmission
of monetary policies to real output.
5.4 Developing Hypotheses 1, 2 and 3
In this subsection we develop the three hypotheses that will be tested in the following
sections.
First, suppose there is an increase in central bank discount rates, which will be
transmitted to bank lending rates and then to the real output. Banks and investors are
involved in this process and will behave according to the constraints and incentives
imposed by institutions. In a first step, the increase in interest rates will increase adverse
selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets in low institutional development
countries and in high institutional development countries; however, these problems will be
exacerbated in low institutional development countries due to the weak contract
enforcement. As a consequence, banks will restrict the supply of credit or increase interest
rates more in these countries than would be expected under a stronger contract
enforcement14. The second step in the analysis of the transmission of contractionary
policies will incorporate the behavior of borrowers or investors. The lending rate set by
banks will now be transmitted to the public. Investors in countries with low institutional
development will have fewer substitutes for the banking loans due to the reduced
development of capital markets caused by weaknesses in the legal framework (La Porta et
14In addition, as explained in subsection 5.2, banks tend to have a non-competitive behavior in countries
with low institutional development. However, while banks with non-competitive behavior will not
transmit a decrease in central bank discount rates they will transmit an increase in central bank discount
rates. Thus, it is not clear that we can distinguish the behavior of banks in non-competitive environments
from the behavior of banks in more competitive environments for the case of an increase in discount rates.
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al. (1997)), being more affected by the increase in interest rates than investors in countries
with high institutional development. The two steps in the analysis of the transmission of
policy rates indicate that an increase in central bank discount rates will reduce the output
more in countries with low institutional development than in countries with high
institutional development.
Now, suppose there is a decrease in central bank discount rates. In the first step, the
decrease in central bank discount rates will be less transmitted to the bank lending rates in
a country with poor institutions than in a country with good regulatory quality and a more
competitive banking sector15. In the second step of the transmission, the decrease in bank
lending rates will be transmitted to the public. Investors tend to have a smaller willingness
to invest in low institutional development countries, thus the effectiveness of a decrease in
bank lending rates in terms of output promotion will be reduced in these countries16. The
15In theory, a decrease in interest rates reduces adverse selection and moral hazard problems and should
make banks reduce interest rates even more or increase the supply of loans. However, we will follow
Garibaldi (1997) and argue that in reality this simply does not happen. Banks will restrict the supply of
loans and increase interest rates when asymmetric information problems increase but they will not reduce
interest rates and expand the supply of loans when asymmetric information problems decrease. This idea
is associated with the phenomenon that prices exhibit downward rigidity. Then, banks have a higher
willingness to increase interest rates in response to an increase in adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. However, they do not have the same willingness to decrease interest rates in response to a
reduction in these problems. In sum, the balance sheet channel simply does not have a counterpart for
negative changes in interest rates, as explained by Garibaldi (1997) without differentiating countries by the
level of institutional development. Since the channel does not exist for a negative change in interest rates,
does not make sense to discuss whether it works in different ways for countries with different levels of
institutional development.
16About the role played by the development of capital markets, Kashyap, Lamont, and Stein (1994) found
that the investment of firms without access to public bond markets is significantly liquidity-constrained
during periods of contractionary policies. In contrast, these liquidity-constraints are absent in periods of
expansionary monetary policies. This evidence shows that for the purpose of this study the development
of capital markets matters most for the case of an increase in interest rates. Underdeveloped capital
markets bind the investments of bank-dependent firms (compared to the investments of firms that have
access to capital markets) in periods of contractionary monetary policies because these firms are not able
to use capital markets to capture financial resources. However, underdeveloped capital markets do not
bind the investments of bank-dependent firms (compared to the investments of firms that have access to
capital markets) in periods of expansionary monetary policies. Therefore, we claim that the effect of
capital markets in the transmission of monetary policies is dependent upon institutions only for the case of
a contractionary monetary policy. For the case of an expansionary policy, capital markets lose importance
for the bank-dependent firms, reducing the importance of institutional differences for this case.
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two steps in the analysis of the transmission of policy rates indicate that an expansionary
monetary policy will give less stimulus to the output in a low institutional development
country than in a high institutional development country. Figure 1 summarizes these
mechanisms.
This theoretical framework allows the development of three hypotheses. The first
one is that institutional development matters for the effects of monetary policies on real
output. The second one is that a contractionary policy reduces the output more in
countries with low institutional development than in countries with high institutional
development. Finally, the third hypothesis is that an expansionary policy stimulates the
output more in countries with high institutional development than in countries with low
institutional development.
Hypotheses two and three are in accordance with the literature providing empirical
evidence that institutional development has positive effects on output. If institutional
development affects economic performance through its impact on the effectiveness of
monetary policies, thus a decrease in interest rates stimulates more the output in a good
institutional environment than in a weak institutional environment. Also, an increase in
interest rates reduces the output more in a weak institutional environment than in a good
institutional environment. Low institutional development would work as a factor that
enhances the negative stimulus on output generated by economic policies and diminishes
the positive stimulus on output generated by economic policies. As a consequence, we can
see that our second and third hypotheses are consistent or, at least, do not contradict the
empirical evidence that more institutional quality is associated with better economic
performance.
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In addition, hypotheses two and three are in accordance with Ball and Mankiw’s
model of asymmetric price adjustment and economic fluctuations (Ball and Mankiw
(1994)). Rhee and Rich (1995) explains that Ball and Mankiw’s model implies that
monetary policy shocks have asymmetric effects on output and that the degree of
asymmetry increases with the average inflation. Increases in average inflation diminish the
real effects of expansionary monetary shocks and increase the real effects of
contractionary monetary shocks17. If we consider that, in general, countries with
relatively high inflation rates also have relatively low institutional development, then, the
results from Ball and Mankiw’s model are the same ones implied by our hypotheses two
and three. The difference is that in Ball and Mankiw’s model the asymmetric effects of
monetary policies increase with average inflation, while in this research, the asymmetric
effects of monetary policies increase with the worsening of the institutional development.
From the literature review, we remember that Acemoglu et al. (2003) argue that
macroeconomic issues like high inflation, for example, are symptoms of a poor
institutional environment. Acemoglu et al. (2003) conclude that the reduced growth in
countries with high inflation, large budget deficits and misaligned exchange rates is
ultimately caused by the poor institutional development and not by these macroeconomic
issues. Putting together the conclusions extracted from Rhee and Rich (1995) and
Acemoglu et al. (2003), we can realize that the hypotheses developed in this research
provide an alternative explanation for the asymmetric effects of monetary policies on
17According to Rhee and Rich (1995), the explanation for this result is that an expansionary monetary
shock, under a positive inflation rate, will lead to an increase in the firms’ desired real price and a decrease
in the firms’ actual relative price. As a consequence, the discrepancy between desired and actual prices
will make many firms adjust their prices, reducing the absolute impact on output. By contrast, a
contractionary monetary shock, under a positive inflation rate, will lead to a decrease in the firms’ desired
real price and a decrease in the firms’ actual relative price. Due to the smaller discrepancy between desired
and actual prices, fewer firms will adjust their prices, increasing the absolute impact on output.
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output and this explanation seems to be fine with the monetary policy literature and with
the institutional economics literature.
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6 Case Studies
This section presents two case studies that demonstrate institutional development as a
factor that changes the behavior of the economic agents and the effectiveness of monetary
policies. The case of Nigeria illustrates our third hypothesis and the case of Brazil
illustrates the second hypothesis of this dissertation.
6.1 The Case of Nigeria: Bank Lending Channel and Institutional
Development
According to The Worldwide Governance Indicators from The World Bank, Nigeria
scored -1.06 in control of corruption, -0.96 in government effectiveness, -0.89 in
regulatory quality and -1.11 in rule of law in the year 2006. The governance indicators go
from -2.5 to 2.5 and higher grades mean more institutional development (see table A.1 for
a detailed description of these indicators). Overall, Nigeria can be considered a country
with low institutional development. With respect to the financial system, Nigeria is
tremendously dominated by commercial banks, which account for about 90% of the
financial system assets and approximately two-thirds of total private sector credit
extension (Fomum (2011)). This means that capital markets have a reduced participation
in the Nigerian financial system.
By January 1st 2006, the banking consolidation process that occurred in Nigeria
was completed and the industry was reduced from the original 89 banks to 25 banks. In
order to achieve the minimum capitalization required by the reform, the banks were forced
to merge or stop activities. According to Soludo (2004), the banking consolidation’s
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objective is to ensure a diversified, strong and reliable banking sector with banks that will
guarantee the safety of depositors money, play an active role in the development of the
Nigerian economy, and be competent and competitive players in the African regional and
global financial system.
A. R. Sanusi (2010) measures the interest rate pass-through in Nigeria for the
period of 2002 to 2010. The lending rate pass-through at a time t is the ratio between the
percentage change in the lending rate between period 0 and period t and the percentage
change in the policy rate at period 0. A pass-through equal to one or close to one means
that the transmission from policy rates to lending rates is complete. A pass-through
smaller than one indicates an incomplete transmission process. The pass-through may also
be bigger than one, meaning that the change in lending rates overshoots the change in
policy rates. The study concludes that the interest rate pass-through in Nigeria is
incomplete and quite slow. More important, it provides empirical evidence that the
pass-through from monetary policy rate to retail lending rate declined in comparison with
the pre-consolidation period (2002-2005), an indication that the reform failed to eliminate
the distortions in the retail loans market.
Fomum (2011) also provides evidence that the pass-through from policy rates to
lending rates was substantially reduced after the banking consolidation. The investigation
covers the period from 1990 to 2010 and shows that the long-run pass-through declined
from an average of 0.90 in the pre-consolidation era to an average of 0.70 in the
post-consolidation era.
Still on the outcomes of the banking consolidation, Siyanbola (2012) presents
evidence that the consolidation has not reduced lending rates. In addition, it seems that the
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reform has not fully eliminated the existence of family banks and neither improved
corporate governance in Nigerian banking system. As an example of poor corporate
governance after consolidation, the author mentions the existence of insider related
lending, which is motivated by the lack of transparency and the pervasive influence of
family and related party affiliation.
Figure 2 presents the evolution of monthly discount and lending rates in Nigeria
from January 2004 to December 2009. The series are from the International Financial
Statistics of the International Monetary Fund (IFS-IMF) and are in percent per annum.
The Central Bank of Nigeria conducted an overall expansionary monetary policy,
reducing discount rates from 15% in January 2004 to 6% in December 2009. In the
pre-consolidation era (January/2004 to December/2005) the lending rates seem to
accompany the decrease in discount rates. Over this period, discount rates decreased from
15% to 13% (growth rate = -13.3%) and lending rates decreased from 19.5% to 17.8%
(growth rate = -8.7%). In the post-consolidation era that started in January 2006, it is
apparent that lending rates are no longer following the decreasing path of discount rates.
From January 2006 to December 2009, discount rates decreased from 13% to 6% (growth
rate = -53.8%) and lending rates increased from 16.7% to 19% (growth rate = 13.7%).
The simple analysis of the evolution of lending and discount rates in Nigeria seems to
support the evidence provided by other studies that indicates that the banking
consolidation was not successful in terms of increasing the transmission of discount rate
reductions to lending rates.
Delis (2012) provides important insights on the outcomes of the Nigerian financial
reform. The research uses a panel analysis including 84 countries to study the effect of
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Figure 2 Evolution of Nigerian Lending and Discount Rates (percent per
annum)
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financial reforms and institutional quality on banking competition. Financial reforms are
policy changes that aim to enhance competition and efficiency in the banking sector and
they are measured by an index of financial liberalization. Institutional development is
measured by the level of transparency (corruption), the quality of the legal system and the
bureaucratic quality. Banking competition is measured by the banks’ market power, which
depends on the elasticity of profits to marginal cost. The empirical results indicate that the
effect of financial liberalization on banks’ market power depends on the level of overall
institutional quality of the country, more specifically; financial reforms reduce banks’
market power more in countries with good institutional development than in countries
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with weak institutional development. Delis (2012) also claims that a concentrated banking
system does not imply a non-competitive banking system if institutions are strong. First,
the research provides evidence that financial liberalization increases banking
concentration. This phenomenon is due to the mergers and acquisitions that occur with the
liberalization policies. Second, the research provides evidence that banking concentration
increases banks’ market power only in low-income countries. A higher banking
concentration in well-developed countries does not imply a significantly higher market
power for banks. According to Delis (2012), the consequence of this result is that mergers
and acquisitions in countries where institutions are relatively weak might lead to
monopolistic outcomes. The main policy implication of the research is that a certain level
of institutional development is a precondition for the success of financial reforms that
intend to improve competition and efficiency in the banking industry.
Following the insights provided by Delis (2012), it may be the case that the
banking consolidation in Nigeria accompanied by the low institutional development of
this country stimulated a non-competitive behavior in the banking sector. Alternatively,
some studies also mention the problem of poor corporate governance in the Nigerian
post-consolidation era. S. L. Sanusi (2010) claims that the consolidation failed to
overcome the corporate governance weakness in many of the banks, which commonly
engage in unethical and fraudulent business practices. The author cites the case of CEOs
who lent money to themselves for stock price manipulation, the case of the bank that set
up 100 fake companies for the purpose of perpetrating fraud, among other cases. The
author also mentions that a lot of the capital supposedly raised to achieve the
capitalization requirements imposed by the consolidation reform was actually fake capital
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financed by depositors’ funds. Ebimobowei and Sophia (2011) also argue that
consolidation did not enhance corporate governance and highlight the necessity of
minimizing fraud, corruption and insiders abuse in the banking industry.
A financial reform that reduces the number of banks will not necessarily result in a
less competitive banking sector. As evidenced by Delis (2012), the outcome of this reform
in terms of competition will depend on the level of institutional development. The lack of
good regulatory quality and the inability to identify and punish anticompetitive behavior
in the industry, for example, may promote a non-competitive environment. The low scores
in the governance indicators and the empirical evidence on the outcomes of the
consolidation reform indicate that this may be the Nigerian case. A. R. Sanusi (2010) and
Fomum (2011) provide evidence that the pass-through from policy rates to lending
decreased after the banking consolidation and Siyanbola (2012) provides evidence that the
lending rates were not reduced in the post-consolidation era. It is also important to note
that the post-consolidation era was characterized by an overall expansionary monetary
policy, with significant reductions in the central bank discount rate. Alternatively, the poor
corporate governance in the financial sector stimulated by the weak rule of law and weak
regulatory quality may also play a role in the outcomes of the Nigerian banking
consolidation. The institutional environment works as a factor that changes the behavior
of the agents and, as a consequence, the effectiveness of economic policies. It seems that
reductions in central bank discount rates tend to be weakly transmitted to lending rates in
Nigeria, especially after the 2006 reform, causing expansionary policies to be less
effective in terms of output promotion. This phenomenon seems to have deep institutional
causes. In conclusion, the Nigerian case illustrates well the hypothesis that a monetary
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expansion will be less effective in terms of output promotion in countries with low
institutional development than in countries with high institutional development.
6.2 The Case of Brazil: Balance Sheet Channel and Institutional
Development
According to The Worldwide Governance Indicators from The World Bank, Brazil scored
0.013 in rule of law in the year 2011. As described in Kaufmann et al. (2010), the rule of
law indicator reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and
abide by the rules of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement,
property rights, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence.
The indicator goes from -2.5 to 2.5 and higher grades mean more institutional
development. Overall, Brazil can be considered a country with low/middle institutional
development.
According to the central bank of Brazil, the Brazilian credit market is characterized
by high costs and reduced supply of funds. Fachada, Figueiredo, and Lundberg (2003) in
a research conducted by the central bank of Brazil state that the high spreads and the
reduced credit supply are explained by the high banking default rates, the bad quality of
contractual guarantees and the high costs and slowness of credit recovery through judicial
means. On average, the recovery of non-paid debts through the judicial system takes from
20 to 37 months, depending on the kind of contractual guarantee18. After the subtraction
of judicial expenses, it is estimated that the lender recovers around 24.1% of the principal
amount, considering a debt of R$50,000 (approximately US$25,000)19. Banco Central do
18Result estimated for the year 2001
19The calculation considers all sorts of judicial expenses and an inter-temporal discount rate of 20% per
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Brasil (2002) in Fachada et al. (2003) also estimates that the banking default rate is
responsible for approximately 17% of the banking spread in the country20. This means
that, everything else constant, if the default rates were reduced to zero or the judicial
system provided certainty with respect to the recovery of non-paid debts, the banking
spread would be reduced by approximately seven percentage points.
Pinheiro and Cabral (1999) detail the process to recover a loan in Brazil when the
borrower defaults. The legal procedures are perceived to be excessively burdensome and
to allow many ways of postponing a decision, creating a strong incentive for debtors to
default. In general, the legal debt recovery process is costly (it is not worth to apply for a
legal recovery for a small loan) and slow (the entire recovery process may take between
one and ten years). Using data from 1988 to 1997, the research tests whether the judicial
performance (slowness, fairness and costs of the judiciary) explains the differences in the
size of credit markets across Brazilian states. The legislation protecting creditor rights is
the same throughout the country, but there is a lack of uniformity in the quality of judicial
enforcement across the states. They found out that the lack of proper judicial enforcement
significantly reduces the ratio of credit to GDP, even after controlling for the level of per
capita income in each state.
According to Beck (2000), the high degree of discretionary power for judges and
the possibility of several levels of appeal up to the highest courts undermine efficient
contract enforcement and impair the resolution of credit disputes in Brazilian courts.
Using cross-country data, the study shows that contract enforceability has a statistically
significant and economically large impact on the level of private credit. The research
year. Result estimated for the year 2001
20Result estimated for the year 2002
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estimates that if Brazil had achieved the average quality of contract enforcement found in
OECD countries, private credit as a share of GDP would have been more than twice as
high (55% instead of 25%) over the period 1980-95. In addition, Demirgüç-Kunt and
Huizinga (1999) in Beck (2000) estimates that if Brazil had achieved the average quality
of contract enforcement found in OECD countries, net interest margins could have
declined by 3.5 percentage points, a 40 percent reduction from the average margin of 8.9
percent over the period 1988-95.
It is apparent that the weak contract enforcement in Brazil works as a factor that
intensifies adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets, reducing the
volume of credit and increasing its cost. With respect to the transmission of monetary
policies, some studies have provided evidence that money contractions increase banking
spread in Brazil, that is; lending rates increases overshoot the increases in central bank
discount rates. Souza-Sobrinho (2003) uses a time-series analysis to study the response of
financial markets to monetary policies in Brazil from 1996 to 2001. The research provides
evidence that banks reduce the quantity of loans and increase the quantity of government
bonds in their assets after a money contraction. In addition, banking spread increases in
response to an increase in policy rates. All these conclusions are confirmed by Denardin
and Balbinotto Neto (2007) in a time-series analysis of the Brazilian economy for the
period 1996-2007. And finally, Manhiça and Jorge (2012) uses a panel composed by 140
banks operating in Brazil for the years 2000 to 2010 and provides evidence that banking
spread increases with central bank discount rates.
As previously mentioned, Fachada et al. (2003) and Demirgüç-Kunt and Huizinga
(1999) in Beck (2000) establish a negative relationship between the quality of the legal
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system and banking spread in Brazil. Cross-country studies have also demonstrated this
same negative relationship. Laeven and Majnoni (2005) conducts a panel analysis with
106 countries at the country level and 32 countries at the level of individual banks. The
study found out that better judicial efficiency is associated with considerably smaller
banking spreads21. Thus, the fact that lending rate increases overshoot the increases in
policy rates in Brazil may, at least partially, be explained by the weak rule of law found in
the country. The weak rule of law would work as a factor that exacerbates the effect of an
increase in policy rates on lending rates, intensifying the adverse effects of monetary
contractions on output. Then, the case of Brazil seems to illustrate well the hypothesis two
of this dissertation, which states that monetary contractions will have more adverse effects
on output in countries with low institutional development than in countries with high
institutional development.
21One standard deviation improvement in judicial efficiency is estimated to reduce banking spreads in about
2.3-2.6% points.
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7 Data
The main macroeconomic variables included in this research are the seasonally adjusted
growth rate of real GDP and the growth rate of central bank discount rates22. These
variables have quarterly frequency, going from the first quarter of 2002 to the fourth
quarter of 2011. The raw series used to build these variables were extracted from the
International Financial Statistics (IFS) of the International Monetary Fund (International
Monetary Fund (2012)).
We have only 52 countries in our sample because many low development countries
do not have quarterly GDP data. We could have a much bigger sample of countries using
annual data; however, for the purposes of this study we consider that it is essential to use a
higher frequency data. Interest rates have short-run effects on output, and these effects
could be missed using annual data. Even though, our sample of countries comprises a
wide variety of institutional development levels. According to the IMF’s definition, our
sample contains 30 advanced economies and 22 emerging and developing economies. The
advanced economies included in our sample are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada,
China (Hong Kong), Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany,
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway,
Portugal, Republic of Korea, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland,
United Kingdom and United States. The emerging and developing economies included in
our sample are: Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Bulgaria, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia,
22The Euro area discount rate was used for member countries after their inclusion in the area. Austria,
Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal and Spain had Euro area
discount rates used for the whole sample period. Cyprus and Malta had Euro area rates used from the first
quarter of 2008 to the fourth quarter of 2011. Slovenia had Euro area values used from the first quarter of
2007 to the fourth quarter of 2011 and Slovak Republic from first quarter of 2009 to the fourth quarter of
2011.
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Egypt, Hungary, Indonesia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Malaysia, Peru, Philippines,
Poland, Russian Federation, South Africa, Thailand, Turkey and Ukraine.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators from World Bank are used as measures of
institutional development (Kaufmann et al. (2010)). There are six indicators available at
annual frequency from 1996 to 201123: voice and accountability; political stability and
absence of violence/terrorism; government effectiveness; regulatory quality; rule of law,
and control of corruption. Table A.1 details these indicators. Each country receives for
each indicator a grade that goes from approximately -2.5 to 2.5. Higher grades indicate
higher institutional development. Table A.2 presents the countries included in our sample
and their average values over the 2002-2011 years for the six institutional development
indicators.
The Worldwide Governance Indicators are perception-based indicators, as opposed
to facts-based indicators. The facts-based indicators reflect formal de jure institutions,
while the perception-based indicators reflect the de facto institutions. According to Arndt
and Oman (2006), perception-based indicators, which often include informal and
unwritten institutions, determine much more the true quality of governance in a country
than facts-based indicators. In this study, we argue that institutions determine the behavior
of banks and investors. These agents will behave according to their perception of the
actual incentives and constraints in a society. Thus, the perception-based Worldwide
Governance Indicators are in accordance with the purposes of this research. In addition,
Arndt and Oman (2006) states that the Worldwide Governance Indicators are probably the
most carefully constructed governance indicators. Finally, the Worldwide Governance
Indicators obviously satisfy our underlying concepts because both of them, the indicators
23They are not available for the years 1997, 1999 and 2001.
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and our concepts, are based on the theoretical definition of institutional quality proposed
by Kaufmann et al. (2010). As detailed in the subsection 5.3, all aspects of our concept of
institutional development may affect the transmission of monetary policies, thus, all six
Worldwide Governance Indicators will be used in our empirical evaluation.
Finally, the data presented in this section is summarized in tables A.3 and A.4 and
will be used in a panel analysis. This research aims to test whether the effectiveness of
monetary policies is dependent upon institutional development. A time-series analysis
would not be appropriate to answer this question because institutions in a given country
change incrementally and slowly, as stated by North (1990). Since our sample of countries
embrace a wide variety of institutional development levels, the comparison across
countries that we propose in this research seems to very appropriate for the purposes of
this study.
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8 Evaluation of Hypothesis 1
This section presents an econometric evaluation of hypothesis 1, which states that the
effect of changes in central bank discount rates on real output is altered by the institutional
quality (regulatory quality, rule of law, control of corruption, political stability, voice and
accountability and government effectiveness). This hypothesis will be tested through the
estimation of the following linear panel data model using fixed-effects method:
gyi,t =
J
∑
j=1
γ jgyi,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
φ jgdisci,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
Θ jinsti,t− jgdisci,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
τ jinsti,t− j+
δ trendt +Z
′
i,tv+ui,t (1)
The variable gyi,t is the seasonally adjusted growth rate of real GDP in percentage
points for each country i at each time period t. The variable gyi,t− j is the j-th lag of the
growth rate of real GDP for country i. The variable gdisci,t− j is the j-th lag of the growth
rate of central bank discount rate in percentage points for country i. The variable insti,t− j
is the j-th lag of one of the six measures of institutional development. The variable
insti,t− jgdisci,t− j is the interaction term between the j-th lag of one of the six measures of
institutional development and the j-th lag of the growth rate of central bank discount rate.
The variable trendt is a linear trend in time. Z
′
i,t is a vector of control variables. Finally,
ui,t = αi + εi,t , where αi is modeled as fixed-effects and εi,t is the idiosyncratic error.
Other studies have also used panel analysis to investigate whether the effectiveness
of monetary policies is differential by some relevant economic variable. Karras (1999)
and Karras (2001) make use of panel analysis to evaluate whether the effect of monetary
54
policies on output is dependent upon trade openness. The two studies employ a panel data
model assuming fixed-effects. Karras (1999) uses a sample of 38 countries and annual
data from the 1953-1990 period (T=38). Karras (2001) uses a sample of 8 countries and
quarterly data from the 1960-1993 period (T=136). Similarly to this section, these studies
do not differentiate between expansionary and contractionary monetary policies.
In this research, we will follow Cecchetti (1999) and Aysun et al. (2013) and treat
institutional development as an exogenous variable. Cecchetti (1999) runs SVAR models
to estimate the impact of a positive shock in interest rates on output. In a second step,
these impact measures are regressed on financial structure quality, using three measures of
legal quality (shareholder rights, creditor rights and law enforcement) as instruments for
financial structure quality. Thus, Cecchetti (1999) assumes that institutional quality is
exogenous to monetary policy effectiveness. Aysun et al. (2013) runs a measure of
monetary policy effectiveness on legal origin and institutional quality, assuming that these
last two variables are exogenous. Aysun et al. (2013) argues that the potential endogeneity
arising from reverse causality would be mitigated if the explanatory variable in question
was mostly time invariant or if cross-country differences were stable. In general, this is
the case of institutional factors. In addition, in this research only lagged values of discount
rate growth and institutional development will be included in all regressions.
Contemporaneous values of these variables will not be included in order to mitigate a
potential simultaneity bias that may arise if discount rates and institutional development
depend on real GDP growth.
Since the institutional development indicators are available at an annual frequency,
we are assuming that they are constant over the quarters inside each year. In addition, we
55
will run one regression for each institutional development measure. As explained by
Arndt and Oman (2006), it is not recommended to aggregate the indicators in order to
produce an overall governance index. The authors explain the reason giving the example
of China and India. The two countries have similar scores if one looks at an index
aggregating the six indicators for the year 2004. However, China has a relatively high
score in government effectiveness and a relatively low score in voice and accountability,
while India scores in the middle on both indicators. Thus, the aggregate index hides
important differences between the two countries, providing no meaningful overall
indicator of governance in terms of comparing two different countries. Also, empirically
determine which aspects of the institutional development are more relevant for the
effectiveness of monetary policies is one of the objectives of this research. Such empirical
verification may have important policy implications, indicating the specific institutional
improvements that would be more fundamental.
The total effect of a permanent one percent increase in discount rates on real GDP
growth will be given by:
(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. We want to test
our first hypothesis that institutional development matters for the transmission of monetary
policies from central bank discount rates to real output. This hypothesis is not rejected
whenever this total effect is significant, relevant in size and considerably dependent on the
level of institutional development. More specifically, we will consider that our first
hypothesis holds whenever
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is significant at the 5% level.
For simplicity, we assume that J in equation 1 is the same for all variables included
in the model. Also, there is no theoretical consensus on the value of J, that is, there is no
consensus on how long does it take for a full transmission of a monetary policy to output.
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Then, the AIC criterion was used to select the most appropriate value for J. The
fixed-effects model described by equation 1 was estimated assuming J=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7
and 8. No additional controls were included. Table A.5 describes that we should prefer the
model with 5 lags for regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability and
government effectiveness. For the models using the indicators control of corruption and
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism, the specification with 8 lags should
be preferred.
Table 1 presents fixed-effects regressions for each one of the six institutional
development indicators. For each model, the choice of J is based on the AIC criterion.
Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are presented for the coefficient estimates. These
standard errors are robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and
cross-sectionally dependent. Cameron and Trivedi (2010) explains that Driscoll and Kraay
standard errors are appropriate for long panels, which is the case of our cross-country
macroeconomic dataset.
Table 1 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors -
Evaluating Hypothesis 1
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0867 0.0939 0.0741 0.0904 0.0905 0.0905
(0.113) (0.107) (0.106) (0.113) (0.114) (0.112)
gy2 0.176* 0.164* 0.150* 0.178* 0.178* 0.179*
(0.0417) (0.0434) (0.0445) (0.0435) (0.0420) (0.0426)
gy3 -0.0573* -0.0397 -0.0516 -0.0567* -0.0562* -0.0557*
(0.0234) (0.0287) (0.0332) (0.0228) (0.0226) (0.0232)
gy4 -0.0713 -0.111* -0.123* -0.0701 -0.0727 -0.0712
(0.0453) (0.0545) (0.0541) (0.0465) (0.0461) (0.0453)
gy5 0.114* 0.0828 0.0724 0.112* 0.111* 0.113*
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(0.0515) (0.0494) (0.0497) (0.0518) (0.0499) (0.0512)
gy6 0.0000584 -0.00913
(0.0304) (0.0329)
gy7 -0.0305 -0.0336
(0.0651) (0.0642)
gy8 -0.189* -0.191*
(0.0420) (0.0404)
gdisc1 -0.00565 0.00198 0.00382 0.000966 0.0000487 -0.00108
(0.00533) (0.00296) (0.00244) (0.00361) (0.00345) (0.00387)
gdisc2 -0.0135* -0.0127+ -0.00823* -0.0118+ -0.0169* -0.0122+
(0.00644) (0.00667) (0.00401) (0.00624) (0.00723) (0.00698)
gdisc3 -0.00734 -0.00517 -0.00640+ -0.00597 -0.00395 -0.00612
(0.00552) (0.00392) (0.00321) (0.00424) (0.00522) (0.00467)
gdisc4 -0.00146 0.00605 0.00218 0.000382 0.000691 0.000290
(0.00624) (0.00555) (0.00396) (0.00512) (0.00576) (0.00542)
gdisc5 -0.00847 -0.00495 -0.00362 -0.00802+ -0.0100+ -0.00828+
(0.00532) (0.00479) (0.00355) (0.00440) (0.00554) (0.00480)
gdisc6 -0.000373 -0.00132
(0.00239) (0.00190)
gdisc7 0.00155 0.000165
(0.00328) (0.00225)
gdisc8 -0.000695 -0.00371+
(0.00296) (0.00188)
inst1∗gdisc1 0.0122* 0.00551* 0.00918* 0.00723* 0.00936* 0.00812*
(0.00418) (0.00179) (0.00334) (0.00271) (0.00360) (0.00279)
inst2∗gdisc2 0.00484 0.00294 -0.000284 0.00364 0.00946* 0.00364
(0.00304) (0.00241) (0.00266) (0.00248) (0.00355) (0.00307)
inst3∗gdisc3 0.00196 0.000519 0.000802 0.000841 -0.00130 0.000940
(0.00369) (0.00223) (0.00330) (0.00260) (0.00428) (0.00282)
inst4∗gdisc4 0.000497 -0.00409 -0.00218 -0.000769 -0.00146 -0.000699
(0.00397) (0.00301) (0.00354) (0.00319) (0.00470) (0.00309)
inst5∗gdisc5 0.00231 0.00222 0.00294 0.00220 0.00489 0.00218
(0.00294) (0.00247) (0.00327) (0.00220) (0.00458) (0.00243)
inst6∗gdisc6 -0.000156 0.000475
(0.00224) (0.00303)
inst7∗gdisc7 -0.00143 -0.00223
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(0.00206) (0.00282)
inst8∗gdisc8 -0.00210+ -0.00146
(0.00120) (0.00175)
inst1 -0.425 0.206 1.349* -0.804 -1.354* -0.222
(0.633) (0.519) (0.387) (0.925) (0.572) (0.424)
inst2 1.259 0.650 -0.912+ 1.712 2.053+ 0.445
(0.949) (0.790) (0.511) (1.042) (1.194) (0.633)
inst3 -0.168 -0.0974 0.671 -1.440 -0.991 0.238
(0.687) (0.620) (0.658) (1.101) (1.092) (0.471)
inst4 -0.446 1.259* 0.689 0.0759 0.355 -0.273
(0.741) (0.600) (0.612) (1.193) (1.033) (0.537)
inst5 -0.275 -2.859* -1.128 0.499 0.272 0.230
(0.604) (0.783) (0.898) (1.229) (0.970) (0.486)
inst6 2.268* 0.781+
(0.864) (0.452)
inst7 -0.464 -0.133
(1.000) (0.333)
inst8 -0.478 -0.745*
(0.411) (0.350)
trend -0.0245* -0.0366* -0.0454* -0.0246* -0.0242* -0.0238*
(0.00829) (0.0113) (0.0123) (0.00829) (0.00839) (0.00822)
Constant 1.082* 1.150* 1.613* 0.999+ 0.755+ 0.617+
(0.362) (0.254) (0.327) (0.543) (0.385) (0.335)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0364 -0.0143 -0.0171 -0.0245 -0.0302 -0.0274
[0.0204] [0.226] [0.0214] [0.0429] [0.0120] [0.0451]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0218 0.00341 0.00724 0.0131 0.0210 0.0142
[0.00702] [0.502] [0.0522] [0.0212] [0.00570] [0.0345]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.248 -0.0294 -0.112 0.254 0.251 0.255
[0.0701] [0.848] [0.489] [0.0630] [0.0568] [0.0593]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0484 -0.0139 -0.0154 -0.0328 -0.0403 -0.0368
[0.063] [0.197] [0.012] [0.096] [0.039] [0.102]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0290 0.00331 0.00652 0.0176 0.0280 0.0190
[0.042] [0.500] [0.077] [0.071] [0.025] [0.095]
N 1769 1610 1610 1769 1769 1769
within R2 0.1210 0.1640 0.1709 0.1174 0.1204 0.1171
Results estimated for equation 1. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 1. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
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control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of
law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic
trend was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and
Kraay standard errors.
Table 1 provides evidence that regulatory quality and voice and accountability
matter for the effectiveness of monetary policies. The conclusion is based on the total
effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term between institutional
development and discount rates,
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, which is significant at the
5% level for these two indicators. In addition, the total effect of the central bank discount
rate coefficients,
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the 5% level for
voice and accountability and at the 10% level for regulatory quality.
Table 1 shows that the effect of monetary policies is dependent upon institutions,
supporting hypothesis 1 of this dissertation. In addition, the sign of the coefficients
indicates that an increase in central bank discount rates has more adverse effects on
economic growth under weaker institutional environments than under stronger
institutional environments. As expected, positive changes in interest rates are driving the
results presented in table 1, making them also consistent with our second hypothesis
(contractionary policies reduce the output more in countries with low institutional
development than in countries with high institutional development). There is a significant
amount of literature on monetary policy transmission providing evidence that increases in
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interest rates reduce the output more than decreases in interest rates raise it24. Since the
effect of positive changes in interest rates is bigger than the effect of negative changes in
interest rates, the regression results are probably driven by the positive changes in interest
rates and are consistent with our first and second hypotheses.
It is also interesting to present the estimated total effect of a permanent one percent
increase in discount rates on real GDP growth,(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, and its standard error at specific levels of
insti,t− j. Table 2 presents the total effect of an increase in discount rates on real GDP
growth for several different levels of institutional development. The results are derived
from the regressions presented in table 1.
Table 2 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional Development -
Fixed-Effects Regressions - Evaluating Hypothesis 1
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov
−2 -0.0284*
(0.0111)
−1.5 -0.0252*
(0.00959)
−1 -0.0774+ -0.0172 -0.0219* -0.0504+ -0.0683* -0.0559+
(0.0393) (0.0152) (0.00815) (0.0287) (0.0309) (0.0331)
−0.5 -0.0629+ -0.0155 -0.0187* -0.0416+ -0.0543* -0.0463+
(0.0324) (0.0129) (0.00688) (0.0240) (0.0249) (0.0276)
0 -0.0484+ -0.0139 -0.0154* -0.0328+ -0.0403* -0.0368
(0.0255) (0.0106) (0.00589) (0.0194) (0.0190) (0.0221)
0.5 -0.0339+ -0.0122 -0.0121* -0.0240 -0.0263+ -0.0273
(0.0187) (0.00846) (0.00536) (0.0147) (0.0133) (0.0167)
24One of the reasons is that prices are less flexible downward than upward. Another reason is that some
monetary policy transmission channels work only for positive interest rate changes or for negative interest
rate changes. This is the case of channels based on asymmetric information, for example. Due to
asymmetric information, an increase in interest rates increases adverse selection and moral hazard
problems. There is no counterpart for a decrease in interest rates.
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1 -0.0194 -0.0106 -0.00888 -0.0152 -0.0123 -0.0178
(0.0120) (0.00653) (0.00540) (0.0103) (0.00803) (0.0114)
1.5 -0.00488 -0.00891+ -0.00562 -0.00638 0.00167 -0.00827
(0.00607) (0.00505) (0.00601) (0.00624) (0.00513) (0.00667)
2 0.00963+ -0.00725 0.00243 0.0157+ 0.00124
(0.00503) (0.00449) (0.00427) (0.00786) (0.00459)
N 1769 1610 1610 1769 1769 1769
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at
different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived from table 1 (equation 1).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Table 2 illustrates the evidence presented in table 1, showing that institutions
matter for the effectiveness of monetary policies and that an increase in central bank
discount rates has more adverse effects on economic growth under weaker institutional
environments than under stronger institutional environments. Table 2 demonstrates that,
for example, a ten percent increase in central bank discount rates would produce an
average decrease of 0.68 percentage points in the quarterly real GDP growth for a country
with average voice and accountability equal to -1. On the other hand, a ten percent
increase in central bank discount rates would produce an average decrease of 0.40
percentage points in the quarterly real GDP growth for a country with average voice and
accountability equal to 0 and a decrease not significantly different than zero for a country
with average voice and accountability equal to 1. The average discount rate in our sample
is 5.8 percent, then, a ten percent increase in central bank discount rates means that the
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average discount rate would increase from 5.8 percent to 6.4 percent25. The average real
GDP growth per quarter in our sample is 0.7 percent, or 2.8 percent per year. Assuming
this initial output growth rate, the increase in interest rates would reduce the GDP growth
from 0.7 percent per quarter (2.8 percent per year) to 0.02 percent per quarter (0.08
percent per year) in the country with voice and accountability equal to -1. On the other
hand, the increase in interest rates would reduce the GDP growth from 0.7 percent per
quarter (2.8 percent per year) to 0.30 percent per quarter (1.2 percent per year) in the
country with voice and accountability equal to 0. And finally, the GDP growth would be
unaffected in a country with voice and accountability equal to 1. These results are in
accordance with the first and second hypotheses of this research.
As a robustness check, J lags of the variable openness and its interaction with
growth rate of central bank discount rates are included in the previous regressions. Karras
(1999) and Karras (2001) provide empirical evidence that the more open the economy, the
smaller the effects of monetary policies on output 26. Since there is a positive correlation
between institutional development and openness 27, our first results may be capturing the
effects of openness instead of the relevance of the institutional indicators. The estimated
results are displayed in Table 3. The variable openness is the same one used by Karras
(1999) and Karras (2001), defined as the sum of imports and exports as a fraction of GDP,
as detailed in the table A.3.
25An one percent increase in discount rates means that the average discount rate would increase from 5.8
percent to 5.86 percent. This increase is irrelevant in size, explaining why we use a ten percent increase in
our analysis.
26According to Karras (1999), in the case of a monetary expansion, for example, the currency depreciation
will increase more prices and wages and less the output, the more open the economy.
27Correlations between openness and the institutional indicators: 0.24 (regulatory quality); 0.11 (control of
corruption); 0.28 (political stability); 0.16 (rule of law); 0.0017 (voice and accountability) and 0.18
(government effectiveness).
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Table 3 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors - with
Openness - Evaluating Hypothesis 1
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0844 0.0904 0.0724 0.0902 0.0880 0.0903
(0.112) (0.103) (0.102) (0.113) (0.113) (0.112)
gy2 0.173* 0.167* 0.153* 0.174* 0.174* 0.174*
(0.0424) (0.0456) (0.0469) (0.0451) (0.0434) (0.0440)
gy3 -0.0517* -0.0124 -0.0217 -0.0498* -0.0481* -0.0493*
(0.0199) (0.0238) (0.0255) (0.0190) (0.0195) (0.0194)
gy4 -0.0663 -0.104+ -0.114* -0.0652 -0.0667 -0.0669
(0.0419) (0.0525) (0.0515) (0.0450) (0.0441) (0.0438)
gy5 0.120* 0.0890+ 0.0786 0.122* 0.123* 0.122*
(0.0525) (0.0497) (0.0503) (0.0530) (0.0515) (0.0521)
gy6 -0.0124 -0.0231
(0.0358) (0.0380)
gy7 -0.0458 -0.0510
(0.0674) (0.0663)
gy8 -0.201* -0.206*
(0.0408) (0.0387)
gdisc1 -0.00662 -0.00145 0.000700 -0.00304 -0.0103+ -0.00397
(0.00450) (0.00275) (0.00235) (0.00343) (0.00573) (0.00340)
gdisc2 -0.0105+ -0.00809 -0.00301 -0.00771 -0.0122* -0.00861
(0.00591) (0.00497) (0.00311) (0.00518) (0.00568) (0.00619)
gdisc3 -0.00650 -0.00603 -0.00773* -0.00660 -0.00429 -0.00656
(0.00538) (0.00399) (0.00301) (0.00466) (0.00690) (0.00499)
gdisc4 -0.00171 0.00286 0.000285 -0.000622 -0.00136 -0.000626
(0.00633) (0.00508) (0.00313) (0.00520) (0.00721) (0.00539)
gdisc5 -0.00739 -0.00555 -0.00338 -0.00701+ -0.0104+ -0.00728+
(0.00521) (0.00425) (0.00313) (0.00399) (0.00596) (0.00422)
gdisc6 -0.000698 -0.000601
(0.00231) (0.00169)
gdisc7 0.000363 -0.00165
(0.00344) (0.00244)
gdisc8 0.00216 -0.00135
(0.00218) (0.00179)
inst1∗gdisc1 0.0103* 0.00397* 0.00778* 0.00629* 0.0124* 0.00660*
(0.00397) (0.00175) (0.00339) (0.00239) (0.00542) (0.00221)
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inst2∗gdisc2 0.00602+ 0.00362 0.000735 0.00380 0.00775* 0.00433
(0.00356) (0.00263) (0.00289) (0.00264) (0.00310) (0.00343)
inst3∗gdisc3 0.00160 -0.000108 -0.000332 0.000163 -0.00197 0.0000738
(0.00363) (0.00243) (0.00345) (0.00271) (0.00494) (0.00289)
inst4∗gdisc4 0.000575 -0.00265 -0.00147 -0.000284 0.0000886 -0.000340
(0.00405) (0.00306) (0.00367) (0.00326) (0.00520) (0.00327)
inst5∗gdisc5 0.00189 0.00241 0.00287 0.00182 0.00474 0.00191
(0.00304) (0.00255) (0.00377) (0.00229) (0.00475) (0.00268)
inst6∗gdisc6 0.00123 0.00202
(0.00246) (0.00325)
inst7∗gdisc7 -0.00217 -0.00294
(0.00243) (0.00324)
inst8∗gdisc8 -0.00257* -0.00149
(0.00121) (0.00173)
inst1 -0.378 0.282 1.339* -0.915 -1.459* -0.160
(0.628) (0.513) (0.368) (0.873) (0.547) (0.431)
inst2 1.152 0.446 -0.865+ 1.718+ 2.092+ 0.355
(0.918) (0.729) (0.516) (1.025) (1.172) (0.643)
inst3 -0.117 0.133 0.578 -1.347 -1.031 0.253
(0.702) (0.672) (0.621) (1.059) (1.083) (0.470)
inst4 -0.409 1.036+ 0.711 -0.0562 0.295 -0.294
(0.751) (0.593) (0.609) (1.262) (1.002) (0.553)
inst5 -0.338 -2.670* -1.062 0.603 0.417 0.266
(0.634) (0.717) (0.826) (1.264) (0.895) (0.496)
inst6 2.047* 0.848+
(0.818) (0.491)
inst7 -0.132 -0.195
(0.940) (0.343)
inst8 -0.607 -0.764*
(0.428) (0.362)
trend -0.0230* -0.0357* -0.0451* -0.0228* -0.0222* -0.0223*
(0.00724) (0.0100) (0.0114) (0.00748) (0.00762) (0.00752)
open1 1.305 1.529 1.630 1.314 1.346 1.365
(0.983) (1.486) (1.521) (1.056) (1.110) (1.055)
open2 -1.720 -4.109 -4.308 -2.263 -2.293 -2.259
(1.211) (2.894) (2.872) (1.718) (1.732) (1.727)
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open3 1.194 1.174 0.950 0.813 0.955
(2.053) (1.925) (1.096) (1.034) (1.091)
open4 0.0565 -0.150 -1.114 -1.137 -1.068
(0.905) (0.928) (0.753) (0.748) (0.733)
open5 0.956 1.203 0.686 0.774 0.644
(0.758) (0.780) (0.484) (0.494) (0.485)
open6 1.875 1.904
(1.830) (1.795)
open7 0.536 0.491
(1.778) (1.819)
open8 -2.347+ -2.036+
(1.220) (1.206)
open1∗gdisc1 0.00224 0.00399* 0.00277 0.00404* 0.00635* 0.00376*
(0.00185) (0.00155) (0.00186) (0.00109) (0.000962) (0.00124)
open2∗gdisc2 -0.00419* -0.00482* -0.00522* -0.00378* -0.00256 -0.00403*
(0.00151) (0.00209) (0.00165) (0.00156) (0.00171) (0.00159)
open3∗gdisc3 0.00320+ 0.00386+ 0.00199 0.00168 0.00209
(0.00187) (0.00201) (0.00143) (0.00167) (0.00139)
open4∗gdisc4 0.00133 0.00138 0.000181 0.000296 0.000195
(0.00122) (0.00127) (0.00119) (0.00139) (0.00119)
open5∗gdisc5 0.000905 0.000726 0.000293 0.00125 0.000167
(0.00166) (0.00192) (0.00170) (0.00139) (0.00179)
open6∗gdisc6 -0.00297+ -0.00306+
(0.00174) (0.00170)
open7∗gdisc7 0.000676 0.000962
(0.00107) (0.00123)
open8∗gdisc8 -0.00321* -0.00356*
(0.00138) (0.00137)
Constant 1.454* 1.372* 1.694* 1.377* 1.171* 0.907*
(0.666) (0.617) (0.736) (0.499) (0.481) (0.419)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0328 -0.0164 -0.0167 -0.0250 -0.0385 -0.0270
[0.0113] [0.0807] [0.0116] [0.0136] [0.00424] [0.0157]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0204 0.00373 0.00717 0.0118 0.0230 0.0126
[0.00922] [0.432] [0.0710] [0.0216] [0.00575] [0.0397]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.260 -0.0287 -0.112 0.271 0.271 0.270
[0.0665] [0.844] [0.466] [0.0564] [0.0521] [0.0554]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0443 -0.0160 -0.0151 -0.0343 -0.0529 -0.0370
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[0.052] [0.060] [0.006] [0.059] [0.030] [0.065]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0275 0.00363 0.00645 0.0162 0.0315 0.0172
[0.056] [0.435] [0.101] [0.083] [0.034] [0.113]
N 1769 1610 1610 1769 1769 1769
within R2 0.1273 0.1859 0.1937 0.1262 0.1317 0.1256
Results estimated for equation 1. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 1. The variable open is openness, as detailed in the table A.3. Total
effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of
law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic
trend was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and
Kraay standard errors.
After the inclusion of J lags of openness and its interaction with the discount rates,
the term
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
keeps being significant at the 5% level for voice and
accountability. However, now this term is only significant at the 10% level for regulatory
quality. Since the regulatory quality indicator lost its importance after the inclusion of
openness, we proceeded with the elimination of lags of openness and its interaction term
that are not significant at the 5% level, starting from the highest to the lowest lag orders.
This procedure was only used for the regression using regulatory quality as a measure of
institutional development. Following this approach, we ended up including only two lags
of openness in the regression. Even after the exclusion of excessive lags of openness, the
term
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
keeps being significant only at the 10% level. We
conclude that hypothesis 1 is no longer supported by the regulatory quality indicator after
the inclusion of openness. According to table 3, only voice and accountability matters for
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the effectiveness of monetary policies after controlling for openness. In addition, we can
note that
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is negative and significant at the 5% level for voice
and accountability, as expected.
The included openness variables have a jointly significant effect on output in all
regressions. An interesting observation is that the total effect of the interaction between
openness and discount rates, given by the sum of the coefficients estimated for the
interaction terms between openness and discount rates divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is
positive and significant at the 5% level for the voice and accountability regression28. This
means that an increase in interest rates will have more adverse effects in countries with
lower economic openness than in countries with higher economic openness. This result is
in accordance with the mainstream economic theory and with the empirical results
presented by Karras (1999) and Karras (2001) with respect to the impact of openness on
the effectiveness of monetary policies.
Finally, table 4 presents the estimated value of(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and its standard error for specific levels of
insti,t− j, after controlling for openness. Table 4 demonstrates the evidence presented by
table 3 that the effect of monetary policies on output is differential by the level of voice
and accountability. A ten percent increase in central bank discount rates would produce a
decrease of 0.84 percentage points in the quarterly real GDP growth for a country with
average voice and accountability equal to -1 and a reduction not significantly different
than zero for a country with average voice and accountability equal to 1.5 or 2. These
results are in accordance with the first (institutional development matters for the effects of
28The estimated total effect of the interaction between openness and discount rates in the voice and
accountability regression is 0.0096416 and the p-value is 0.001. This effect is not significant at the 5%
level in the other regressions.
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monetary policies on real output) and second (contractionary policies reduce the output
more in countries with low institutional development than in countries with high
institutional development) hypotheses of this research.
Table 4 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional Development -
Fixed-Effects Regressions with Openness - Evaluating Hypothesis 1
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov
-2 -0.0280*
(0.0109)
-1.5 -0.0247*
(0.00921)
-1 -0.0718+ -0.0196 -0.0215* -0.0504+ -0.0844* -0.0542+
(0.0361) (0.0125) (0.00764) (0.0266) (0.0378) (0.0301)
-0.5 -0.0580+ -0.0178+ -0.0183* -0.0424+ -0.0686* -0.0456+
(0.0292) (0.0103) (0.00627) (0.0222) (0.0307) (0.0248)
0 -0.0443+ -0.0160+ -0.0151* -0.0343+ -0.0529* -0.0370+
(0.0223) (0.00831) (0.00526) (0.0178) (0.0236) (0.0197)
0.5 -0.0305+ -0.0142* -0.0118* -0.0262+ -0.0371* -0.0284+
(0.0155) (0.00648) (0.00485) (0.0135) (0.0167) (0.0146)
1 -0.0167+ -0.0123* -0.00861 -0.0181+ -0.0213* -0.0198*
(0.00912) (0.00505) (0.00518) (0.00939) (0.0103) (0.00986)
1.5 -0.00296 -0.0105* -0.00538 -0.0100 -0.00559 -0.0112+
(0.00501) (0.00443) (0.00613) (0.00608) (0.00607) (0.00615)
2 0.0108 -0.00871+ -0.00196 0.0102 -0.00261
(0.00811) (0.00493) (0.00525) (0.00857) (0.00595)
N 1769 1610 1610 1769 1769 1769
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at
different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived from table 3 (equation 1).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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8.1 Discussion of the Empirical Results
The results presented in this section provide empirical support in favor of hypothesis 1,
which states that the effect of changes in central bank discount rates on real output
depends on the level of institutional development. Voice and accountability seem to be the
characteristics of institutional development that matters most for the effectiveness of
monetary policies. In addition, the results provide evidence that the effect on output of a
monetary contraction seems to be more negative under weaker institutional environments
than under stronger institutional environments, supporting also hypothesis 2 of this
dissertation.
Since monetary expansions and contractions are expected to have asymmetrical
effects on output depending on the level of institutional development, the models
presented in this section are unable to provide evidence that is simultaneously consistent
with hypotheses 2 (contractionary policies reduce the output more in countries with low
institutional development than in countries with high institutional development) and 3
(expansionary policies stimulate the output more in countries with high institutional
development than in countries with low institutional development). The next sections
focus on models that treat increases and decreases in interest rates separately, as two
different phenomena. Even though the models that follow would be enough to provide
evidence in favor or against hypothesis 1 (institutional development matters for the effects
of monetary policies on real output), we consider that the models presented in this section
have the important function of providing a comparison between the results when
asymmetries are considered and when it is assumed that asymmetries are not present.
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9 Evaluation of Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
In this section we empirically evaluate the hypotheses 2 and 3 developed in the section 5
of this dissertation. The second hypothesis states that a positive change in interest rates
reduces the output more in countries with low institutional development than in countries
with high institutional development. The third hypothesis states that a negative change in
interest rates increases the output more in countries with high institutional development
than in countries with low institutional development. Robustness checks are performed
through the use of alternative econometric models, the choice of different numbers of lags
and the inclusion of control variables.
The following procedure is based on the methodology used in Garibaldi (1997) to
test whether positive and negative interest rate shocks have asymmetrical effects on job
flows. First, the author extracted positive and negative interest rate shocks from the
interest rate time series process estimated for the US economy. Then, net employment
changes were regressed on the positive and negative shocks extracted in the first step. He
concluded that contractionary policies increase job destruction while expansionary
policies are ineffective in terms of job creation. Garibaldi (1997) focuses on monetary
policy shocks and treats interest rates as endogenous to real output growth, inflation and
past interest rates. In this section, we focus on ordinary monetary policies and treat
interest rates as exogenous. In addition, we have a panel of countries instead of a time
series analysis for only one country. Finally, we include the role of institutional
development in the transmission process. It is worth to mention that the methodology used
by Garibaldi (1997) follows the technique pioneered by Cover (1992) to test the
asymmetric effects of monetary shocks. Cover (1992) proposed the use of the original
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monetary shock series to derive two additional time series, one including only the positive
shocks and other including only the negative shocks. The addition of these two series
results in the original series. Thus, in this research we follow the suggestion and define
positive growth rates in interest rates as:
gdisc+i,t = max(gdisci,t ,0)
and negative growth rates in interest rates as:
gdisc−i,t = min(gdisci,t ,0)
Then, the following linear panel data model will be estimated:
gyi,t = β +
J
∑
j=1
γ jgyi,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
φ jgdisc+i,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
Θ jinsti,t− jgdisc+i,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
λ jgdisc−i,t− j+
J
∑
j=1
ψ jinsti,t− jgdisc−i,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
τ jinsti,t− j +δ trendt +Z
′
i,tv+ui,t (2)
The variable gyi,t is the seasonally adjusted real GDP growth for each country i at
each time period t. The variable gdisc+i,t− j represents the positive growth rates in central
bank discount rates. The variable gdisc−i,t− j represents the negative growth rates in central
bank discount rates. These positive and negative growth rates in interest rates interact with
one of the six measures of institutional development, insti,t− j. The term trendt is a linear
trend in time. Z
′
i,t is a vector of control variables. Finally, ui,t is the error term.
Cover’s methodology has also been used including a relevant economic variable
that interacts with monetary policies and with panel data models. Rhee and Rich (1995)
uses quarterly United States data over the period 1961:2-1990:4. The study provides
evidence that the asymmetric effects of monetary shocks on output depend on average
inflation. The empirical test is conducted including the interaction terms of monetary
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expansions and contractions with average inflation. Karras and Stokes (1999) examines
whether the asymmetric effect of money on output is an international phenomenon using
quarterly data from the 1963-1993 period (T=124) for a panel of 12 OECD countries. The
empirical results indicate that money contractions have a stronger effect on output than
money expansions.
The total effect of a permanent one percent increase in discount rates is given by:(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. If our second hypothesis holds this total
effect is expected to be statistically significant, relevant in size and considerably
dependent on the level of institutional development. In addition, ∑Jj=1φ j is expected to be
negative and ∑Jj=1Θ j is expected to be positive. More specifically, we will consider that
our second hypothesis holds whenever
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive and
significant at the 5% level. The total effect of a permanent one percent decrease in
discount rates is given by:
(
−∑Jj=1λ j−∑Jj=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. If our third
hypothesis holds this total effect is expected to be statistically significant, relevant in size
and considerably dependent on the level of institutional development. In addition, ∑Jj=1λ j
is expected to be negative and ∑Jj=1ψ j is also expected to be negative. More specifically,
we will consider that our third hypothesis holds whenever
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is
negative and significant at the 5% level.
9.1 Fixed-effects Regression
In this subsection we assume that the error term in equation 2 is described as
ui,t = αi + εi,t , where αi is modeled as fixed-effects and εi,t is the idiosyncratic error.
For simplicity, we assume that J in equation 2 is the same for all variables included
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in the model. Also, there is no theoretical consensus on the value of J, that is, there is no
consensus on how long does it take for a full transmission of a monetary policy to output.
Fixed-effects models were estimated assuming J=1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Then, the AIC
criterion was used to select the most appropriate model. Table A.6 describes that we
should choose the model with 5 lags for the regressions including regulatory quality,
control of corruption, rule of law, voice and accountability and government effectiveness.
For the model using political stability, the choice of 8 lags is preferable, even though, the
choice of 5 lags is the second best one. This subsection will focus on models that include
5 lags. Models using alternative numbers of lags will be presented in the following
subsections.
Table 5 presents fixed-effects estimations of the model described by equation 2
without the inclusion of additional controls. Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are
presented for the coefficient estimates. These standard errors are robust to disturbances
being heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and cross-sectionally dependent and seem to be
appropriate for long panels with cross-country macroeconomic data.
Table 5 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors - 5
Lags - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0816 0.0893 0.0819 0.0866 0.0876 0.0859
(0.111) (0.111) (0.112) (0.112) (0.113) (0.111)
gy2 0.174* 0.177* 0.169* 0.175* 0.176* 0.176*
(0.0425) (0.0431) (0.0448) (0.0442) (0.0424) (0.0435)
gy3 -0.0570* -0.0562* -0.0650* -0.0568* -0.0575* -0.0554*
(0.0226) (0.0225) (0.0243) (0.0222) (0.0227) (0.0226)
gy4 -0.0670 -0.0687 -0.0789 -0.0661 -0.0687 -0.0660
(0.0444) (0.0464) (0.0485) (0.0464) (0.0448) (0.0449)
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Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors - 5 Lags -
Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I - Continued
gy5 0.118* 0.116* 0.111* 0.117* 0.117* 0.119*
(0.0539) (0.0538) (0.0535) (0.0542) (0.0523) (0.0534)
gdisc1+ -0.0145+ -0.00419 -0.000449 -0.00734 -0.0108 -0.0114
(0.00800) (0.00696) (0.00514) (0.00722) (0.00782) (0.00832)
gdisc2+ -0.0315* -0.0217* -0.00732 -0.0221* -0.0263* -0.0285*
(0.00867) (0.00699) (0.00517) (0.00761) (0.00963) (0.00955)
gdisc3+ -0.00962 -0.00624 -0.00461 -0.00817 -0.00339 -0.00982
(0.0158) (0.0108) (0.00673) (0.0114) (0.0145) (0.0136)
gdisc4+ -0.0120+ -0.00279 0.00365 -0.00568 -0.00397 -0.00805
(0.00668) (0.00560) (0.00613) (0.00590) (0.00775) (0.00688)
gdisc5+ -0.0157 -0.00931 -0.00243 -0.00940 -0.0151 -0.0125
(0.0149) (0.0115) (0.00814) (0.0107) (0.0188) (0.0134)
inst1∗gdisc1+ 0.0121* 0.00279 0.00203 0.00591 0.00979+ 0.00798+
(0.00499) (0.00319) (0.00391) (0.00368) (0.00555) (0.00412)
inst2∗gdisc2+ 0.0284* 0.0191* 0.0139* 0.0210* 0.0282* 0.0233*
(0.00838) (0.00615) (0.00610) (0.00720) (0.0104) (0.00779)
inst3∗gdisc3+ 0.00261 0.000356 -0.00323 0.00188 -0.00243 0.00284
(0.0120) (0.00705) (0.00693) (0.00806) (0.0123) (0.00885)
inst4∗gdisc4+ 0.0123* 0.00398 -0.00136 0.00672* 0.00668 0.00776+
(0.00490) (0.00262) (0.00377) (0.00322) (0.00578) (0.00409)
inst5∗gdisc5+ 0.0145 0.00932 0.00698 0.00966 0.0175 0.0109
(0.0108) (0.00668) (0.00890) (0.00707) (0.0177) (0.00835)
gdisc1− -0.00263 0.00488 0.00645* 0.00322 0.00391 0.00166
(0.00490) (0.00327) (0.00258) (0.00345) (0.00386) (0.00371)
gdisc2− -0.00985 -0.00989 -0.00713+ -0.00871 -0.0140+ -0.00777
(0.00606) (0.00603) (0.00399) (0.00540) (0.00744) (0.00610)
gdisc3− -0.00520 -0.00478 -0.00678* -0.00534 -0.00339 -0.00488
(0.00453) (0.00369) (0.00309) (0.00371) (0.00353) (0.00412)
gdisc4− 0.00339 0.00327 -0.00147 0.00323 0.00277 0.00429
(0.00799) (0.00625) (0.00415) (0.00640) (0.00722) (0.00669)
gdisc5− -0.00525 -0.00723* -0.00859* -0.00720+ -0.00748* -0.00648
(0.00408) (0.00344) (0.00285) (0.00372) (0.00362) (0.00415)
inst1∗gdisc1− 0.0119* 0.00624* 0.0122* 0.00791* 0.00900* 0.00845*
(0.00359) (0.00203) (0.00373) (0.00262) (0.00391) (0.00257)
inst2∗gdisc2− -0.000546 -0.000465 -0.00533 -0.00156 0.00317 -0.00212
(0.00275) (0.00201) (0.00351) (0.00207) (0.00429) (0.00235)
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Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I - Continued
inst3∗gdisc3− 0.000531 0.000295 0.00276 0.000718 -0.00117 0.000259
(0.00242) (0.00177) (0.00257) (0.00191) (0.00294) (0.00215)
inst4∗gdisc4− -0.00430 -0.00412 -0.00159 -0.00407 -0.00480 -0.00467
(0.00553) (0.00401) (0.00527) (0.00449) (0.00665) (0.00430)
inst5∗gdisc5− -0.00184 -0.000177 0.00152 -0.000177 0.0000369 -0.000764
(0.00264) (0.00164) (0.00194) (0.00188) (0.00237) (0.00210)
inst1 -0.315 0.321 1.235* -0.750 -1.356* -0.147
(0.658) (0.377) (0.339) (0.976) (0.545) (0.413)
inst2 1.010 -0.481 -0.843* 1.607 1.993+ 0.495
(0.895) (0.883) (0.419) (1.056) (1.188) (0.596)
inst3 0.0130 0.643 0.450 -1.396 -0.998 0.148
(0.712) (0.784) (0.626) (1.101) (1.117) (0.445)
inst4 -0.453 0.870 0.671 -0.156 0.397 -0.541
(0.706) (0.538) (0.551) (1.237) (1.053) (0.586)
inst5 -0.558 -1.234* -1.183 0.498 0.214 0.388
(0.600) (0.530) (0.824) (1.273) (0.950) (0.543)
trend -0.0246* -0.0238* -0.0285* -0.0244* -0.0243* -0.0234*
(0.00890) (0.00898) (0.0106) (0.00887) (0.00905) (0.00874)
Constant 1.316* 0.920* 1.013* 1.196* 0.811* 0.694*
(0.404) (0.211) (0.201) (0.545) (0.349) (0.320)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0832 -0.0442 -0.0112 -0.0526 -0.0595 -0.0703
[0.00416] [0.0441] [0.431] [0.00861] [0.0310] [0.00823]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0699 0.0356 0.0183 0.0452 0.0597 0.0528
[0.00139] [0.00993] [0.181] [0.00178] [0.0145] [0.00230]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0195 -0.0137 -0.0175 -0.0148 -0.0182 -0.0132
[0.158] [0.205] [0.0630] [0.192] [0.159] [0.256]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00576 0.00177 0.00952 0.00283 0.00624 0.00116
[0.464] [0.748] [0.0658] [0.633] [0.513] [0.848]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.249 0.258 0.218 0.256 0.255 0.259
[0.0719] [0.0596] [0.113] [0.0641] [0.0564] [0.0579]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.111 -0.0596 -0.0143 -0.0708 -0.0798 -0.0950
[0.018] [0.074] [0.444] [0.030] [0.052] [0.033]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0932 0.0479 0.0234 0.0607 0.0802 0.0713
[0.013] [0.037] [0.212] [0.017] [0.033] [0.022]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0260 -0.0185 -0.0224 -0.0199 -0.0244 -0.0178
[0.207] [0.252] [0.109] [0.245] [0.191] [0.300]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00768 0.00238 0.0122 0.00381 0.00837 0.00156
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[0.468] [0.748] [0.062] [0.635] [0.509] [0.848]
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
within R2 0.1340 0.1312 0.1352 0.1302 0.1308 0.1307
Results estimated for equation 2. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 2. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend
was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and
Kraay standard errors.
Table 5 provides evidence that an increase in central bank discount rates will have
more adverse effects on output under weaker institutional environments, supporting
hypothesis 2 (contractionary policies reduce the output more in countries with low
institutional development than in countries with high institutional development) of this
dissertation. The total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term
between institutional development and positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is positive and significant at the 5% level for all indicators,
except for political stability. In addition, the total effect of the coefficients estimated for
the positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative for all
indicators and significant at the 5% level for regulatory quality, rule of law and
government effectiveness and at the 10% level for control of corruption and voice and
accountability. However, there is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 (expansionary
policies stimulate the output more in countries with high institutional development than in
countries with low institutional development) of this dissertation because ∑Jj=1λ j and
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∑Jj=1ψ j are not significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators.
In order to make the evidence clearer, it is also appropriate to present the estimated
total effects of an increase
(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and a decrease(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
in discount rates on real GDP growth and
their standard errors for specific levels of insti,t− j. Table 6 presents the total effect of a
permanent one percent increase/decrease in discount rates on real GDP growth for several
different levels of institutional development.
Table 6 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Fixed-Effects Regressions with 5 Lags - Evaluating
Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0610
(0.0502)
-1.5 -0.0493
(0.0415)
-1 -0.204* -0.108* -0.0376 -0.132* -0.160* -0.166*
(0.0798) (0.0531) (0.0330) (0.0542) (0.0752) (0.0720)
-0.5 -0.157* -0.0836+ -0.0260 -0.101* -0.120* -0.131*
(0.0623) (0.0427) (0.0251) (0.0426) (0.0575) (0.0574)
0 -0.111* -0.0596+ -0.0143 -0.0708* -0.0798+ -0.0950*
(0.0454) (0.0327) (0.0185) (0.0317) (0.0402) (0.0432)
0.5 -0.0643* -0.0356 -0.00257 -0.0404+ -0.0397 -0.0593+
(0.0299) (0.0239) (0.0150) (0.0223) (0.0243) (0.0299)
1 -0.0177 -0.0117 0.00913 -0.0101 0.000372 -0.0237
(0.0197) (0.0178) (0.0167) (0.0170) (0.0154) (0.0194)
1.5 0.0289 0.0123 0.0208 0.0203 0.0404+ 0.0119
(0.0233) (0.0178) (0.0225) (0.0196) (0.0234) (0.0177)
2 0.0754* 0.0362 0.0507+ 0.0805* 0.0475+
(0.0369) (0.0238) (0.0279) (0.0391) (0.0266)
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Continued (
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0467+
(0.0237)
-1.5 -0.0407+
(0.0209)
-1 -0.0337 -0.0209 -0.0346+ -0.0237 -0.0328 -0.0194
(0.0292) (0.0217) (0.0183) (0.0233) (0.0294) (0.0235)
-0.5 -0.0299 -0.0197 -0.0285+ -0.0218 -0.0286 -0.0186
(0.0246) (0.0187) (0.0159) (0.0200) (0.0237) (0.0201)
0 -0.0260 -0.0185 -0.0224 -0.0199 -0.0244 -0.0178
(0.0203) (0.0160) (0.0137) (0.0169) (0.0184) (0.0170)
0.5 -0.0222 -0.0173 -0.0163 -0.0180 -0.0202 -0.0170
(0.0166) (0.0138) (0.0121) (0.0144) (0.0139) (0.0144)
1 -0.0184 -0.0161 -0.0102 -0.0161 -0.0160 -0.0162
(0.0139) (0.0123) (0.0111) (0.0126) (0.0112) (0.0126)
1.5 -0.0145 -0.0150 -0.00414 -0.0142 -0.0118 -0.0155
(0.0129) (0.0118) (0.0111) (0.0119) (0.0118) (0.0119)
2 -0.0107 -0.0138 -0.0123 -0.00765 -0.0147
(0.0139) (0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0152) (0.0126)
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and
(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates
derived from table 5 (equation 2).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality
(reg), control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol),
rule of law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Table 6 illustrates the conclusions from table 5, providing support for hypothesis 2,
but not for hypothesis 3. Table 6 shows that an increase in interest rates has more negative
effects on output in countries with weaker institutional development than in countries with
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stronger institutional development. This is true for all institutional indicators, except for
political stability. A decrease in interest rates seems to be ineffective in terms of output
promotion for all countries, meaning that there is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 of
this dissertation.
Table 6 shows that a ten percentage point increase in the growth rate of central
bank discount rates would produce a decrease of 2 percentage points in the quarterly real
GDP growth for a country with average regulatory quality equal to -1 and a decrease not
significantly different than zero for a country with average regulatory quality equal to 1 or
1.5. A ten percentage point increase in the growth rate of central bank discount rates
would produce a decrease of 1 percentage point in the quarterly real GDP growth for a
country with average control of corruption equal to -1 and a reduction not significantly
different than zero for a country with average control of corruption equal or higher than
0.5. The evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 is also strong for rule of law, voice and
accountability and government effectiveness. For all these three indicators, the effect of an
increase in interest rates on output is negative and significant at the 5% level for countries
with relatively weak institutional development and not significantly different than zero for
countries with relatively high institutional development.
As a robustness check, J lags of the variable openness and its interaction with
positive and negative growth rates of central bank discount rates are included in the
previous regressions. As mentioned in the previous section, Karras (1999) and Karras
(2001) provide empirical evidence that the more open the economy, the smaller the effects
of monetary policies on output. There is a positive correlation between institutional
development and openness 29. Then, our previous results may be capturing the effects of
29Correlations between openness and the institutional indicators: 0.24 (regulatory quality); 0.11 (control of
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openness instead of the relevance of the institutional indicators. The estimated results are
displayed in table 7.
Table 7 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors - 5 Lags
with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0810 0.0884 0.0818 0.0855 0.0853 0.0846
(0.110) (0.111) (0.112) (0.111) (0.113) (0.110)
gy2 0.167* 0.171* 0.164* 0.169* 0.172* 0.169*
(0.0439) (0.0447) (0.0459) (0.0459) (0.0439) (0.0448)
gy3 -0.0517* -0.0508* -0.0579* -0.0511* -0.0499* -0.0508*
(0.0194) (0.0191) (0.0195) (0.0188) (0.0200) (0.0194)
gy4 -0.0654 -0.0668 -0.0753 -0.0637 -0.0644 -0.0645
(0.0431) (0.0455) (0.0465) (0.0453) (0.0438) (0.0438)
gy5 0.126* 0.125* 0.121* 0.126* 0.128* 0.127*
(0.0546) (0.0545) (0.0543) (0.0550) (0.0535) (0.0540)
gdisc1+ -0.0105 0.000424 0.00644 -0.00286 -0.00685 -0.00733
(0.00901) (0.00813) (0.00508) (0.00861) (0.00848) (0.00945)
gdisc2+ -0.0302* -0.0247* -0.00682 -0.0235* -0.0276* -0.0313*
(0.00963) (0.0102) (0.00735) (0.00976) (0.0108) (0.0121)
gdisc3+ -0.00954 -0.00650 -0.00416 -0.00845 -0.00596 -0.00970
(0.0129) (0.00983) (0.00701) (0.0102) (0.0122) (0.0119)
gdisc4+ -0.0156* -0.00715 -0.00166 -0.0123+ -0.0111 -0.0143+
(0.00703) (0.00733) (0.00640) (0.00699) (0.00667) (0.00772)
gdisc5+ -0.00995 -0.00422 0.00333 -0.00366 -0.0123 -0.00676
(0.00862) (0.00534) (0.00517) (0.00526) (0.0135) (0.00811)
inst1∗gdisc1+ 0.0124* 0.00239 0.00214 0.00551 0.00876+ 0.00764+
(0.00526) (0.00322) (0.00387) (0.00370) (0.00516) (0.00416)
inst2∗gdisc2+ 0.0280* 0.0193* 0.0144* 0.0211* 0.0281* 0.0236*
(0.00756) (0.00603) (0.00563) (0.00687) (0.0101) (0.00745)
inst3∗gdisc3+ 0.00209 -0.000192 -0.00409 0.00119 -0.00193 0.00188
(0.0121) (0.00707) (0.00684) (0.00807) (0.0121) (0.00877)
inst4∗gdisc4+ 0.0123* 0.00487+ -0.000859 0.00783* 0.00811 0.00907*
corruption); 0.28 (political stability); 0.16 (rule of law); 0.0017 (voice and accountability) and 0.18
(government effectiveness).
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(0.00478) (0.00263) (0.00350) (0.00316) (0.00534) (0.00385)
inst5∗gdisc5+ 0.0139 0.00858 0.00726 0.00871 0.0176 0.00986
(0.0106) (0.00629) (0.00868) (0.00674) (0.0172) (0.00795)
gdisc1− -0.00375 0.00161 0.00420 -0.00105 -0.00902 -0.00110
(0.00430) (0.00320) (0.00275) (0.00334) (0.00656) (0.00354)
gdisc2− -0.00810 -0.00748 -0.00574 -0.00589 -0.00860 -0.00566
(0.00554) (0.00531) (0.00428) (0.00458) (0.00631) (0.00550)
gdisc3− -0.00514 -0.00485 -0.00705* -0.00539 -0.00374 -0.00489
(0.00444) (0.00386) (0.00340) (0.00396) (0.00567) (0.00417)
gdisc4− 0.00280 0.00191 -0.00263 0.00210 0.00149 0.00311
(0.00759) (0.00607) (0.00350) (0.00646) (0.00972) (0.00652)
gdisc5− -0.00515 -0.00704* -0.00813* -0.00684+ -0.00782 -0.00619
(0.00386) (0.00332) (0.00294) (0.00363) (0.00468) (0.00390)
inst1∗gdisc1− 0.0102* 0.00515* 0.0113* 0.00721* 0.0135* 0.00700*
(0.00389) (0.00196) (0.00408) (0.00260) (0.00604) (0.00257)
inst2∗gdisc2− -0.0000381 -0.000176 -0.00523 -0.00165 0.000941 -0.00183
(0.00342) (0.00214) (0.00354) (0.00211) (0.00411) (0.00257)
inst3∗gdisc3− 0.000130 -0.000299 0.00232 0.000115 -0.00186 -0.000377
(0.00250) (0.00166) (0.00261) (0.00183) (0.00390) (0.00206)
inst4∗gdisc4− -0.00463 -0.00405 -0.00179 -0.00362 -0.00347 -0.00444
(0.00587) (0.00393) (0.00546) (0.00436) (0.00733) (0.00428)
inst5∗gdisc5− -0.00237 -0.000670 0.00117 -0.000795 -0.000242 -0.00147
(0.00273) (0.00151) (0.00213) (0.00172) (0.00289) (0.00191)
inst1 -0.277 0.383 1.233* -0.867 -1.422* -0.0755
(0.670) (0.385) (0.333) (0.912) (0.522) (0.429)
inst2 0.902 -0.599 -0.912* 1.598 2.021+ 0.404
(0.911) (0.859) (0.421) (1.027) (1.170) (0.633)
inst3 0.0970 0.770 0.528 -1.278 -0.947 0.121
(0.733) (0.781) (0.629) (1.055) (1.095) (0.449)
inst4 -0.478 0.730 0.576 -0.262 0.237 -0.482
(0.701) (0.514) (0.516) (1.284) (0.976) (0.566)
inst5 -0.579 -1.148* -1.119 0.561 0.347 0.399
(0.608) (0.491) (0.766) (1.288) (0.872) (0.533)
trend -0.0238* -0.0228* -0.0271* -0.0233* -0.0226* -0.0226*
(0.00820) (0.00836) (0.00986) (0.00813) (0.00850) (0.00811)
open1 1.505 1.483 1.420 1.471 1.435 1.534
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(1.126) (1.133) (1.133) (1.109) (1.174) (1.100)
open2 -2.104 -2.153 -2.139 -2.120 -2.162 -2.118
(1.690) (1.695) (1.718) (1.704) (1.729) (1.714)
open3 0.941 0.938 0.842 0.934 0.825 0.928
(1.010) (1.022) (0.962) (1.039) (1.008) (1.030)
open4 -1.093 -1.120 -1.107 -1.163 -1.202+ -1.080
(0.721) (0.705) (0.703) (0.731) (0.715) (0.718)
open5 0.527 0.554 0.645 0.548 0.652 0.502
(0.423) (0.438) (0.442) (0.448) (0.426) (0.437)
open1∗gdisc1+ -0.00505 -0.00488 -0.00811 -0.00463 -0.00292 -0.00423
(0.00541) (0.00532) (0.00522) (0.00551) (0.00538) (0.00507)
open2∗gdisc2+ -0.000241 0.00444 0.0000708 0.00262 0.00265 0.00390
(0.00691) (0.00816) (0.00793) (0.00752) (0.00638) (0.00763)
open3∗gdisc3+ 0.000862 0.00134 0.000175 0.00141 0.00244 0.00154
(0.0107) (0.0100) (0.0103) (0.00975) (0.00963) (0.00964)
open4∗gdisc4+ 0.00488 0.00452 0.00656 0.00739 0.00748 0.00642
(0.00736) (0.00769) (0.00700) (0.00767) (0.00802) (0.00741)
open5∗gdisc5+ -0.00628 -0.00539 -0.00755 -0.00604 -0.00384 -0.00573
(0.0121) (0.0119) (0.0132) (0.0125) (0.0106) (0.0121)
open1∗gdisc1− 0.00204 0.00309+ 0.00157 0.00352* 0.00647* 0.00311+
(0.00208) (0.00175) (0.00212) (0.00156) (0.00130) (0.00167)
open2∗gdisc2− -0.00256 -0.00273 -0.00172 -0.00260 -0.00272 -0.00251
(0.00229) (0.00214) (0.00181) (0.00207) (0.00195) (0.00205)
open3∗gdisc3− 0.00107 0.00142 0.00144 0.00127 0.00141 0.00134
(0.00124) (0.00136) (0.00158) (0.00134) (0.00155) (0.00139)
open4∗gdisc4− 0.000748 0.000933 0.000986 0.000310 -0.000179 0.000578
(0.00138) (0.00116) (0.00159) (0.00122) (0.00192) (0.00114)
open5∗gdisc5− 0.00148 0.00135 0.000880 0.00129 0.00149 0.00141
(0.00119) (0.00111) (0.00123) (0.00115) (0.00140) (0.00116)
Constant 1.526* 1.145* 1.290* 1.501* 1.178* 0.858*
(0.646) (0.405) (0.496) (0.550) (0.438) (0.414)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0757 -0.0422 -0.00287 -0.0508 -0.0638 -0.0694
[0.00119] [0.0153] [0.748] [0.00223] [0.00761] [0.00300]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0687 0.0350 0.0188 0.0443 0.0607 0.0521
[0.00122] [0.0105] [0.167] [0.00173] [0.0112] [0.00214]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0193 -0.0159 -0.0193 -0.0171 -0.0277 -0.0147
[0.0918] [0.0611] [0.0149] [0.0690] [0.0682] [0.106]
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∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00327 -0.0000467 0.00780 0.00126 0.00890 -0.00112
[0.685] [0.993] [0.119] [0.816] [0.391] [0.837]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.257 0.266 0.233 0.266 0.271 0.265
[0.0690] [0.0583] [0.0984] [0.0605] [0.0527] [0.0584]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.102 -0.0575 -0.00375 -0.0692 -0.0875 -0.0944
[0.013] [0.049] [0.752] [0.020] [0.026] [0.027]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0925 0.0477 0.0246 0.0604 0.0832 0.0708
[0.015] [0.044] [0.205] [0.020] [0.032] [0.025]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0260 -0.0216 -0.0252 -0.0233 -0.0380 -0.0200
[0.145] [0.113] [0.054] [0.130] [0.110] [0.160]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00440 -0.0000637 0.0102 0.00171 0.0122 -0.00153
[0.687] [0.993] [0.118] [0.816] [0.398] [0.837]
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
within R2 0.1409 0.1388 0.1426 0.1381 0.1415 0.1381
Results estimated for equation 2. The number after each variable name represents the lag j specified
in equation 2. The variable open is openness, as detailed in the table A.3. Total effects are presented
in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend was
not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and Kraay
standard errors.
After the inclusion of openness as a control, the conclusions keep being the same
as the ones extracted from table 5: there is strong support in favor of hypothesis 2 and no
support in favor of hypothesis 3. The total effect of the positive growth rates in interest
rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the 5% level and the total
effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term between institutional
development and the positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is
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positive and significant at the 5% level for all indicators, except for political stability. In
addition, it seems that there is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 because ∑Jj=1ψ j is not
significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators.
In all regressions, the openness variables have a jointly significant effect on output.
In addition, the total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative growth
rates in interest rates is positive and significant at the 5% level in the regression for the
voice and accountability indicator30. This means that the effectiveness of monetary
expansions decreases with the level of openness, which is in accordance with the accepted
economic theory. Finally, table 8 presents the total effect of a permanent one percent
increase/decrease in discount rates on real GDP growth for several different levels of
institutional development after controlling for openness.
Table 8 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional Development
- Fixed-Effects Regressions with 5 Lags and Openness - Evaluating
Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0528
(0.0471)
-1.5 -0.0406
(0.0377)
-1 -0.195* -0.105* -0.0283 -0.130* -0.171* -0.165*
(0.0761) (0.0509) (0.0285) (0.0535) (0.0754) (0.0718)
-0.5 -0.148* -0.0813* -0.0160 -0.0995* -0.129* -0.130*
30The total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates is given
by the sum of the coefficients associated with this interaction term divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. This total
effect for the voice and accountability regression is estimated to be 0.008886 with a corresponding p-value
of 0.008. This total effect is not significant in the other regressions. In addition, the total effect of the
interaction between openness and the positive growth rates in interest rates is given by the sum of the
coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. These total effects are not
significant at the 5% level in any of the regressions.
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(0.0578) (0.0396) (0.0196) (0.0411) (0.0567) (0.0565)
0 -0.102* -0.0575* -0.00375 -0.0692* -0.0875* -0.0944*
(0.0398) (0.0285) (0.0118) (0.0288) (0.0382) (0.0414)
0.5 -0.0557* -0.0336+ 0.00853 -0.0390* -0.0459* -0.0590*
(0.0225) (0.0179) (0.00878) (0.0171) (0.0204) (0.0265)
1 -0.00943 -0.00979 0.0208 -0.00880 -0.00425 -0.0236+
(0.0103) (0.00975) (0.0141) (0.00824) (0.00940) (0.0129)
1.5 0.0368+ 0.0140 0.0331 0.0214+ 0.0374+ 0.0118
(0.0197) (0.0117) (0.0224) (0.0127) (0.0218) (0.0102)
2 0.0831* 0.0379+ 0.0516* 0.0790+ 0.0473*
(0.0368) (0.0210) (0.0239) (0.0397) (0.0227)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0456*
(0.0217)
-1.5 -0.0405*
(0.0191)
-1 -0.0304 -0.0215 -0.0354* -0.0250 -0.0502 -0.0185
(0.0266) (0.0178) (0.0166) (0.0204) (0.0364) (0.0192)
-0.5 -0.0282 -0.0216 -0.0303* -0.0241 -0.0441 -0.0193
(0.0219) (0.0154) (0.0145) (0.0176) (0.0297) (0.0164)
0 -0.0260 -0.0216 -0.0252+ -0.0233 -0.0380 -0.0200
(0.0176) (0.0134) (0.0128) (0.0151) (0.0234) (0.0141)
0.5 -0.0238+ -0.0216+ -0.0201+ -0.0224+ -0.0319+ -0.0208+
(0.0142) (0.0120) (0.0117) (0.0132) (0.0176) (0.0124)
1 -0.0216+ -0.0217+ -0.0151 -0.0216+ -0.0258+ -0.0216+
(0.0123) (0.0116) (0.0115) (0.0121) (0.0133) (0.0116)
1.5 -0.0194 -0.0217+ -0.00997 -0.0207+ -0.0197 -0.0223+
(0.0126) (0.0121) (0.0122) (0.0121) (0.0121) (0.0121)
2 -0.0172 -0.0217 -0.0199 -0.0136 -0.0231+
(0.0150) (0.0135) (0.0132) (0.0147) (0.0135)
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table 7 (equation 2).
Standard errors in parentheses
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+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality
(reg), control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol),
rule of law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Table 8 demonstrates that an increase in interest rates has more negative effects on
output in countries with weaker institutional development than in countries with stronger
institutional development, supporting hypothesis 2. This is true for all institutional
indicators, except for political stability. As an example, table 8 shows that a ten
percentage point increase in the growth rate of central bank discount rates would produce
a decrease of 1.95 percentage points in the quarterly real GDP growth for a country with
average regulatory quality equal to -1 and a decrease not significantly different than zero
for a country with average regulatory quality equal to 1 or 1.5.
Table 8 also presents some interesting results with respect to hypothesis 3. We may
consider that the results for government effectiveness provide a weak support in favor of
hypothesis 3. For this indicator, the effect on output of a decrease in interest rates
increases with the level of institutional development, that is,
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
is negative, as
described in the bottom of table 7. Table 8 shows that the effect of a monetary expansion
is significantly different than zero at the 10% level for countries with relatively high
government effectiveness (≥ 0.5) and not significantly different than zero for countries
with relatively low government effectiveness (≤ 0). However, this evidence should be
considered pretty fragile because table 7 showed that
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is not
statistically significant, indicating that the effect of money expansions is not differential
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by government effectiveness.
The results presented in this subsection provide empirical support for the
hypothesis 2, which states that an increase in interest rates has more adverse effects on
output in countries with weaker institutional development than in countries with stronger
institutional development. This evidence holds for all institutional indicators, except for
political stability. In general, we may conclude that there is no evidence to support
hypothesis 3 (expansionary policies stimulate the output more in countries with high
institutional development than in countries with low institutional development).
Comparing with the results in the previous section, in general, treating positive and
negative changes in interest rates as two different phenomena improved the statistical
significance of our estimates. According to the results estimated in section 8, hypothesis 1
(institutional development matters for the effects of monetary policies on real output) of
this dissertation holds only for the voice and accountability indicator. In contrast, this
section demonstrated that hypothesis 1 holds for all indicators, with the exception of
political stability. This improvement in the statistical significance of our results may be an
indication that taking asymmetries into account is the appropriate way of modeling the
transmission of monetary policies.
9.2 Prais-Winsten Regression
As a first robustness check, this subsection presents an alternative econometric model.
Since we are dealing with a long panel (T=40), the errors in equation 2 may be serially
correlated. The Prais-Winsten regression provides pooled least-squares estimators and
models the serial correlation in the error term assuming that it follows an AR(1) process,
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ui,t = ρiui,t−1 + εi,t . In addition, standard error estimates are robust to disturbances being
heteroskedastic and contemporaneously cross-sectionally correlated.
The Prais-Winsten regression may produce more efficient results than the previous
fixed-effects model with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors because it models the serial
correlation in the error term instead of simply adjusting the standard errors. Table 7 in the
previous subsection showed that the effect on output of a decrease in interest rates
increases with the level of government effectiveness, that is,
(
∑Jj=1λ j
)
is negative and(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
is also negative for this indicator. Even though the direction of these effects
was in accordance with the hypothesis 3 (expansionary policies stimulate the output more
in countries with high institutional development than in countries with low institutional
development) of this dissertation, neither of these effects was statistically significant. In
this case, the gain of efficiency provided by the models developed in this subsection can be
relevant to find support for the hypothesis 3 of this dissertation. However, it is important
to note that the models presented in this subsection are inconsistent under the fixed-effects
assumption and because of this reason the estimates should be interpreted with caution.
The results for the Prais-Winsten regressions are displayed in tables A.7 and A.8,
assuming J=5 and without the inclusion of additional controls. Tables A.9 and A.10
assume J=5 and include the openness variables as additional controls. In general, the total
effects in the bottom of table A.9 are more statistically significant than the total effects
displayed in the bottom of table 7, as expected. For example, the effect of monetary
expansions,
(
∑Jj=1λ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, which was insignificant at the 5% level for all
indicators in table 7, turned out to be statistically significant at the 5% level for all
indicators in table A.9.
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Unfortunately, the increase in efficiency offered by the Prais-Winsten models was
not enough to provide evidence in favor of hypothesis 3 of this dissertation. Tables A.7
shows that
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is not significant at the 5% level for any of the
indicators. Table A.9 shows that
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is significant at the 5% level
only for the voice and accountability indicator. This result indicates that the effect of a
monetary expansion does not depend on the level of institutional development, except for
the voice and accountability indicator. In addition, for this indicator,
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
is
positive, contradicting hypothesis 3 of this dissertation. This unexpected result for the
voice and accountability indicator is illustrated by table A.10.
Our conclusions keep being the same for the hypothesis 2. Tables A.7 and A.9
show that
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is negative and
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive
and both of them are significant at the 5% level for all indicators, except for political
stability. This means that the effect on output of a money contraction is more negative in
countries with weaker institutional development than in countries with higher institutional
development. Tables A.8 and A.10 illustrate this evidence.
Finally, the openness variables included are jointly significant at the 5% level for
voice and accountability and at the 10% level for regulatory quality and rule of law. They
are not jointly significant for the other indicators. In addition, the total effect of the
interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates is positive and
significant at the 5% level in the regression for the voice and accountability indicator31.
31The total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates is given
by the sum of the coefficients associated with this interaction term divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. This total
effect for the voice and accountability regression is estimated to be .012584 with a corresponding p-value
of 0.020. This total effect is not significant in the other regressions. In addition, the total effect of the
interaction between openness and the positive growth rates in interest rates is given by the sum of the
coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. These total effects are not
significant at the 5% level in any of the regressions.
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This means that the effectiveness of monetary expansions decreases with the level of
openness, which is in accordance with the accepted economic theory.
9.3 Alternative Number of Lags
As a second robustness check, this subsection estimates equation 2 assuming alternative
values for J. Fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and Kraay standard errors will be
presented because this is our favorite and most conservative approach.
Table A.6 shows that the specification with 4 lags (J=4) is the second best option
for regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability and government effectiveness
and the third best option for control of corruption and political stability. Tables A.11 and
A.12 present the results for the estimation of equation 2 including four lags and the
openness variables as additional controls. The openness variables are jointly significant in
all regressions32. Table A.11 shows that
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is negative and(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive and both of them are significant at the 5% level for
all indicators, except for political stability. This evidence that an increase in interest rates
has more adverse effects on output in countries with relatively weak institutional
development, except for the political stability indicator, is illustrated in table A.12. Thus,
the models with 4 lags provide strong and additional support in favor of hypothesis 2.
There is not support in favor of hypothesis 3 (expansionary policies stimulate the output
more in countries with high institutional development than in countries with low
institutional development). Table A.11 shows that ∑Jj=1λ j and ∑
J
j=1ψ j are not significant
at the 5% level for any of the indicators. In addition, table A.12 confirms that the effect of
32The total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative/positive growth rates in interest rates
is given by the sum of the coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
.
These total effects are not significant in any of the regressions.
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a monetary expansion is not significantly different than zero for any institutional
development level.
Table A.6 shows that the specification with 8 lags (J=8) is the first best option for
political stability, the second best option for control of corruption and the third best option
for regulatory quality, rule of law, voice and accountability and government effectiveness.
Tables A.13 and A.14 present the results for equation 2 including eight lags and the
openness variables as additional controls. The openness variables are jointly significant in
all regressions33. Table A.13 shows that
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is negative and
significant at the 5% level for all indicators, except for political stability. In addition,(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive and significant at the 5% level for regulatory
quality, control of corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness, significant at the
10% level for voice and accountability and not significant for political stability. Table
A.14 shows that the effect on output of an increase in interest rates is more adverse for
countries with relatively weak institutions. In conclusion, the models with 8 lags support
hypothesis 2 of this dissertation, except for the political stability and voice and
accountability indicators34.
With respect to hypothesis 3, the models with 8 lags provide mixed evidence. On
one hand, table A.13 and table A.14 indicate that a decrease in interest rates has stronger
33The total effect of the interaction between openness and the positive growth rates in interest rates is given
by the sum of the coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. These
total effects are not significant at the 5% level in any of the regressions. The total effect of the interaction
between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates is given by the sum of the coefficients
associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. These total effects are not significant at
the 5% level in any of the regressions.
34Since the voice and accountability indicator lost its relevance in terms of supporting hypothesis 2,
compared to the previous models, we would proceed with the elimination of excessive lags of openness
and its interaction terms. However, the 8-th lag of the interaction between openness and the negative
growth rate in interest rates is significant in the voice and accountability model. Then, we do not eliminate
any lag of openness, concluding that hypothesis 2 is no longer supported by the voice and accountability
indicator.
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positive effects on output in countries with weaker political stability than in countries with
stronger political stability. The term
(
∑Jj=1λ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is negative and the term(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive and both of them are significant at the 5% level for
the political stability indicator. This evidence contradicts hypothesis 3 of this dissertation.
On the other hand, the results in table A.14 for control of corruption, voice and
accountability and, especially, for government effectiveness, weakly support hypothesis 3
of this dissertation. For example, a ten percentage point decrease in the growth rate of
central bank discount rates would produce an increase of 0.15 percentage points in the
quarterly real GDP growth for a country with government effectiveness equal to 2 and an
increase not significantly different than zero for a country with government effectiveness
equal or smaller than 0.5. However, this evidence is weak and should be interpreted with
caution because table A.13 shows that
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is not significant in the
model including the government effectiveness indicator, meaning that we cannot affirm
that these two mentioned effects are really statistically different from each other.
9.4 Institutional Quality or Financial Development?
In the subsection 5.2, we argue that an increase in central bank discount rates tends to
have more negative effects on output in countries with relatively low institutional
development because, among other reasons, firms are more bank-dependent in these
countries, that is, they are more limited in terms of finding alternative ways for capturing
funds. The development of capital markets would be constrained by poor investor
protection, low quality of contract enforcement and a weak legal framework. This
argument used for the construction of our second hypothesis may induce the reader to the
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conclusion that, eventually, it is the level of financial development that matters for the
effectiveness of monetary policies rather than the level of institutional development. In
addition, there is support for the argument that financial development matters for the
effectiveness of monetary policies. Carranza, Galdon-Sanchez, and Gomez-Biscarri
(2010), for example, provides empirical evidence that the cumulative impact of monetary
policies is larger when the financial system is less developed and the level of activity in
the stock market is smaller. This subsection aims to address the criticism that it is the level
of financial development, and not the level of institutional development, the ultimate
explanation for the degree of effectiveness of monetary policies.
Thus, as a third robustness check, the variable financial development and its
interaction with positive and negative growth rates in central bank discount rates are
included in all regressions as additional controls. The financial development variable
( f di,t) is defined as the number of publicly listed companies per capita (Beck et al.
(2000)), as detailed in table A.335 36. If the institutional variables and their interactions
with interest rates become insignificant after the inclusion of the financial development
variables, this means that the effectiveness of monetary policies may depend on
institutional development, but only through its effect on financial development (in the case
that financial development statistically matters for the effectiveness of monetary policies).
If the institutional variables and their interactions with interest rates keep being significant
after the inclusion of the financial development variables, this means that institutions have
a direct impact on the effectiveness of monetary policies, even though they may have also
35The financial development variable is only available at an annual frequency. We assume that the financial
development index is constant over the quarters inside each year. This is the same assumption used for the
institutional development indicators.
36Correlation between financial development and institutional development: 0.4355 (regulatory quality),
0.4157 (control of corruption), 0.2413 (political stability), 0.3917 (rule of law), 0.2524 (voice and
accountability) and 0.4398 (government effectiveness)
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an impact through financial development. In this case, we can state that the degree of
monetary policy effectiveness has deep institutional causes.
Table A.15 presents fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and Kraay standard
errors, including also the openness variables as additional controls. For each institutional
indicator, J in equation 2 was chosen following the AIC criterion presented in table A.6.
After the inclusion of J lags of openness, financial development and their interaction
terms, the total effect
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
was no longer significant at the 5% level
in the regressions including control of corruption and voice and accountability. Then, we
proceed with the elimination of insignificant lags of openness and financial development
for these two models. Following this procedure, we ended up choosing the model with
one lag of openness and three lags of financial development for the specification using
control of corruption and one lag of openness and no lags of financial development for the
specification using voice and accountability as the measure of institutional development.
According to table A.15, we conclude that hypothesis 2 is supported by regulatory quality,
rule of law, voice and accountability and government effectiveness. Table A.15 shows that(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is negative and
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive and both
of them are significant at the 5% level for these indicators. This evidence is illustrated by
table A.16, which shows the effect of an increase/decrease in interest rates at specific
institutional development levels. For all these indicators, table A.16 describes that the
effect of an increase in interest rates is more negative for countries with relatively weak
institutional development.
There is no evidence in favor of hypothesis 3. Actually, the results presented for
political stability in tables A.15 and A.16 contradict hypothesis 3. The total effect
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(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive and significant at the 5% level for this indicator,
meaning that money expansions are more effective in terms of output promotion in
countries with relatively weak institutional development.
The openness variables are jointly significant in all regressions. The total effect of
the interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates is given by
the sum of the coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. These total effects are positive and significant at the 5% level for control
of corruption and voice and accountability37. This means that the effectiveness of money
expansions diminishes with the level of openness, as predicted by the accepted economic
theory. The financial development variables are jointly significant in the models for
regulatory quality, political stability and rule of law and not jointly significant in the
models for control of corruption and government effectiveness38.
9.5 Discussion of the Empirical Results
First, the results presented in this section are in accordance with numerous empirical
works (Cover (1992), Rhee and Rich (1995), Garibaldi (1997), Karras and Stokes (1999),
among others) that have showed that expansionary monetary policies have smaller and
less statistically significant effects on output than contractionary policies.
Second, there is strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 2 for regulatory quality, rule
of law and government effectiveness. Fixed-effects models with 4, 5 and 8 lags and
37The total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates was
estimated to be 0.007371 for control of corruption and 0.009304 for voice and accountability. This effect
is not significant at the 5% level for any other regression. In addition, the total effect of the interaction
between openness and the positive growth rates in interest rates is not significant at the 5% level in any of
the regressions.
38The total effect of the interaction between financial development and the negative/positive growth rates in
interest rates is not significant at the 5% level in any of the models.
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Prais-Winsten models with 5 lags support hypothesis 2 for the mentioned indicators. The
evidence is robust to the inclusion of openness, financial development and their
interactions with policy rates. There is strong evidence that a contractionary monetary
policy will have more adverse effects on output in countries with lower institutional
development than in countries with higher institutional development. The effectiveness of
monetary contractions seems to have deep institutional causes.
Figure 3 exemplifies the evidence presented in this section in favor of hypothesis 2.
The total effects of monetary contractions on the real GDP growth were derived from the
fixed-effects model with five lags and openness variables as controls (tables 7 and 8). The
graph shows that the effect of an increase in interest rates on output is more negative for a
country with regulatory quality equal to -0.1 (low ID) than for a country with regulatory
quality equal to 1.1 (high ID). The 95% confidence interval associated with the effect
estimated for the country with low institutional development embraces only negative
values, meaning that this effect is negative and statistically significant at the 5% level. On
the other hand, the 95% confidence interval associated with the effect estimated for the
country with high institutional development floats around zero, indicating that this effect
is not statistically significant.39
Figure 4 demonstrates the relevance of the rule of law indicator for the transmission
of monetary policies. The graph describes the result estimated for the fixed-effects model
with five lags and openness variables as controls (tables 7 and 8). A permanent ten percent
increase in interest rates is expected to reduce the quarterly real GDP growth rate by
almost one percentage point, on average, in a country with average rule of law equal to
39Despite not being the research question of this study, Figure B.1 presents the estimated total effect of
institutional development on real GDP growth. The graph displays a positive relationship between
institutional development and real GDP growth.
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Figure 3 Empirical Evidence on the Hypothesis 2 - Regulatory Quality
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Total effects were extracted from table 8 for the regulatory quality indicator. Low ID
(institutional development) represents a country with regulatory quality equal to -0.1 and high
ID represents a country with regulatory quality equal to 1.1.
-0.4 (low ID country). The same change in interest rates would not be statistically
different than zero in a country with average rule of law equal to 1.2 (high ID country).
Figure 5 shows that the effect of a given money contraction in a country with low
government effectiveness (low ID) is statistically different than the effect of the same
money contraction in a country with high government effectiveness (high ID). The graph
demonstrates that a permanent ten percent increase in central bank discount rates would
produce a reduction of approximately 1 percentage point in the quarterly real GDP growth
in a country with average government effectiveness equal to 0 (low ID country). The
effect of the same policy would not be statistically different than zero in a country with
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Figure 4 Empirical Evidence on the Hypothesis 2 - Rule of Law
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Total effects were extracted from table 8 for the rule of law indicator. Low ID (institutional
development) represents a country with rule of law equal to -0.4 and high ID represents a
country with rule of law equal to 1.2.
government effectiveness equal to 1.5 (high ID country). The evidence indicates that the
effect of an increase in interest rates in countries with average government effectiveness
equal or smaller than zero (Ukraine, Bolivia, Egypt, Russian Federation, Peru, Indonesia,
Macedonia, Colombia, Philippines and Brazil) is more pronounced and statistically
different than the effect of the same increase in interest rates in a country with average
government effectiveness equal or greater than 1.5 (Ireland, United States, Germany,
France, United Kingdom, Belgium, China,P.R.:Hong Kong, New Zealand, Australia,
Austria, Iceland, Netherlands, Canada, Norway, Switzerland, Sweden, Finland and
Denmark), supporting hypothesis 2 of this dissertation.
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Figure 5 Empirical Evidence on the Hypothesis 2 - Government Effectiveness
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Total effects were extracted from table 8 for the government effectiveness indicator. Low ID
(institutional development) represents a country with government effectiveness equal to 0 and
high ID represents a country with government effectiveness equal to 1.5.
Third, the evidence in favor of hypothesis 3 (expansionary policies stimulate the
output more in countries with high institutional development than in countries with low
institutional development) is weak and provided mainly by the government effectiveness
indicator. The support was extracted from the fixed-effects models with 5 and 8 lags and
openness variables as additional controls. For these models, we estimate that a decrease in
interest rates is more effective in terms of output promotion in countries with higher
government effectiveness than in countries with lower government effectiveness. The total
effect of money expansions was found to be statistically significant only for countries with
relatively high government effectiveness. However, we have to mention that this evidence
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is pretty fragile because the fact that the impact is significant for countries with high
institutional development and not significant for countries with low institutional
development does not make them statistically different from each other.
Figure 6 illustrates the evidence in favor of hypothesis 3. The total effects of
monetary expansions on the real GDP growth were derived from the fixed-effects model
with eight lags and openness variables as controls (tables A.13 and A.14). The graph
shows that the effect of a decrease in interest rates on output is greater for a country with
government effectiveness equal to 2 (high ID) than for a country with government
effectiveness equal to -0.5 (low ID). The 95% confidence interval associated with the
effect estimated for the country with high institutional development embraces only
positive values, meaning that this effect is positive and statistically significant at the 5%
level. On the other hand, the 95% confidence interval associated with the effect estimated
for the country with low institutional development is quite imprecise, indicating that it is
not possible to reject the hypothesis that this effect is equal to zero. However, the
complete overlap between the two confidence intervals makes the evidence pretty fragile.
It is not possible to state that the effect estimated for a country with high ID is really
statistically different from the effect estimated for a country with low ID.
Finally, the political stability indicator requires special consideration. In general,
this indicator does not provide support for hypothesis 2 and contradicts hypothesis 3. The
detailed description of this measure provided by Kaufmann et al. (2010) indicates that
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism reflects perceptions of the likelihood
that the government will be destabilized or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent
means, including politically-motivated violence and terrorism. Some countries in our
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Figure 6 Empirical Evidence on the Hypothesis 3
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Total effects were extracted from table A.14 for the government effectiveness indicator. Low
ID (institutional development) represents a country with government effectiveness equal to
-0.5 and high ID represents a country with government effectiveness equal to 2.
sample, despite having good overall institutional development, score below the average in
terms of political stability. This is the case of Cyprus, France, Israel, Republic of Korea,
Malaysia, Spain, United Kingdom and United States. All these countries score above the
average in terms of government effectiveness and below the average in terms of political
stability. For example, while Spain scores on average 1.2 in government effectiveness and
Brazil scores zero in this indicator, both countries score approximately zero in political
stability. United States scores 1.6 in government effectiveness and Bulgaria scores zero in
this indicator, even though, the two countries have similar low scores in political stability,
0.2 for United States and 0.3 for Bulgaria. Israel and Indonesia score poorly in political
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stability, respectively, -1.4 and -1.3. However, Israel scores above the average in terms of
government effectiveness, 1.2, and Indonesia scores below the average in this indicator,
-0.3. All this makes political stability a complicated indicator of institutional development
that may lead to misleading conclusions. In general, we may conclude that the level of
political stability and absence of violence/terrorism is irrelevant for the effectiveness of
monetary contractions. In addition, the evidence against hypothesis 3 provided by some
regressions using the political stability indicator should be interpreted with caution. If this
evidence is driven by countries with overall high institutional development and poor
scores in political stability, the results can actually be interpreted as an indication in favor
of hypothesis 3, meaning that the effect of monetary expansions on output tends to be
relatively great in countries with low political stability but overall high institutional
development.
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10 Evaluation of Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II
In this section we present an alternative methodology to evaluate the hypotheses 2 and 3
developed in the section 5 of this dissertation. The main objective of this section is to
address the criticism that discount rates are endogenous to real GDP growth. It is likely
that discount rates respond to movements in the real output. This lack of exogeneity in
one of our main independent variables may cause some bias in the estimated results. In
the previous section, this endogeneity in the form of reverse causality was mitigated
through the inclusion of lagged values of the explanatory variables and the exclusion of
current values of these variables. In this section, an alternative approach is introduced as
an important robustness check.
The methodology consists of two steps. In the first step, a model for the discount
rate growth is estimated and the residuals are extracted. In the second step, equation 2,
presented in the previous section, is rewritten using the residuals estimated in the first step
instead of the growth rate of central bank discount rates. This two-step approach was used
by Cover (1992), Rhee and Rich (1995), Garibaldi (1997), Karras (1999), Karras and
Stokes (1999), Karras (2001) and Berument, Konac, and Senay (2007).
Equation 3 specifies a model for the discount rate growth and composes the first
step. The model is written in terms of past values of the growth rate of central bank
discount rate and past values of the real output growth rate. In addition, following the
specification used by Garibaldi (1997) and Berument et al. (2007), past values of inflation
rates are also included in the model.
gdisci,t =
J
∑
j=1
ρ jgdisci,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
η jgyi,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
χ jin f li,t− j +δ trendt +νi,t (3)
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The variable gdisci,t is the growth rate of central bank discount rate in percentage
points for country i at time t. The variable gdisci,t− j is the j-th lag of the growth rate of
central bank discount rate. The variable gyi,t− j is the j-th lag of the seasonally adjusted
growth rate of real GDP in percentage points for each country i. The variable in f li,t− j is
the j-th lag of the inflation rate in percentage points for each country i. The variable trendt
is a linear trend in time. Finally, νi,t = pii +ωi,t , where pii is modeled as fixed-effects and
ωi,t is the idiosyncratic error.
The rationale for equation 3 is that central bankers set discount rates in response to
inflation rates and output movements. Current values of these two variables are not
included in order to reduce a potential reverse causality problem that might arise. In
addition, past values of the discount rate growth are also included in the model because
expansionary or contractionary policies may exhibit some inertia.
The shocks ωi,t extracted from equation 3 offer an alternative measure for the
discount rate growth variable, mitigating the endogeneity of policy rates with respect to
the real GDP growth rates. In this sense, the shocks ωi,t represent the exogenous part of
the discount rate movements or the discount rate growth series after subtracting the effect
that the real GDP growth has on policy rate movements.
In the second step, the equation 2 presented in the previous section will be rewritten
using only the exogenous part of monetary policies, which is described by ωi,t . In order to
deal with the asymmetric effects of monetary policies, the residuals ωi,t extracted from
equation 3 are used to derive two additional variables, one including only the positive
shocks and other including only the negative shocks. The addition of these two series
results in the original series. Thus, the positive discount rate shocks are defined as:
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ω+i,t = max(ωi,t ,0)
and the negative discount rate shocks are defined as:
ω−i,t = min(ωi,t ,0)
In the second step, equation 2 will be rewritten using these alternative monetary
policy measures:
gyi,t =
J
∑
j=1
γ jgyi,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
φ jω+i,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
Θ jinsti,t− jω+i,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
λ jω−i,t− j+
J
∑
j=1
ψ jinsti,t− jω−i,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
τ jinsti,t− j +δ trendt +Z
′
i,tv+ui,t (4)
The variable gyi,t is the seasonally adjusted real GDP growth for each country i at
each time period t. The variable ω+i,t− j represents the exogenous part of the positive
growth rates in central bank discount rates. The variable ω−i,t− j represents the exogenous
part of the negative growth rates in central bank discount rates. These positive and
negative shocks in the growth rate of interest rates interact with one of the six measures of
institutional development, insti,t− j. The term trendt is a linear trend in time. Z
′
i,t is a vector
of control variables. Finally, ui,t is the error term. We assume that the error term is
described as ui,t = αi + εi,t , where αi is modeled as fixed-effects and εi,t is the
idiosyncratic error.
Table A.17 presents the results estimated for equation 3, which composes the
first-step. Initially, we assume that J=4 for all variables. This choice is explained by the
fact that we are using quarterly data. The inclusion of four lags guarantees that all the four
quarters of the year will be taken into account by the set of explanatory variables. In
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addition, we are not considering the inclusion of more than four lags to avoid an excessive
loss of observations, as we have to remember that the approach developed in this section
consists of two steps, and each of them makes use of lagged explanatory variables. The
estimation of the model described by equation 3 proceeds with the elimination of lags that
are not significant, from the highest to the lowest orders. Following this procedure, we
choose the model with one lag of discount rate growth, two lags of real GDP growth, two
lags of inflation and no time trend. The residuals ωi,t are extracted and used to derive the
positive and negative discount rate shock series, as previously explained. It is important to
mention that the results estimated for equation 3 and displayed in table A.17 are quite
intuitive. Discount rate movements are explained by previous discount rate movements.
The coefficient estimated for the first lag of the discount rate growth is positive,
highlighting the inertial component of monetary policies. In addition, discount rates
increase in response to increases in real GDP growth and inflation rates, a result that is in
accordance with the expectations.
The residuals ω+i,t and ω
−
i,t derived from the first step are used in the second step,
which consists of the estimation of equation 4. The AIC criterion was used to select the
most appropriate number of lags that should be included in equation 4. Fixed-effects
models without additional controls were estimated assuming J=4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. The
choice of J ≥ 4 is based on the results of the previous section, where the models with 4, 5
and 8 lags were pointed as the favorite ones. Table A.18 indicates that we should choose
the model with 4 lags for all institutional development indicators, except for political
stability, whose model with 5 lags seems to be more appropriate.
Table 9 presents fixed-effects estimations of the model described by equation 4
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without the inclusion of additional controls. Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are
presented for the coefficient estimates. These standard errors are robust to disturbances
being heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and cross-sectionally dependent and seem to be
appropriate for long panels with cross-country macroeconomic data.
Table 9 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors
- Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0764 0.0770 0.0891 0.0781 0.0802 0.0769
(0.115) (0.116) (0.114) (0.116) (0.116) (0.114)
gy2 0.174* 0.176* 0.175* 0.177* 0.178* 0.175*
(0.0447) (0.0444) (0.0479) (0.0453) (0.0453) (0.0443)
gy3 -0.0508 -0.0489 -0.0668* -0.0477 -0.0475 -0.0514
(0.0344) (0.0339) (0.0304) (0.0339) (0.0332) (0.0348)
gy4 -0.0962* -0.0976* -0.104* -0.0936* -0.0933* -0.0959*
(0.0411) (0.0430) (0.0478) (0.0422) (0.0408) (0.0417)
gy5 0.0938
(0.0576)
ω1+ -0.0206 -0.0156 -0.00617 -0.0155 -0.0163 -0.0249
(0.0143) (0.0119) (0.00799) (0.0123) (0.0121) (0.0155)
ω2+ 0.000142 0.000384 0.00523 0.00250 0.00641 0.00302
(0.00815) (0.00657) (0.00579) (0.00609) (0.00732) (0.00797)
ω3+ -0.00447 -0.00241 -0.00119 -0.00350 -0.00494 -0.00378
(0.0234) (0.0164) (0.0113) (0.0177) (0.0211) (0.0213)
ω4+ -0.0218* -0.0106* -0.00268 -0.0125* -0.0157* -0.0176*
(0.00658) (0.00504) (0.00459) (0.00549) (0.00686) (0.00580)
ω5+ 0.00884
(0.0102)
inst1∗ω1+ 0.0137+ 0.00859+ 0.00231 0.00935 0.0107+ 0.0154*
(0.00736) (0.00478) (0.00418) (0.00567) (0.00608) (0.00756)
inst2∗ω2+ 0.00738+ 0.00724* 0.00760 0.00538* 0.00220 0.00418
(0.00408) (0.00217) (0.00470) (0.00250) (0.00432) (0.00330)
inst3∗ω3+ 0.00179 -0.000103 -0.00177 0.000983 0.00304 0.000917
(0.0155) (0.00901) (0.00804) (0.0106) (0.0153) (0.0122)
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inst4∗ω4+ 0.0180* 0.00757* 0.000901 0.00985* 0.0155* 0.0129*
(0.00415) (0.00239) (0.00516) (0.00273) (0.00459) (0.00289)
inst5∗ω5+ 0.00348
(0.0103)
ω1− 0.0119* 0.0176* 0.0126* 0.0162* 0.0184* 0.0177*
(0.00533) (0.00477) (0.00293) (0.00496) (0.00478) (0.00588)
ω2− -0.0150 -0.0162+ -0.0123+ -0.0152 -0.0230+ -0.0164
(0.0109) (0.00922) (0.00614) (0.00961) (0.0116) (0.0108)
ω3− -0.0129 -0.00955 -0.00811+ -0.00880 -0.00585 -0.0101
(0.0108) (0.00802) (0.00406) (0.00788) (0.00459) (0.0103)
ω4− 0.00700 0.00813 0.00194 0.00663 0.00603 0.00804
(0.00929) (0.00713) (0.00407) (0.00750) (0.00671) (0.00820)
ω5− -0.0121*
(0.00256)
inst1∗ω1− 0.00505+ 0.00114 0.00933* 0.00217 0.000147 0.00105
(0.00281) (0.00205) (0.00366) (0.00242) (0.00445) (0.00291)
inst2∗ω2− 0.00283 0.00375 -0.000413 0.00310 0.0114 0.00389
(0.00468) (0.00306) (0.00364) (0.00368) (0.00715) (0.00423)
inst3∗ω3− 0.00650 0.00394 0.00350+ 0.00344 0.00107 0.00418
(0.00630) (0.00414) (0.00197) (0.00425) (0.00246) (0.00573)
inst4∗ω4− -0.00580 -0.00668 -0.00531 -0.00573 -0.00713 -0.00633
(0.00606) (0.00443) (0.00581) (0.00482) (0.00579) (0.00495)
inst5∗ω5− 0.00419+
(0.00240)
inst1 0.250 0.316 1.315* -0.106 -1.005* -0.209
(0.637) (0.480) (0.442) (0.797) (0.452) (0.524)
inst2 0.448 -0.346 -1.044* 0.958 1.628+ 0.441
(0.771) (0.936) (0.486) (0.657) (0.906) (0.638)
inst3 0.0630 0.599 0.575 -1.407 -1.090 0.284
(0.663) (0.741) (0.638) (1.091) (1.095) (0.436)
inst4 -1.049 -0.356 0.739 0.327 0.578 -0.272
(0.778) (0.659) (0.600) (0.575) (0.519) (0.297)
inst5 -1.197
(0.792)
trend -0.0288* -0.0281* -0.0313* -0.0287* -0.0289* -0.0280*
(0.00976) (0.00964) (0.0113) (0.00971) (0.00971) (0.00976)
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Constant 1.570* 1.126* 1.050* 1.490* 1.199* 1.079*
(0.368) (0.224) (0.210) (0.563) (0.418) (0.358)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0468 -0.0282 0.00403 -0.0290 -0.0306 -0.0432
[0.0103] [0.0566] [0.826] [0.0251] [0.0856] [0.00749]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0409 0.0233 0.0125 0.0256 0.0315 0.0334
[0.00467] [0.00511] [0.321] [0.00673] [0.0346] [0.00114]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.00893 0.0000306 -0.0179 -0.00118 -0.00440 -0.000825
[0.549] [0.998] [0.0861] [0.915] [0.748] [0.945]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00859 0.00214 0.0113 0.00299 0.00548 0.00279
[0.234] [0.647] [0.0541] [0.515] [0.556] [0.603]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.103 0.107 0.188 0.114 0.117 0.104
[0.367] [0.359] [0.139] [0.327] [0.313] [0.359]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0521 -0.0316 0.00496 -0.0327 -0.0347 -0.0483
[0.021] [0.062] [0.826] [0.034] [0.090] [0.015]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0456 0.0261 0.0154 0.0288 0.0356 0.0373
[0.016] [0.012] [0.333] [0.017] [0.045] [0.006]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.00996 0.0000343 -0.0220 -0.00133 -0.00498 -0.000922
[0.559] [0.998] [0.123] [0.916] [0.750] [0.945]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00957 0.00240 0.0139 0.00337 0.00621 0.00312
[0.250] [0.646] [0.070] [0.522] [0.557] [0.605]
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
within R2 0.1151 0.1143 0.1360 0.1128 0.1133 0.1143
Results estimated for equation 4. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 4. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality
(reg), control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol),
rule of law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic
trend was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll
and Kraay standard errors.
As explained in the previous section, the total effect of a permanent one percent
increase in discount rates is given by:
(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. If our
second hypothesis (contractionary policies reduce the output more in countries with low
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institutional development than in countries with high institutional development) holds this
total effect is expected to be statistically significant, relevant in size and considerably
dependent on the level of institutional development. In addition, ∑Jj=1φ j is expected to be
negative and ∑Jj=1Θ j is expected to be positive. More specifically, we will consider that
our second hypothesis holds whenever
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is positive and
significant at the 5% level. The total effect of a permanent one percent decrease in
discount rates is given by:
(
−∑Jj=1λ j−∑Jj=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. If our third
hypothesis (expansionary policies stimulate the output more in countries with high
institutional development than in countries with low institutional development) holds this
total effect is expected to be statistically significant, relevant in size and considerably
dependent on the level of institutional development. In addition, ∑Jj=1λ j is expected to be
negative and ∑Jj=1ψ j is also expected to be negative. More specifically, we will consider
that our third hypothesis holds whenever
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is negative and
significant at the 5% level.
Table 9 provides evidence that an increase in central bank discount rates will have
more adverse effects on output under weaker institutional environments than under
stronger institutional environments, supporting hypothesis 2 of this dissertation. The total
effect of the positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative
and significant at the 5% level for regulatory quality, rule of law and government
effectiveness. The total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term
between institutional development and the positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is positive and significant at the 5% level for all indicators,
except for political stability. Then, we can conclude that hypothesis 2 is supported by all
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institutional development indicators, with the exception of political stability. However,
there is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 of this dissertation because ∑Jj=1λ j and
∑Jj=1ψ j are not significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators.
It is also interesting to present the estimated total effect of a permanent one percent
increase in discount rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, and of a
permanent one percent decrease in discount rates,(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, at specific levels of insti,t− j. Table 10
presents these effects and their standard errors for different levels of institutional
development.
Table 10 Estimated Total Effect at Specific Values of Institutional Development -
Fixed-Effects Regressions - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0259
(0.0513)
-1.5 -0.0182
(0.0437)
-1 -0.0977* -0.0577* -0.0105 -0.0616* -0.0703+ -0.0856*
(0.0381) (0.0241) (0.0363) (0.0236) (0.0354) (0.0301)
-0.5 -0.0749* -0.0446* -0.00275 -0.0471* -0.0525+ -0.0669*
(0.0297) (0.0201) (0.0291) (0.0189) (0.0274) (0.0244)
0 -0.0521* -0.0316+ 0.00496 -0.0327* -0.0347+ -0.0483*
(0.0219) (0.0165) (0.0225) (0.0150) (0.0201) (0.0191)
0.5 -0.0293+ -0.0185 0.0127 -0.0183 -0.0169 -0.0296+
(0.0155) (0.0140) (0.0169) (0.0127) (0.0143) (0.0149)
1 -0.00654 -0.00550 0.0204 -0.00388 0.000959 -0.0110
(0.0131) (0.0129) (0.0138) (0.0128) (0.0125) (0.0128)
1.5 0.0163 0.00754 0.0281+ 0.0105 0.0188 0.00765
(0.0163) (0.0137) (0.0148) (0.0153) (0.0161) (0.0139)
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2 0.0391+ 0.0206 0.0250 0.0366 0.0263
(0.0230) (0.0162) (0.0193) (0.0226) (0.0175)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0499+
(0.0276)
-1.5 -0.0429+
(0.0241)
-1 -0.0195 -0.00237 -0.0360+ -0.00470 -0.0112 -0.00404
(0.0249) (0.0166) (0.0206) (0.0173) (0.0254) (0.0190)
-0.5 -0.0147 -0.00117 -0.0290+ -0.00301 -0.00809 -0.00248
(0.0209) (0.0142) (0.0172) (0.0148) (0.0204) (0.0161)
0 -0.00996 0.0000343 -0.0220 -0.00133 -0.00498 -0.000922
(0.0169) (0.0119) (0.0141) (0.0125) (0.0156) (0.0134)
0.5 -0.00517 0.00123 -0.0151 0.000357 -0.00188 0.000636
(0.0131) (0.00982) (0.0113) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.0107)
1 -0.000385 0.00241 -0.00814 0.00204 0.00123 0.00219
(0.00946) (0.00800) (0.00920) (0.00815) (0.00766) (0.00827)
1.5 0.00440 0.00363 -0.00118 0.00373 0.00433 0.00375
(0.00644) (0.00665) (0.00840) (0.00652) (0.00702) (0.00633)
2 0.00919+ 0.00483 0.00542 0.00743 0.00531
(0.00523) (0.00619) (0.00567) (0.00975) (0.00546)
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table 9 (equation 4).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality
(reg), control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol),
rule of law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Table 10 shows that an increase in interest rates has more negative effects on output
for countries with relatively weak institutional development. This is true for all
institutional indicators, except for political stability. Table 10 shows that a ten percent
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increase in central bank discount rates would produce a decrease of 0.97 percentage points
in the quarterly real GDP growth for a country with average regulatory quality equal to -1
and a decrease not significantly different than zero for a country with average regulatory
quality equal to 1 or 1.5. A ten percent increase in central bank discount rates would
produce a decrease of 0.57 percentage point in the quarterly real GDP growth for a
country with average control of corruption equal to -1 and a reduction not significantly
different than zero for a country with average control of corruption equal or higher than
0.5. Similar evidence is provided by rule of law, voice and accountability and government
effectiveness. As described by table 9, table 10 shows that a decrease in interest rates is
ineffective in terms of output promotion for all countries, meaning that there is no
evidence to support hypothesis 3 of this dissertation.
As a robustness check, J lags of the variable openness and its interaction with
positive and negative growth rates of central bank discount rates are included in the
previous regressions. As mentioned in the previous section, Karras (1999) and Karras
(2001) provide empirical evidence that the more open the economy, the smaller the effects
of monetary policies on output. There is a positive correlation between institutional
development and openness 40. Then, our previous results may be capturing the effects of
openness instead of the relevance of the institutional indicators.
Table 11 presents the results estimated for equation 4 after controlling for
openness. Initially, J lags of openness and its interaction terms are included in all
regressions, where J is determined according to the AIC criterion displayed in table A.18.
In all regressions, the openness variables have a jointly significant effect on output. The
40Correlations between openness and the institutional indicators: 0.24 (regulatory quality); 0.11 (control of
corruption); 0.28 (political stability); 0.16 (rule of law); 0.0017 (voice and accountability) and 0.18
(government effectiveness).
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total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term between institutional
development and the positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
,
keeps being positive and significant at the 5% level for regulatory quality, control of
corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness. This effect is now significant only at
the 10% level for voice and accountability and it keeps being insignificant for political
stability. The total effect of the positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the 5% level only for government
effectiveness. This effect is significant at the 10% level for regulatory quality, control of
corruption and rule of law and it is not significant for political stability and voice and
accountability. In order to reduce the loss of efficiency caused by the inclusion of
excessive lags of openness, we proceed with the elimination of lags of openness and its
interaction terms that are not significant, from the highest to the lowest orders. In this way,
we reduce the standard errors of the variables of interest without ignoring the role played
by additional controls. Following this procedure, we choose the model with one lag of
openness for regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law, voice and accountability
and government effectiveness and the model with five lags of openness for the political
stability indicator, as displayed in table 11.
Table 11 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors -
with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0770 0.0774 0.0902 0.0787 0.0809 0.0772
(0.115) (0.116) (0.113) (0.116) (0.117) (0.115)
gy2 0.176* 0.179* 0.168* 0.179* 0.180* 0.177*
(0.0452) (0.0452) (0.0493) (0.0461) (0.0462) (0.0450)
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gy3 -0.0482 -0.0461 -0.0580* -0.0450 -0.0441 -0.0493
(0.0309) (0.0307) (0.0234) (0.0308) (0.0299) (0.0316)
gy4 -0.0930* -0.0943* -0.0992* -0.0904* -0.0900* -0.0932*
(0.0401) (0.0422) (0.0448) (0.0414) (0.0402) (0.0409)
gy5 0.108+
(0.0557)
ω1+ -0.0186 -0.0139 0.00105 -0.0132 -0.00937 -0.0237
(0.0166) (0.0145) (0.00778) (0.0146) (0.0121) (0.0179)
ω2+ 0.000534 0.000490 0.00993* 0.00261 0.00630 0.00327
(0.00811) (0.00652) (0.00421) (0.00602) (0.00746) (0.00791)
ω3+ -0.00425 -0.00248 -0.00165 -0.00359 -0.00566 -0.00373
(0.0233) (0.0165) (0.0105) (0.0176) (0.0209) (0.0213)
ω4+ -0.0215* -0.0106* -0.0120* -0.0124* -0.0158* -0.0175*
(0.00668) (0.00515) (0.00501) (0.00565) (0.00708) (0.00597)
ω5+ 0.00924
(0.00720)
inst1∗ω1+ 0.0146+ 0.00882+ 0.00227 0.00941 0.00882 0.0158+
(0.00750) (0.00493) (0.00422) (0.00580) (0.00588) (0.00786)
inst2∗ω2+ 0.00697+ 0.00697* 0.00763+ 0.00512* 0.00211 0.00382
(0.00403) (0.00216) (0.00446) (0.00250) (0.00446) (0.00322)
inst3∗ω3+ 0.00147 -0.000167 -0.00180 0.000916 0.00338 0.000798
(0.0154) (0.00895) (0.00792) (0.0105) (0.0151) (0.0121)
inst4∗ω4+ 0.0178* 0.00758* 0.00115 0.00985* 0.0156* 0.0129*
(0.00422) (0.00240) (0.00531) (0.00282) (0.00484) (0.00296)
inst5∗ω5+ 0.00385
(0.0105)
ω1− 0.0111+ 0.0146* 0.0103* 0.0128* 0.0101 0.0151*
(0.00588) (0.00557) (0.00361) (0.00575) (0.00652) (0.00681)
ω2− -0.0151 -0.0160+ -0.00774 -0.0150 -0.0227+ -0.0164
(0.0109) (0.00916) (0.00619) (0.00954) (0.0121) (0.0108)
ω3− -0.0127 -0.00942 -0.00916+ -0.00863 -0.00570 -0.0100
(0.0108) (0.00804) (0.00481) (0.00778) (0.00448) (0.0102)
ω4− 0.00743 0.00827 0.00143 0.00671 0.00543 0.00819
(0.00935) (0.00713) (0.00406) (0.00742) (0.00638) (0.00820)
ω5− -0.0139*
(0.00291)
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inst1∗ω1− 0.00275 -0.0000726 0.00837* 0.00140 0.00321 -0.000442
(0.00310) (0.00211) (0.00380) (0.00242) (0.00541) (0.00317)
inst2∗ω2− 0.00311 0.00394 0.000854 0.00329 0.0115 0.00422
(0.00501) (0.00314) (0.00358) (0.00371) (0.00745) (0.00436)
inst3∗ω3− 0.00647 0.00393 0.00199 0.00343 0.00118 0.00418
(0.00626) (0.00412) (0.00167) (0.00417) (0.00238) (0.00570)
inst4∗ω4− -0.00616 -0.00684 -0.00564 -0.00586 -0.00668 -0.00653
(0.00617) (0.00453) (0.00596) (0.00485) (0.00559) (0.00505)
inst5∗ω5− 0.00304
(0.00234)
inst1 0.223 0.313 1.302* -0.135 -1.048* -0.211
(0.626) (0.492) (0.440) (0.784) (0.464) (0.513)
inst2 0.439 -0.348 -1.081* 0.934 1.608+ 0.416
(0.771) (0.935) (0.494) (0.655) (0.907) (0.617)
inst3 0.0714 0.582 0.590 -1.398 -1.042 0.285
(0.657) (0.739) (0.633) (1.103) (1.087) (0.434)
inst4 -1.065 -0.320 0.690 0.342 0.592 -0.254
(0.780) (0.633) (0.584) (0.595) (0.565) (0.294)
inst5 -1.160
(0.745)
trend -0.0280* -0.0272* -0.0289* -0.0278* -0.0278* -0.0274*
(0.00955) (0.00946) (0.0103) (0.00947) (0.00966) (0.00960)
open1 -0.237 -0.261 1.254 -0.266 -0.294 -0.193
(0.473) (0.452) (1.202) (0.457) (0.477) (0.456)
open2 -2.316
(1.761)
open3 1.294
(0.927)
open4 -1.421+
(0.757)
open5 0.490
(0.517)
open1∗ω1+ -0.00324 -0.00191 -0.00817 -0.00240 -0.00544 -0.00148
(0.00633) (0.00603) (0.00619) (0.00559) (0.00496) (0.00548)
open2∗ω2+ -0.00563
(0.00694)
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open3∗ω3+ 0.00211
(0.0103)
open4∗ω4+ 0.0105
(0.00634)
open5∗ω5+ -0.0000926
(0.00815)
open1∗ω1− 0.00323* 0.00383* 0.00136 0.00359* 0.00450* 0.00380*
(0.00147) (0.00149) (0.00251) (0.00148) (0.00154) (0.00138)
open2∗ω2− -0.00546*
(0.00225)
open3∗ω3− 0.00156
(0.00253)
open4∗ω4− 0.000594
(0.00331)
open5∗ω5− 0.00399*
(0.00161)
Constant 1.812* 1.333* 1.636* 1.736* 1.442* 1.249*
(0.617) (0.437) (0.532) (0.549) (0.435) (0.499)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0438 -0.0264 0.00659 -0.0266 -0.0246 -0.0417
[0.00678] [0.0648] [0.541] [0.0320] [0.195] [0.00525]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0408 0.0232 0.0131 0.0253 0.0299 0.0333
[0.00338] [0.00397] [0.313] [0.00585] [0.0452] [0.000640]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.00928 -0.00252 -0.0191 -0.00408 -0.0129 -0.00318
[0.488] [0.790] [0.0648] [0.677] [0.388] [0.766]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00616 0.000947 0.00861 0.00226 0.00924 0.00143
[0.386] [0.843] [0.122] [0.624] [0.385] [0.788]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.112 0.116 0.210 0.123 0.127 0.112
[0.332] [0.328] [0.0994] [0.297] [0.286] [0.336]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0493 -0.0299 0.00835 -0.0303 -0.0281 -0.0469
[0.013] [0.058] [0.532] [0.030] [0.185] [0.008]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0460 0.0262 0.0166 0.0288 0.0343 0.0375
[0.015] [0.011] [0.328] [0.016] [0.054] [0.005]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0105 -0.00285 -0.0242 -0.00464 -0.0148 -0.00358
[0.500] [0.791] [0.110] [0.684] [0.404] [0.768]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00694 0.00107 0.0109 0.00257 0.0106 0.00161
[0.395] [0.843] [0.150] [0.628] [0.394] [0.788]
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
within R2 0.1159 0.1155 0.1455 0.1140 0.1150 0.1154
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Results estimated for equation 4. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 4. The variable open is openness, as detailed in the table A.3. Total
effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of
law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic
trend was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and
Kraay standard errors.
Table 11 provides evidence that an increase in central bank discount rates will have
more adverse effects on output under weaker institutional environments than under
stronger institutional environments, supporting hypothesis 2 of this dissertation, even after
controlling for openness. The total effect of the positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, keeps being negative and significant at the 5% level for
regulatory quality, rule of law and government effectiveness. The total effect of the
coefficients associated with the interaction term between institutional development and
positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is positive and
significant at the 5% level for all indicators, except for political stability and voice and
accountability. Then, we can conclude that hypothesis 2 is supported by all institutional
development indicators, with the exception of political stability and voice and
accountability. However, there is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 of this dissertation
because ∑Jj=1λ j and ∑
J
j=1ψ j are not significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators.
Table 12 presents the estimated total effect of a permanent one percent increase in
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discount rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, and of a permanent one
percent decrease in discount rates,
(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, at
specific levels of insti,t− j. Table 12 makes clear that an increase in interest rates has more
negative effects on output in countries with weaker institutional development than in
countries with stronger institutional development. After controlling for openness, this is
true for regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness.
For all these indicators, table 12 demonstrates that a contractionary monetary policy has a
negative and significant effect on output for a country with institutional development
equal to -0.5 and an effect that is not different than zero for a country with institutional
development equal to 1.5, for example. As described by table 11, table 12 shows that a
decrease in interest rates seems to be ineffective in terms of output promotion for all
countries, meaning that there is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 of this dissertation.
Table 12 Estimated Total Effect at Specific Values of Institutional Development -
Fixed-Effects Regressions with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0248
(0.0439)
-1.5 -0.0165
(0.0358)
-1 -0.0953* -0.0561* -0.00823 -0.0591* -0.0624+ -0.0844*
(0.0348) (0.0219) (0.0278) (0.0209) (0.0355) (0.0272)
-0.5 -0.0723* -0.0430* 0.0000589 -0.0447* -0.0452 -0.0656*
(0.0266) (0.0183) (0.0201) (0.0167) (0.0278) (0.0218)
0 -0.0493* -0.0299+ 0.00835 -0.0303* -0.0281 -0.0469*
(0.0191) (0.0154) (0.0133) (0.0136) (0.0209) (0.0170)
0.5 -0.0264+ -0.0167 0.0166+ -0.0159 -0.0110 -0.0282*
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(0.0137) (0.0138) (0.00941) (0.0125) (0.0159) (0.0137)
1 -0.00337 -0.00363 0.0249* -0.00146 0.00615 -0.00944
(0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0119) (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0129)
1.5 0.0196 0.00949 0.0332+ 0.0130 0.0233 0.00929
(0.0183) (0.0156) (0.0183) (0.0173) (0.0183) (0.0152)
2 0.0426 0.0226 0.0274 0.0404 0.0280
(0.0257) (0.0186) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0195)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0460+
(0.0268)
-1.5 -0.0406+
(0.0235)
-1 -0.0174 -0.00392 -0.0351+ -0.00722 -0.0254 -0.00520
(0.0231) (0.0154) (0.0204) (0.0161) (0.0294) (0.0175)
-0.5 -0.0139 -0.00339 -0.0297+ -0.00593 -0.0201 -0.00439
(0.0192) (0.0130) (0.0174) (0.0137) (0.0234) (0.0148)
0 -0.0105 -0.00285 -0.0242 -0.00464 -0.0148 -0.00358
(0.0154) (0.0107) (0.0149) (0.0114) (0.0176) (0.0121)
0.5 -0.00698 -0.00232 -0.0188 -0.00336 -0.00951 -0.00278
(0.0117) (0.00873) (0.0129) (0.00921) (0.0121) (0.00963)
1 -0.00351 -0.00179 -0.0133 -0.00207 -0.00422 -0.00197
(0.00842) (0.00723) (0.0119) (0.00739) (0.00766) (0.00754)
1.5 -0.0000419 -0.00124 -0.00787 -0.000785 0.00107 -0.00117
(0.00608) (0.00648) (0.0119) (0.00621) (0.00683) (0.00622)
2 0.00343 -0.000709 0.000502 0.00637 -0.000361
(0.00598) (0.00681) (0.00603) (0.0105) (0.00617)
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived from
table 11 (equation 4).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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The regressions in table 11 also provide some interesting results with respect to the
impact of openness on the effectiveness of monetary policies. The total effect of the
interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates (given by the
sum of the coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
)
is positive and significant at the 5% level for all indicators, except for political stability41.
This means that the effectiveness of money expansions diminishes with the level of
openness, which is in accordance with the accepted economic theory.
Finally, J lags of financial development and its interaction terms are included in all
regressions, where J is determined according to the AIC criterion displayed in table A.18.
In order to reduce the loss of efficiency caused by the inclusion of excessive lags of
financial development, we proceed with the elimination of lags that are not significant,
from the highest to the lowest orders. Following this procedure, we choose the model with
three lags of financial development for regulatory quality, control of corruption, political
stability and government effectiveness. We ended up eliminating all lags of financial
development for rule of law and voice and accountability. These results are displayed in
table A.19.
Table A.19 provides evidence that an increase in central bank discount rates will
have more adverse effects on output under weaker institutional environments than under
stronger institutional environments for regulatory quality, rule of law and government
effectiveness, supporting hypothesis 2 of this dissertation. The total effect of the positive
growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the
41The total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates was
estimated to be 0.0036369 for regulatory quality, 0.0043301 for control of corruption, 0.0040925 for rule
of law, 0.0051484 for voice and accountability and 0.0042716 for government effectiveness. The total
effect of the interaction between openness and the positive growth rates in interest rates is not significant
at the 5% level in any of the regressions.
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5% level and the total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term
between institutional development and positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is positive and significant at the 5% level for these mentioned
indicators42. There is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 of this dissertation because
∑Jj=1λ j and ∑
J
j=1ψ j are not significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators. Table
A.20, which presents the estimated total effect of a permanent one percent
increase/decrease in discount rates at specific levels of institutional development after
controlling for openness and financial development, demonstrates that a contractionary
monetary policy has a negative and significant effect on output for a country with
institutional development equal or smaller than 0 and an effect that is not different than
zero for a country with institutional development equal or greater than 0.5. This is true for
regulatory quality, rule of law and government effectiveness, illustrating the evidence on
the relevance of these indicators provided by table A.19. In addition, table A.20 shows
that a decrease in interest rates seems to be ineffective in terms of output promotion for all
countries, meaning that there is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 of this dissertation.
Finally, the regressions in table A.19 indicate that the total effect of the interaction
between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates (given by the sum of the
coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
) is positive
and significant at the 5% level for all indicators, except for political stability43. This
42Hypothesis 2 keeps holding for rule of law after the inclusion of one insignificant lag of financial
development. In this case, the total effect of the positive growth rates in interest rates is -0.0216551 with a
corresponding p-value of 0.095 and the total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term
between institutional development and the positive growth rates in interest rates is 0.0242635 with a
corresponding p-value of 0.040.
43The total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates was
estimated to be 0.0112389 for regulatory quality, 0.0112964 for control of corruption, 0.0040925 for rule
of law, 0.0051484 for voice and accountability and 0.0110583 for government effectiveness. The total
effect of the interaction between openness and the positive growth rates in interest rates is not significant
at the 5% level in any of the regressions.
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means that the effectiveness of money expansions diminishes with the level of openness,
which is in accordance with the accepted economic theory. The total effect of the
interaction between financial development and the negative/positive growth rates in
interest rates (given by the sum of the coefficients associated with these interaction terms
divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
) is not significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators.
In summary, under the two-step approach to deal with the endogeneity of discount
rates, this subsection allows us to affirm that hypothesis 2 holds for regulatory quality, rule
of law and government effectiveness, increasing the robustness of the previous section’s
conclusions. In addition, there is no support for hypothesis 3.
10.1 A Second Alternative Specification
As a robustness check, in this subsection we present an alternative specification for the
discount rate growth model displayed in equation 3. Now, the model is written only in
terms of past values of the growth rate of central bank discount rates and past values of the
real output growth rate. Past values of inflation rate are no longer included in the model. A
similar specification was used by Karras (1999), Karras (2001) and Karras and Stokes
(1999). All these works disregard the role played by past inflation rates in the discount
rate model. Equation 5 describes this alternative specification.
gdisci,t =
J
∑
j=1
ρ jgdisci,t− j +
J
∑
j=1
η jgyi,t− j +δ trendt +νi,t (5)
The variable gdisci,t is the growth rate of central bank discount rate in percentage
points for country i at time t. The variable gdisci,t− j is the j-th lag of the growth rate of
central bank discount rate. The variable gyi,t− j is the j-th lag of the seasonally adjusted
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growth rate of real GDP in percentage points for each country i. The variable trendt is a
linear trend in time. Finally, νi,t = pii +ωi,t , where pii is modeled as fixed-effects and ωi,t is
the idiosyncratic error.
The rationale for this alternative specification is that if we are trying to solve the
endogeneity of discount rates with respect to the output, it would be enough to include
only the real GDP growth in the first-step equation. In this sense, the inclusion of inflation
in the first-step equation would be unjustifiable. On the other hand, the inclusion of
inflation rates in the firt-step equation, earlier in this section, is strongly supported by the
accepted economic theory, which states that, in general, central bankers set interest rates
in response to real GDP growth and inflation rate movements. It seems that there is no
consensus on the most appropriate way to model central bank discount rates while dealing
with this endogeneity issue. Some works that use this two-step approach to study the
effectiveness of monetary policies included inflation rates in the first step (Cover (1992),
Rhee and Rich (1995), Garibaldi (1997) and Berument et al. (2007)) and others did not
(Karras (1999), Karras (2001) and Karras and Stokes (1999)). As a result, we do not have
a favorite specification and the results presented in this subsection offer an alternative and
a robustness check to the previous estimations.
Table A.21 presents the results estimated for equation 5. Initially, we assume that
J=4 for all variables. Then, we proceed with the elimination of lags that are not
significant. Following this procedure, we choose the model with one lag of discount rate
growth, two lags of real GDP growth and no time trend. The residuals ωi,t are extracted
and used to derive the positive and negative discount rate shock series, as explained earlier
in this section. As expected, past movements in discount rates have a significant influence
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on current monetary policies as the coefficient for the first lag of the growth rate of central
bank discount rates is estimated to be positive. In addition, the results show that interest
rates go up in response to increases in real GDP growth.
The residuals ω+i,t and ω
−
i,t derived from the first step are used in the second step,
which consists of the estimation of equation 4. The AIC criterion was used to select the
most appropriate number of lags that should be included in equation 4. Fixed-effects
models without additional controls were estimated assuming J=4, 5, 6, 7 and 8. Table
A.22 indicates that we should choose the model with 4 lags for all institutional
development indicators, except for political stability, whose model with 5 lags seems to be
more appropriate.
Table A.23 presents fixed-effects estimations of the model described by equation 4
without the inclusion of additional controls.44 The table provides evidence that hypothesis
2 holds for regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law and government
effectiveness. The total effect of the positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the 5% level and the total effect
of the coefficients associated with the interaction term between institutional development
and positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is positive and
significant at the 5% level for these indicators. There is no evidence to support hypothesis
3 because ∑Jj=1λ j and ∑
J
j=1ψ j are not significant at the 5% level, except for political
stability. The term
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
is significant at the 5% level for political
stability, however, it has an unexpected positive sign, which is not in accordance with
hypothesis 3 of this dissertation. Table A.24 presents the estimated total effect of a
44Driscoll and Kraay standard errors are presented for the coefficient estimates. These standard errors are
robust to disturbances being heteroskedastic, autocorrelated and cross-sectionally dependent and seem to
be appropriate for long panels with cross-country macroeconomic data.
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permanent one percent increase/decrease in discount rates at specific levels of institutional
development. The table makes clearer the strong support in favor of hypothesis 2.
Countries with lower values of insti,t− j suffer more adverse impacts on output after a
monetary contraction than countries with higher values of insti,t− j. With respect to the
monetary expansions, the evidence provided in table A.24 for the political stability
indicator contradicts hypothesis 3, showing that these policies are more effective in
countries with relatively low political stability.
Table A.25 presents the results estimated for equation 4 after controlling for
openness. Initially, J lags of openness and its interaction terms are included in all
regressions, where J is determined according to the AIC criterion displayed in table A.22.
The total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term between
institutional development and positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, keeps being positive and significant at the 5% level for
regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness. This
effect keeps being significant at the 10% level for voice and accountability and
insignificant for political stability. The total effect of the positive growth rates in interest
rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the 5% level only for
government effectiveness. This effect is significant at the 10% level for regulatory quality,
control of corruption and rule of law and it is not significant for political stability and
voice and accountability. In order to reduce the loss of efficiency caused by the inclusion
of excessive lags of openness, we proceed with the elimination of lags of openness and its
interaction terms that are not significant, from the highest to the lowest orders. Following
this procedure, we ended up with the models displayed in table A.25. We include one lag
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of openness in the model for control of corruption, rule of law, voice and accountability
and government effectiveness, five lags of openness in the model for political stability and
no lags of openness in the model for regulatory quality.
Table A.25 shows that there is support in favor of hypothesis 2 even after
controlling for openness. The total effect of the positive growth rates in interest rates,(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the 5% level and the total effect
of the coefficients associated with the interaction term between institutional development
and the positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is positive and
significant at the 5% level for for regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law and
government effectiveness. There is no evidence to support hypothesis 3 because ∑Jj=1λ j
and ∑Jj=1ψ j are not significant at the 5% level, except for political stability. However, the
term
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
in the political stability model is positive, contradicting
hypothesis 3 of this dissertation. Table A.26 describes the total effect of a permanent one
percent increase/decrease in discount rates at different levels of institutional development
after controlling for openness, providing a good illustration of the conclusions extracted
from table A.25. Table A.26 shows that a contractionary monetary policy has a negative
and significant effect on output for a country with institutional development equal to or
smaller than 0.5 and an effect that is not different than zero for a country with institutional
development equal to or greater than 1. This evidence holds for regulatory quality, control
of corruption, rule of law and government effectiveness. Table A.26 provides no evidence
in favor of hypothesis 3 of this dissertation.
Finally, J lags of financial development and its interaction terms are included in all
regressions, where J is determined according to the AIC criterion displayed in table A.22.
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In order to reduce the loss of efficiency caused by the inclusion of excessive lags of
financial development, we proceed with the elimination of lags that are not significant,
from the highest to the lowest orders. Following this procedure, we choose the model with
four lags of financial development for regulatory quality and control of corruption and the
model with three lags of financial development for political stability and government
effectiveness. We ended up eliminating all lags of financial development in the models for
rule of law and voice and accountability. These results are displayed in table A.27. In
addition, the first lag of openness becomes significant after the inclusion of the financial
development variables in the regression for regulatory quality. Thus, we present the model
for regulatory quality including the first lag of openness.
Table A.27 provides evidence that an increase in central bank discount rates will
have more adverse effects on output under weaker institutional environments than under
stronger institutional environments for rule of law and government effectiveness,
supporting hypothesis 2 of this dissertation. The total effect of the positive growth rates in
interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1φ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is negative and significant at the 5% level and
the total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term between institutional
development and the positive growth rates in interest rates,
(
∑Jj=1Θ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
, is
positive and significant at the 5% level for these mentioned indicators45. There is no
evidence to support hypothesis 3 of this dissertation because
(
∑Jj=1λ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and
(
∑Jj=1ψ j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
are not significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators.
Table A.28, which presents the estimated total effect of a permanent one percent
45Hypothesis 2 keeps holding for rule of law after the inclusion of one insignificant lag of financial
development. In this case, the total effect of the positive growth rates in interest rates is -0.033902 with a
corresponding p-value of 0.002 and the total effect of the coefficients associated with the interaction term
between institutional development and the positive growth rates in interest rates is 0.028011 with a
corresponding p-value of 0.037.
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increase/decrease in discount rates at specific levels of institutional development after
controlling for openness and financial development, demonstrates that a contractionary
monetary policy has a negative and significant effect on output for countries with
relatively weak institutional development and an effect that is not different than zero for
countries with relatively strong institutional development. As displayed in table A.27,
these differences are significantly explained by the level of institutional development,
especially by the levels of rule of law and government effectiveness.
One more time we confirm the importance of openness for the effectiveness of
money expansions. From table A.27, we derive that the total effect of the interaction
between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates (given by the sum of the
coefficients associated with these interaction terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
) is positive
and significant at the 5% level for regulatory quality, control of corruption, rule of law,
voice and accountability and government effectiveness46. This means that the
effectiveness of money expansions diminishes with the level of openness, which is in
accordance with the accepted economic theory. The financial development variables and
their interaction terms with interest rates are jointly significant in the regressions for
regulatory quality, control of corruption and government effectiveness. However, the total
effect of the interaction between financial development and the negative/positive growth
rates in interest rates (given by the sum of the coefficients associated with these interaction
terms divided by
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
) is not significant at the 5% level for any of the indicators.
46The total effect of the interaction between openness and the negative growth rates in interest rates was
estimated to be 0.0100076 for regulatory quality, 0.0099343 for control of corruption, 0.0038849 for rule
of law, 0.0065291 for voice and accountability and 0.0102255 for government effectiveness. The total
effect of the interaction between openness and the positive growth rates in interest rates is not significant
at the 5% level in any of the regressions.
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10.2 Discussion of the Empirical Results
This section offered an alternative approach to deal with the endogeneity of discount rates;
an approach that is no longer limited to the exclusion of current values of discount rate
growth from the set of explanatory variables. On one hand, in comparison with the
previous section, the two-step approach developed in this section has the advantage of
being a potential solution to the issue of reverse causality that affects one of our main
explanatory variables, the discount rates. On the other hand, despite being a common
methodology in studies of monetary effectiveness, the solution for the endogeneity
problem provided by the two-step approach has its own drawbacks. It seems that it is
technically impossible to extract only the effect of real GDP growth from the discount rate
growth series, what would be desirable since the objective is to solve the endogeneity of
discount rates with respect to real GDP growth. If we include only past values of real
GDP growth in the discount rate growth equation, the coefficients estimated will be biased
in the case that important variables are omitted. As a consequence, the shocks extracted
from the first step probably will not represent exactly the exogenous part, with respect to
the real GDP growth, of the discount rate growth series. If we include past values of real
GDP growth and other relevant variables in the discount rate growth equation, as we did
through the inclusion of inflation rates, the shocks will exclude the effect of real GDP on
discount rates, as desired, but they will also exclude the effect that other relevant variables
have on the discount rate growth series, what is not exactly fine with our objectives and
may lead to misleading conclusions. As a consequence, the two-step approach presented
in this section should not be evaluated as better or worse than the methodology developed
in the previous section, since both of them have advantages and drawbacks. The models
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presented in this section should be seen as an alternative to the models described in the
previous section, providing additional and important checks.
The tests in this section provided strong evidence in favor of hypothesis 2
(contractionary policies reduce the output more in countries with low institutional
development than in countries with high institutional development) and no evidence in
favor of hypothesis 3 (expansionary policies stimulate the output more in countries with
high institutional development than in countries with low institutional development).
Hypothesis 2 holds mainly for rule of law and government effectiveness. The evidence in
favor of hypothesis 2 holds for these two indicators under all specifications and for all
checks developed in this section. Hypothesis 2 also holds for these two indicators in all
tests presented in the previous section, adding to the robustness of our findings.
It is important to note the strong association between the theory developed in the
section 5 of this dissertation and our empirical results. Section 5 states that, after an
increase in interest rates, adverse selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets
would increase more in countries with low institutional development than in countries
with high institutional development due to the relatively weak contract enforcement found
in the first set of countries. As a consequence, banks would restrict the supply of credit or
increase interest rates more in countries with low institutional development than in
countries with high institutional development, exacerbating the negative effects of
contractionary policies in countries with relatively weak institutions. In addition,
borrowers in countries with low institutional development would have fewer substitutes
for the banking loans due to the reduced development of capital markets, being more
affected by the increase in interest rates than investors in countries with high institutional
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development. We argue that the poor contract enforcement, the weak protection of
property rights, the reduced quality of the legal system and the overall low institutional
development are the deepest explanations for the reduced development of capital markets.
The strong evidence stating that the effectiveness of contractionary policies
depends on the level of rule of law is completely in accordance with the theory presented
in this dissertation. In the words of Kaufmann et al. (2010), the rule of law indicator
reflects perceptions of the extent to which agents have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society, and in particular the quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the
police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. The detailed
description of the rule of law indicator makes even clearer the consistency between the
theoretical hypothesis 2 and our empirical results.
According to Kaufmann et al. (2010), the government effectiveness indicator
reflects perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such policies. The
government effectiveness indicator seems to be a much broader measure of institutional
development than the rule of law indicator. However, the indicator evaluates, among other
things, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, which is a feature that can
be easily related to our developed theory. In sum, the strong evidence supporting that the
effectiveness of contractionary policies depends on the level of government effectiveness
seems to be also consistent with the theory presented in this dissertation.
Finally, there is also consistency between the case study presented for the Brazilian
economy and our empirical results. The case study emphasizes the role played by the
133
judicial system on the effects of monetary policies. There is evidence that the high spreads
and the reduced credit supply in Brazil are explained by the bad quality of contractual
guarantees and the high costs and slowness of credit recovery through judicial means. The
weak contract enforcement in the country works as a factor that intensifies adverse
selection and moral hazard problems in credit markets, reducing the volume of credit and
increasing its cost. Thus, the additional evidence that lending rate increases overshoot the
increases in policy rates in Brazil may, at least partially, be explained by the weak rule of
law found in the country. The weak rule of law would work as a factor that exacerbates the
effect of an increase in policy rates on lending rates, intensifying the adverse effects of
money contractions on output. In our sample period, which goes from 2002 to 2011,
Brazil scores on average -0.30 in the rule of law indicator. The average score of the
countries in our sample is 0.79, placing Brazil below the average. Thus, the empirical
relevance of the rule of law indicator is also consistent with the Brazilian case study and in
accordance with our expectations.
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11 Conclusions
As elucidated by North (1990), the incentives and constraints imposed by the set of
institutions shape human interaction, changing the costs of transformation and exchange
and determining the economic performance. This dissertation states that the behavior of
banks and investors varies according to the rules of the game and demonstrates that the
level of institutional development may have an important role on the outcomes of
monetary policies.
This research presents a framework to explain how the traditional channels of
monetary policy transmission are altered by the level of institutional development,
allowing the construction of three hypotheses. The first hypothesis is that institutional
development matters for the effects of monetary policies on output. The second
hypothesis is that increases in central bank discount rates have more adverse effects on
output in countries with low institutional development than in countries with high
institutional development. The third hypothesis is that decreases in central bank discount
rates are more effective in terms of output promotion in countries with high institutional
development than in countries with low institutional development. To the best of our
knowledge, this is the first time that a research establishes a relationship between the level
of institutional development and the asymmetric effects of monetary policies on output.
This research provides empirical evidence that the effects of monetary policies on
real output are dependent upon institutional development. There is strong support in favor
of hypothesis 1 and 2, overall sustaining the argument that the asymmetric effects of
monetary policies on output may have deep institutional causes and indicating that these
asymmetries increase with the worsening of the institutional environment.
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The results presented in this dissertation indicate that government effectiveness and
rule of law are the most relevant aspects of the institutional development for the
effectiveness of monetary policies. Government effectiveness is a broad indicator, which
measures, among other things, the overall quality of policy formulation. Especial
consideration should be given to the rule of law indicator because of its clear connection
with the theoretical arguments and with the country examples. In addition, rule of law is a
specific indicator, which evaluates, among other things, the quality of contract
enforcement, property rights and the courts. The specificity of this indicator offers clear
policy recommendations, suggesting that fundamental institutional improvements should
be focused on the efficiency of the judiciary system and the quality of law enforcement.
On the theoretical side, we recognize that the framework presented in this
dissertation is not complete. Future research should add other mechanisms through which
institutional development may affect the outcomes of monetary policies, building a really
comprehensive theory.
On the empirical side, institutions explain better the effectiveness of contractionary
policies than the effectiveness of expansionary policies. Future research could use
alternative econometric models or specifications in order to search for support for the
hypothesis 3 of this dissertation. However, it is important to mention that, in general, the
empirical literature finds that monetary expansions do not have a statistically significant
effect on output. This occurrence may be due to the fact that money expansions tend to
have a smaller effect on output than money contractions, making the statistical detection
of the impact of money expansions a difficult task.
Finally, the endogeneity of institutional development with respect to output growth
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could be pointed out as a drawback of this investigation. Future research could solve this
issue, even though, the current associated literature tolerates this potential weakness
simply by taking institutions as a given or relying on the argument that the issue should be
minimized by the fact that institutions do not vary a lot neither over time nor across
countries.
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Appendix A - Tables
Table A.1 Worldwide Governance Indicators - World Bank
Name of the Indicator Definition
Voice and Accountability
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which a
country’s citizens are able to participate in
selecting their government, as well as freedom of
expression, freedom of association, and a free
media.
Political Stability and Absence
of Violence/Terrorism
Reflects perceptions of the likelihood that the
government will be destabilized or overthrown
by unconstitutional or violent means, including
politically-motivated violence and terrorism.
Government Effectiveness
Reflects perceptions of the quality of public
services, the quality of the civil service and the
degree of its independence from political
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and
implementation, and the credibility of the
government’s commitment to such policies.
Regulatory Quality
Reflects perceptions of the ability of the
government to formulate and implement sound
policies and regulations that permit and promote
private sector development.
Rule of Law
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which
agents have confidence in and abide by the rules
of society, and in particular the quality of
contract enforcement, property rights, the police,
and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime
and violence.
Control of Corruption
Reflects perceptions of the extent to which
public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of
corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by
elites and private interests.
Source: Kaufmann et al. (2010)
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Table A.4 Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max. Observations
gy overall 0.7133773 1.721495 -13.70777 14.34498 N = 2057
between 0.3935956 -0.0027007 1.53357 n = 52
within 1.676704 -14.02253 13.88359 T-bar = 39.5577
disc overall 5.825964 6.005052 .1 60 N = 2059
between 5.384658 .29375 29.675 n = 52
within 2.719403 -9.849036 36.15096 T-bar = 39.5962
gdisc overall -2.118901 17.08174 -194.591 138.6294 N = 2056
between 1.851234 -7.627487 2.746531 n = 52
within 16.98281 -192.0304 133.764 T-bar = 39.5385
gdisc+ overall 2.830423 7.692708 0 138.6294 N = 2056
between 1.832518 0.5087674 8.958798 n = 52
within 7.473059 -6.128375 136.4226 T-bar = 39.5385
gdisc− overall -4.949324 14.30304 -194.591 0 N = 2056
between 2.394985 -12.1423 -1.257379 n = 52
within 14.10429 -192.3777 7.19298 T-bar = 39.5385
in f l overall .9441286 1.232014 -3.505993 10.19058 N = 2080
between .6602746 -.0454557 2.840966 n = 52
within 1.044066 -4.438955 8.948063 T = 40
reg overall 0.909343 0.6943166 -0.9810643 1.997333 N = 2080
between 0.6900828 -0.5987369 1.904597 n = 52
within 0.1216333 0.3613317 1.457831 T = 40
law overall 0.7916931 0.8878175 -1.141194 2.001923 N = 2080
between 0.8907391 -0.8818133 1.945267 n = 52
within 0.0984247 0.4187481 1.195257 T = 40
voice overall 0.7885088 0.6945141 -1.21094 1.826408 N = 2080
between 0.6932615 -1.110253 1.619776 n = 52
within 0.1037022 0.3579492 1.40835 T = 40
pol overall 0.3652498 0.8745086 -2.378574 1.665204 N = 2080
between 0.8602766 -1.847313 1.513949 n = 52
within 0.1963992 -0.4421261 1.62662 T = 40
gov overall 0.9259247 0.8197556 -0.8272157 2.344899 N = 2080
between 0.8178974 -0.6754873 2.21921 n = 52
within 0.1248681 0.5705643 1.597796 T = 40
cor overall 0.7961205 1.00268 -1.133944 2.55743 N = 2080
between 1.001948 -0.9300395 2.448949 n = 52
within 0.1424715 0.1588729 1.30748 T = 40
open overall 0.940674 0.5837193 0.1993954 4.751972 N = 2064
between 0.5749247 0.256585 3.874996 n = 52
within 0.1207371 -0.3250407 1.81765 T-bar = 39.6923
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f d overall 0.3018376 0.3620997 0.013489 1.98245 N = 1872
between 0.3509993 0.015796 1.609068 n = 52
within 0.1010957 -0.3871238 1.375229 T = 36
gy: seasonally adjusted real GDP growth; disc: central bank discount rate; gdisc: growth rate of
central bank discount rate; gdisc+: positive growth rates in central bank discount rates; gdisc−:
negative growth rates in central bank discount rates; in f l: inflation rate; reg: regulatory quality; law:
rule of law; voice: voice and accountability; pol: political stability; gov: government effectiveness;
cor: control of corruption; open: openness and f d: financial development.
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Table A.5 Choosing the Number of Lags - Evaluation of Hypothesis 1
Lags AIC=-2lnL+2k N=Number of AICn=(-2lnL+2k)/N Model
Observations Selection
regulatory quality
1 7479.663 1981 3.775701
2 7245.375 1928 3.757975
3 6968.874 1875 3.716733
4 6732.372 1822 3.695045 2
5 6534.159 1769 3.693702 1
6 6365.429 1716 3.709457
7 6189.209 1663 3.721713
8 5959.333 1610 3.701449 3
control of corruption
1 7487.027 1981 3.779418
2 7251.44 1928 3.761120
3 6976.126 1875 3.720601
4 6740.241 1822 3.699364 3
5 6538.378 1769 3.696087 2
6 6364.053 1716 3.708656
7 6184.332 1663 3.718781
8 5950.081 1610 3.695702 1
political stability
1 7477.869 1981 3.774795
2 7248.001 1928 3.759337
3 6971.432 1875 3.718097
4 6731.72 1822 3.694687 2
5 6526.99 1769 3.689650 3
6 6357.116 1716 3.704613
7 6174.062 1663 3.712605
8 5936.669 1610 3.687372 1
rule of law
1 7484.243 1981 3.778013
2 7251.256 1928 3.761025
3 6974.679 1875 3.719829
4 6739.687 1822 3.699060 2
5 6541.408 1769 3.697800 1
6 6373.75 1716 3.714307
7 6197.993 1663 3.726995
8 5966.517 1610 3.705911 3
voice and accountability
1 7485.667 1981 3.778731
2 7245.76 1928 3.758174
3 6969.53 1875 3.717083
4 6733.723 1822 3.695786 2
5 6535.503 1769 3.694462 1
6 6368.77 1716 3.711404
7 6191.01 1663 3.722796
8 5959.762 1610 3.701716 3
government effectiveness
1 7484.425 1981 3.778104
2 7250.167 1928 3.760460
3 6974.891 1875 3.719942
4 6740.022 1822 3.699244 2
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5 6542.047 1769 3.698161 1
6 6372.108 1716 3.713350
7 6194.066 1663 3.724634
8 5963.142 1610 3.703815 3
The AIC criterion is not appropriate because the models do not have the same number of
observations. The AICn criterion is appropriate for our case because it penalizes the loss
of observations due to the inclusion of additional lags.
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Table A.6 Choosing the Number of Lags - Evaluation of Hypotheses 2
and 3 - I
Lags AIC=-2lnL+2k N=Number of AICn=(-2lnL+2k)/N Model
Observations Selection
regulatory quality
1 7474.801 1981 3.773246
2 7234.249 1928 3.752204
3 6962.553 1875 3.713362
4 6726.205 1822 3.691660 2
5 6527.861 1769 3.690142 1
6 6362.28 1716 3.707622
7 6183.353 1663 3.718192
8 5954.521 1610 3.698460 3
control of corruption
1 7481.52 1981 3.776638
2 7241.54 1928 3.755985
3 6971.295 1875 3.718024
4 6737.209 1822 3.697700 3
5 6533.684 1769 3.693434 1
6 6362.132 1716 3.707536
7 6181.672 1663 3.717181
8 5950.291 1610 3.695833 2
political stability
1 7471.426 1981 3.771543
2 7239.839 1928 3.755103
3 6967.805 1875 3.716163
4 6731.165 1822 3.694383 3
5 6525.491 1769 3.688802 2
6 6358.335 1716 3.705323
7 6171.035 1663 3.710785
8 5934.804 1610 3.686214 1
rule of law
1 7479.024 1981 3.775378
2 7240.019 1928 3.755197
3 6967.816 1875 3.716169
4 6734.465 1822 3.696194 2
5 6535.664 1769 3.694553 1
6 6371.2 1716 3.712821
7 6194.239 1663 3.724738
8 5963.144 1610 3.703816 3
voice and accountability
1 7479.631 1981 3.775685
2 7238.391 1928 3.754352
3 6967.849 1875 3.716186
4 6733.677 1822 3.695761 2
5 6534.375 1769 3.693824 1
6 6370.502 1716 3.712414
7 6190.202 1663 3.722310
8 5959.583 1610 3.701604 3
government effectiveness
1 7478.346 1981 3.775036
2 7238.158 1928 3.754231
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3 6967.083 1875 3.715778
4 6733.698 1822 3.695773 2
5 6534.675 1769 3.693994 1
6 6367.919 1716 3.710909
7 6189.508 1663 3.721893
8 5961.185 1610 3.702599 3
The AIC criterion is not appropriate because the models do not have the same number of
observations. The AICn criterion is appropriate for our case because it penalizes the loss
of observations due to the inclusion of additional lags.
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Table A.7 Prais-Winsten Regressions - 5 Lags - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.112 0.119 0.119 0.115 0.113 0.119
(0.0752) (0.0751) (0.0739) (0.0756) (0.0758) (0.0754)
gy2 0.0554 0.0636 0.0602 0.0556 0.0552 0.0602
(0.0715) (0.0715) (0.0707) (0.0721) (0.0723) (0.0718)
gy3 -0.0455 -0.0429 -0.0477 -0.0468 -0.0491 -0.0434
(0.0682) (0.0684) (0.0673) (0.0687) (0.0691) (0.0685)
gy4 -0.0210 -0.0214 -0.0278 -0.0215 -0.0279 -0.0183
(0.0680) (0.0684) (0.0673) (0.0687) (0.0692) (0.0684)
gy5 0.123+ 0.126+ 0.123+ 0.119+ 0.119+ 0.123+
(0.0645) (0.0647) (0.0642) (0.0650) (0.0653) (0.0648)
gdisc1+ -0.0102 -0.00337 -0.00172 -0.00533 -0.00743 -0.00870
(0.0107) (0.00821) (0.00637) (0.00835) (0.0104) (0.0100)
gdisc2+ -0.0234* -0.0175* -0.00577 -0.0161* -0.0182+ -0.0211*
(0.0105) (0.00803) (0.00648) (0.00804) (0.0100) (0.00969)
gdisc3+ -0.00887 -0.00606 -0.00533 -0.00794 -0.00234 -0.00933
(0.0106) (0.00819) (0.00639) (0.00806) (0.0103) (0.00968)
gdisc4+ -0.0101 -0.00132 0.00432 -0.00333 -0.00184 -0.00536
(0.0110) (0.00814) (0.00614) (0.00816) (0.0105) (0.00977)
gdisc5+ -0.0152 -0.00952 -0.00502 -0.00996 -0.0133 -0.0113
(0.0109) (0.00816) (0.00591) (0.00826) (0.0104) (0.00983)
inst1∗gdisc1+ 0.00917 0.00257 0.00237 0.00475 0.00748 0.00652
(0.00745) (0.00466) (0.00571) (0.00530) (0.00859) (0.00603)
inst2∗gdisc2+ 0.0219* 0.0161* 0.0103+ 0.0164* 0.0213* 0.0182*
(0.00727) (0.00459) (0.00569) (0.00514) (0.00836) (0.00587)
inst3∗gdisc3+ 0.00275 0.000532 -0.00297 0.00236 -0.00258 0.00318
(0.00751) (0.00461) (0.00555) (0.00513) (0.00852) (0.00584)
inst4∗gdisc4+ 0.0123 0.00418 -0.00148 0.00647 0.00660 0.00749
(0.00876) (0.00514) (0.00564) (0.00578) (0.00979) (0.00640)
inst5∗gdisc5+ 0.0141+ 0.00932+ 0.00865 0.0102+ 0.0159+ 0.0103
(0.00853) (0.00507) (0.00543) (0.00578) (0.00966) (0.00635)
gdisc1− -0.00692 0.00246 0.00471 0.00116 0.00207 -0.00132
(0.00589) (0.00451) (0.00305) (0.00458) (0.00530) (0.00526)
gdisc2− -0.00831 -0.00784+ -0.00469 -0.00718 -0.0130* -0.00686
(0.00610) (0.00473) (0.00304) (0.00479) (0.00543) (0.00553)
gdisc3− -0.00611 -0.00487 -0.00630* -0.00534 -0.00322 -0.00548
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(0.00595) (0.00457) (0.00302) (0.00465) (0.00524) (0.00540)
gdisc4− 0.000950 0.00131 -0.00203 0.00176 -0.000219 0.00206
(0.00593) (0.00454) (0.00305) (0.00463) (0.00519) (0.00535)
gdisc5− -0.00595 -0.00695 -0.00761* -0.00721 -0.00898+ -0.00615
(0.00603) (0.00478) (0.00335) (0.00477) (0.00540) (0.00545)
inst1∗gdisc1− 0.0135* 0.00634* 0.0110* 0.00789* 0.00913* 0.00887*
(0.00409) (0.00254) (0.00299) (0.00292) (0.00403) (0.00330)
inst2∗gdisc2− -0.000389 -0.000657 -0.00601+ -0.00124 0.00438 -0.00151
(0.00421) (0.00269) (0.00331) (0.00306) (0.00422) (0.00346)
inst3∗gdisc3− 0.00218 0.00102 0.00371 0.00164 0.000203 0.00143
(0.00414) (0.00267) (0.00329) (0.00299) (0.00414) (0.00341)
inst4∗gdisc4− -0.00392 -0.00393 -0.00269 -0.00419 -0.00330 -0.00440
(0.00413) (0.00265) (0.00333) (0.00297) (0.00413) (0.00339)
inst5∗gdisc5− -0.00101 -0.0000185 0.00167 0.000302 0.00234 -0.000650
(0.00398) (0.00262) (0.00313) (0.00288) (0.00406) (0.00330)
inst1 -0.453 -0.621 0.631 -0.557 -1.002 -0.181
(0.771) (0.916) (0.567) (0.927) (1.078) (0.584)
inst2 1.390 -0.0722 -0.612 1.597 1.507 0.545
(0.983) (1.155) (0.713) (1.225) (1.351) (0.706)
inst3 -0.382 0.401 0.266 -1.563 -0.990 0.0471
(0.986) (1.173) (0.716) (1.254) (1.365) (0.722)
inst4 0.0571 1.144 0.733 0.386 0.425 -0.505
(1.007) (1.188) (0.733) (1.283) (1.358) (0.731)
inst5 -0.989 -1.111 -1.212* -0.179 -0.311 -0.227
(0.800) (0.963) (0.571) (0.981) (1.080) (0.609)
trend -0.0247+ -0.0245+ -0.0261* -0.0245+ -0.0258* -0.0245+
(0.0126) (0.0126) (0.0129) (0.0126) (0.0128) (0.0126)
Constant 1.408* 1.279* 1.188* 1.329* 1.382* 1.363*
(0.374) (0.363) (0.340) (0.368) (0.375) (0.374)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0677 -0.0378 -0.0135 -0.0426 -0.0431 -0.0557
[0.000609] [0.0105] [0.199] [0.00436] [0.0110] [0.00230]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0602 0.0327 0.0168 0.0402 0.0487 0.0457
[0.0000597] [0.000608] [0.0643] [0.000277] [0.00333] [0.000146]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0263 -0.0159 -0.0159 -0.0168 -0.0233 -0.0178
[0.0199] [0.0443] [0.0139] [0.0477] [0.0194] [0.0635]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.0104 0.00276 0.00772 0.00440 0.0128 0.00373
[0.177] [0.557] [0.0726] [0.408] [0.114] [0.546]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.225 0.244 0.227 0.221 0.211 0.240
[0.144] [0.117] [0.135] [0.160] [0.191] [0.120]
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(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0873 -0.0500 -0.0175 -0.0548 -0.0546 -0.0733
[0.003] [0.024] [0.213] [0.013] [0.024] [0.009]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0776 0.0433 0.0218 0.0516 0.0617 0.0601
[0.001] [0.004] [0.077] [0.002] [0.010] [0.002]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0340 -0.0210 -0.0206 -0.0216 -0.0295 -0.0234
[0.027] [0.057] [0.030] [0.063] [0.018] [0.077]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0134 0.00365 0.00998 0.00565 0.0162 0.00491
[0.171] [0.551] [0.071] [0.403] [0.080] [0.542]
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
R2 0.145 0.140 0.143 0.140 0.139 0.140
Results estimated for equation 2. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 2. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend
was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xt pcse, pairwise corr(psar1) was used to estimate Prais-Winsten regressions
with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
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Table A.8 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Prais-Winsten Regressions with 5 Lags - Evaluating Hypotheses
2 and 3 - I
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0610*
(0.0294)
-1.5 -0.0501*
(0.0242)
-1 -0.165* -0.0933* -0.0393* -0.106* -0.116* -0.133*
(0.0513) (0.0350) (0.0195) (0.0369) (0.0461) (0.0462)
-0.5 -0.126* -0.0717* -0.0284+ -0.0806* -0.0854* -0.103*
(0.0403) (0.0283) (0.0158) (0.0292) (0.0348) (0.0370)
0 -0.0873* -0.0500* -0.0175 -0.0548* -0.0546* -0.0733*
(0.0296) (0.0221) (0.0141) (0.0220) (0.0241) (0.0282)
0.5 -0.0485* -0.0284+ -0.00661 -0.0290+ -0.0237 -0.0433*
(0.0200) (0.0170) (0.0148) (0.0160) (0.0155) (0.0202)
1 -0.00966 -0.00673 0.00428 -0.00317 0.00710 -0.0132
(0.0135) (0.0141) (0.0178) (0.0131) (0.0134) (0.0144)
1.5 0.0292+ 0.0149 0.0152 0.0226 0.0379+ 0.0169
(0.0152) (0.0148) (0.0222) (0.0151) (0.0201) (0.0139)
2 0.0680* 0.0366+ 0.0484* 0.0688* 0.0469*
(0.0233) (0.0187) (0.0207) (0.0303) (0.0192)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0405*
(0.0163)
-1.5 -0.0355*
(0.0141)
-1 -0.0474* -0.0247 -0.0306* -0.0272 -0.0457* -0.0283
(0.0240) (0.0154) (0.0121) (0.0168) (0.0202) (0.0198)
-0.5 -0.0407* -0.0229+ -0.0256* -0.0244+ -0.0376* -0.0258
(0.0195) (0.0130) (0.0105) (0.0141) (0.0161) (0.0164)
0 -0.0340* -0.0210+ -0.0206* -0.0216+ -0.0295* -0.0234+
(0.0153) (0.0111) (0.00946) (0.0116) (0.0125) (0.0132)
0.5 -0.0273* -0.0192* -0.0156+ -0.0188+ -0.0215* -0.0209*
(0.0117) (0.00966) (0.00914) (0.00975) (0.00964) (0.0107)
1 -0.0206* -0.0174+ -0.0106 -0.0159+ -0.0134 -0.0185*
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(0.00923) (0.00912) (0.00963) (0.00882) (0.00854) (0.00924)
1.5 -0.0139 -0.0156 -0.00561 -0.0131 -0.00532 -0.0160+
(0.00906) (0.00958) (0.0108) (0.00912) (0.00978) (0.00946)
2 -0.00714 -0.0137 -0.0103 0.00276 -0.0135
(0.0113) (0.0109) (0.0106) (0.0127) (0.0112)
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.7 (equation 2).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.9 Prais-Winsten Regressions - 5 Lags with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses
2 and 3 - I
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.106 0.116 0.115 0.111 0.109 0.115
(0.0746) (0.0742) (0.0732) (0.0747) (0.0745) (0.0745)
gy2 0.0432 0.0538 0.0502 0.0451 0.0469 0.0498
(0.0706) (0.0705) (0.0698) (0.0710) (0.0708) (0.0707)
gy3 -0.0464 -0.0404 -0.0461 -0.0452 -0.0452 -0.0414
(0.0674) (0.0673) (0.0665) (0.0677) (0.0676) (0.0675)
gy4 -0.0284 -0.0252 -0.0327 -0.0264 -0.0296 -0.0232
(0.0677) (0.0677) (0.0668) (0.0681) (0.0679) (0.0678)
gy5 0.124+ 0.130* 0.126* 0.123+ 0.126+ 0.127*
(0.0646) (0.0645) (0.0642) (0.0649) (0.0647) (0.0647)
gdisc1+ -0.00639 0.00184 0.00437 -0.000494 -0.00413 -0.00404
(0.0109) (0.00945) (0.00804) (0.00938) (0.0104) (0.0110)
gdisc2+ -0.0243* -0.0217* -0.00795 -0.0196* -0.0211* -0.0260*
(0.0104) (0.00910) (0.00789) (0.00892) (0.00990) (0.0105)
gdisc3+ -0.00708 -0.00519 -0.00434 -0.00706 -0.00522 -0.00717
(0.0107) (0.00950) (0.00802) (0.00912) (0.0103) (0.0106)
gdisc4+ -0.0167 -0.00893 -0.00410 -0.0122 -0.0120 -0.0148
(0.0113) (0.00958) (0.00758) (0.00934) (0.0107) (0.0110)
gdisc5+ -0.00975 -0.00473 0.000559 -0.00464 -0.0119 -0.00564
(0.0112) (0.00935) (0.00746) (0.00932) (0.0109) (0.0109)
inst1∗gdisc1+ 0.0103 0.00258 0.00266 0.00479 0.00733 0.00658
(0.00746) (0.00461) (0.00572) (0.00526) (0.00860) (0.00596)
inst2∗gdisc2+ 0.0228* 0.0167* 0.0111+ 0.0173* 0.0215* 0.0194*
(0.00736) (0.00458) (0.00575) (0.00517) (0.00851) (0.00585)
inst3∗gdisc3+ 0.00275 0.000213 -0.00378 0.00215 -0.000699 0.00248
(0.00758) (0.00461) (0.00559) (0.00518) (0.00860) (0.00585)
inst4∗gdisc4+ 0.0138 0.00582 -0.000640 0.00843 0.00885 0.00994
(0.00865) (0.00511) (0.00554) (0.00574) (0.00975) (0.00638)
inst5∗gdisc5+ 0.0142+ 0.00863+ 0.00869 0.00973+ 0.0180+ 0.00949
(0.00851) (0.00504) (0.00538) (0.00577) (0.00965) (0.00635)
gdisc1− -0.00858 -0.00173 0.00126 -0.00389 -0.0130* -0.00481
(0.00572) (0.00450) (0.00307) (0.00471) (0.00638) (0.00526)
gdisc2− -0.00732 -0.00597 -0.00376 -0.00498 -0.00821 -0.00530
(0.00597) (0.00480) (0.00316) (0.00499) (0.00676) (0.00556)
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gdisc3− -0.00600 -0.00508 -0.00671* -0.00555 -0.00536 -0.00561
(0.00584) (0.00470) (0.00322) (0.00490) (0.00671) (0.00547)
gdisc4− -0.000499 -0.000509 -0.00365 -0.000109 -0.00213 0.000140
(0.00584) (0.00469) (0.00326) (0.00489) (0.00663) (0.00544)
gdisc5− -0.00548 -0.00595 -0.00625+ -0.00599 -0.00880 -0.00521
(0.00574) (0.00474) (0.00345) (0.00483) (0.00664) (0.00533)
inst1∗gdisc1− 0.0117* 0.00503* 0.00937* 0.00684* 0.0141* 0.00715*
(0.00418) (0.00251) (0.00296) (0.00286) (0.00453) (0.00326)
inst2∗gdisc2− 0.000662 -0.000245 -0.00559+ -0.00110 0.00209 -0.000977
(0.00432) (0.00266) (0.00331) (0.00299) (0.00480) (0.00341)
inst3∗gdisc3− 0.00184 0.000371 0.00319 0.000835 0.000235 0.000749
(0.00420) (0.00260) (0.00328) (0.00289) (0.00472) (0.00332)
inst4∗gdisc4− -0.00385 -0.00369 -0.00284 -0.00355 -0.00226 -0.00389
(0.00418) (0.00259) (0.00334) (0.00287) (0.00471) (0.00330)
inst5∗gdisc5− -0.000817 -0.000273 0.00199 -0.000284 0.00193 -0.000954
(0.00395) (0.00248) (0.00314) (0.00273) (0.00456) (0.00314)
inst1 -0.362 -0.546 0.664 -0.536 -0.941 -0.109
(0.767) (0.904) (0.560) (0.907) (1.047) (0.583)
inst2 1.227 -0.153 -0.685 1.526 1.535 0.417
(0.978) (1.142) (0.708) (1.195) (1.316) (0.697)
inst3 -0.217 0.456 0.337 -1.428 -0.928 0.0761
(0.982) (1.159) (0.716) (1.225) (1.324) (0.712)
inst4 -0.0686 0.995 0.621 0.245 0.210 -0.502
(1.001) (1.175) (0.730) (1.256) (1.318) (0.722)
inst5 -1.029 -1.033 -1.172* -0.161 -0.256 -0.242
(0.799) (0.952) (0.568) (0.963) (1.043) (0.606)
trend -0.0263* -0.0253* -0.0270* -0.0255* -0.0262* -0.0254*
(0.0124) (0.0125) (0.0127) (0.0125) (0.0124) (0.0124)
open1 1.287 1.301 1.184 1.286 1.266 1.225
(0.839) (0.847) (0.844) (0.843) (0.843) (0.850)
open2 -1.756* -1.779* -1.740* -1.764* -1.772* -1.807*
(0.883) (0.890) (0.878) (0.890) (0.881) (0.895)
open3 0.959 0.917 0.815 0.931 0.823 0.949
(0.853) (0.857) (0.843) (0.857) (0.848) (0.863)
open4 -1.066 -1.062 -1.005 -1.091 -1.112 -1.064
(0.857) (0.858) (0.851) (0.859) (0.850) (0.865)
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open5 0.798 0.752 0.925 0.800 0.902 0.859
(0.847) (0.851) (0.848) (0.848) (0.842) (0.857)
open1∗gdisc1+ -0.00578 -0.00634 -0.00737 -0.00571 -0.00350 -0.00552
(0.00931) (0.00942) (0.00960) (0.00930) (0.00915) (0.00930)
open2∗gdisc2+ 0.00182 0.00582 0.00345 0.00469 0.00483 0.00567
(0.00952) (0.00953) (0.00965) (0.00944) (0.00956) (0.00940)
open3∗gdisc3+ -0.00228 -0.000864 -0.000972 -0.00107 0.000503 -0.00187
(0.0100) (0.0101) (0.0102) (0.0100) (0.0100) (0.00998)
open4∗gdisc4+ 0.00762 0.00833 0.0106 0.00987 0.0110 0.00922
(0.00986) (0.0100) (0.00996) (0.00988) (0.00979) (0.00997)
open5∗gdisc5+ -0.00753 -0.00588 -0.00819 -0.00686 -0.00565 -0.00678
(0.00959) (0.00980) (0.00979) (0.00969) (0.00958) (0.00974)
open1∗gdisc1− 0.00347+ 0.00474* 0.00385+ 0.00521* 0.00843* 0.00476*
(0.00210) (0.00212) (0.00213) (0.00203) (0.00230) (0.00207)
open2∗gdisc2− -0.00218 -0.00233 -0.00104 -0.00208 -0.00183 -0.00203
(0.00230) (0.00228) (0.00227) (0.00221) (0.00250) (0.00224)
open3∗gdisc3− 0.00119 0.00167 0.00177 0.00181 0.00242 0.00179
(0.00224) (0.00223) (0.00224) (0.00218) (0.00249) (0.00220)
open4∗gdisc4− 0.00110 0.00105 0.00148 0.000689 0.000456 0.000942
(0.00220) (0.00220) (0.00221) (0.00215) (0.00247) (0.00216)
open5∗gdisc5− -0.000220 -0.000248 -0.000840 -0.0000916 0.000504 -0.000124
(0.00209) (0.00211) (0.00213) (0.00204) (0.00233) (0.00206)
Constant 1.316* 1.198* 1.069* 1.236* 1.287* 1.276*
(0.350) (0.342) (0.323) (0.345) (0.349) (0.351)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0642 -0.0388 -0.0115 -0.0440 -0.0544 -0.0576
[0.00189] [0.0255] [0.422] [0.0112] [0.00516] [0.00507]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0637 0.0340 0.0180 0.0424 0.0550 0.0479
[0.0000321] [0.000468] [0.0536] [0.000166] [0.00116] [0.0000918]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0279 -0.0192 -0.0191 -0.0205 -0.0375 -0.0208
[0.0134] [0.0232] [0.00768] [0.0241] [0.00304] [0.0364]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00949 0.00119 0.00611 0.00275 0.0161 0.00207
[0.222] [0.794] [0.155] [0.596] [0.0673] [0.729]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.199 0.235 0.212 0.207 0.207 0.227
[0.202] [0.131] [0.165] [0.190] [0.191] [0.143]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0802 -0.0506 -0.0146 -0.0555 -0.0686 -0.0744
[0.004] [0.034] [0.418] [0.017] [0.010] [0.011]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0795 0.0444 0.0229 0.0534 0.0694 0.0620
[0.000] [0.003] [0.066] [0.001] [0.005] [0.001]
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(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0348 -0.0251 -0.0243 -0.0259 -0.0472 -0.0269
[0.017] [0.033] [0.020] [0.035] [0.003] [0.045]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0118 0.00156 0.00776 0.00346 0.0203 0.00268
[0.208] [0.791] [0.148] [0.591] [0.044] [0.726]
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
R2 0.159 0.152 0.156 0.154 0.156 0.153
Results estimated for equation 2. The number after each variable name represents the lag j specified
in equation 2. The variable open is openness, as detailed in the table A.3. Total effects are presented
in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend was
not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xt pcse, pairwise corr(psar1) was used to estimate Prais-Winsten regressions
with correlated panels corrected standard errors (PCSEs)
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Table A.10 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Prais-Winsten Regressions with 5 Lags and Openness -
Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0603*
(0.0285)
-1.5 -0.0488*
(0.0240)
-1 -0.160* -0.0951* -0.0374+ -0.109* -0.138* -0.136*
(0.0479) (0.0350) (0.0203) (0.0368) (0.0479) (0.0459)
-0.5 -0.120* -0.0728* -0.0260 -0.0823* -0.103* -0.105*
(0.0376) (0.0290) (0.0182) (0.0296) (0.0367) (0.0372)
0 -0.0802* -0.0506* -0.0146 -0.0555* -0.0686* -0.0744*
(0.0279) (0.0238) (0.0180) (0.0233) (0.0266) (0.0291)
0.5 -0.0404* -0.0284 -0.00314 -0.0288 -0.0339+ -0.0435+
(0.0200) (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0187) (0.0192) (0.0223)
1 -0.000628 -0.00623 0.00828 -0.00213 0.000811 -0.0125
(0.0165) (0.0188) (0.0233) (0.0171) (0.0180) (0.0181)
1.5 0.0391* 0.0160 0.0197 0.0246 0.0355 0.0185
(0.0198) (0.0203) (0.0277) (0.0195) (0.0241) (0.0184)
2 0.0789* 0.0382 0.0513* 0.0702* 0.0495*
(0.0277) (0.0241) (0.0246) (0.0337) (0.0232)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0398*
(0.0160)
-1.5 -0.0359*
(0.0140)
-1 -0.0466* -0.0267+ -0.0320* -0.0293+ -0.0675* -0.0296
(0.0229) (0.0156) (0.0124) (0.0172) (0.0246) (0.0195)
-0.5 -0.0407* -0.0259+ -0.0282* -0.0276+ -0.0574* -0.0282+
(0.0186) (0.0135) (0.0111) (0.0146) (0.0201) (0.0163)
0 -0.0348* -0.0251* -0.0243* -0.0259* -0.0472* -0.0269*
(0.0146) (0.0118) (0.0104) (0.0123) (0.0159) (0.0134)
0.5 -0.0289* -0.0244* -0.0204+ -0.0241* -0.0371* -0.0256*
(0.0112) (0.0106) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0123) (0.0111)
1 -0.0230* -0.0236* -0.0165 -0.0224* -0.0270* -0.0242*
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(0.00891) (0.0102) (0.0111) (0.00943) (0.0100) (0.00976)
1.5 -0.0170+ -0.0228* -0.0126 -0.0207* -0.0168+ -0.0229*
(0.00885) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.00944) (0.00998) (0.00984)
2 -0.0111 -0.0220+ -0.0189+ -0.00670 -0.0215+
(0.0110) (0.0117) (0.0105) (0.0122) (0.0113)
N 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769 1769
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.9 (equation 2).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.11 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors - 4
Lags with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0655 0.0721 0.0659 0.0690 0.0682 0.0682
(0.107) (0.108) (0.109) (0.108) (0.109) (0.107)
gy2 0.178* 0.181* 0.172* 0.180* 0.181* 0.180*
(0.0408) (0.0415) (0.0425) (0.0423) (0.0408) (0.0414)
gy3 -0.0384+ -0.0353 -0.0443+ -0.0370 -0.0350 -0.0362
(0.0221) (0.0217) (0.0224) (0.0226) (0.0226) (0.0224)
gy4 -0.0749* -0.0759+ -0.0829* -0.0735+ -0.0740+ -0.0743+
(0.0364) (0.0380) (0.0391) (0.0385) (0.0381) (0.0375)
gdisc1+ -0.0151+ -0.00448 0.00263 -0.00697 -0.00976 -0.0119
(0.00901) (0.00861) (0.00529) (0.00865) (0.00890) (0.00931)
gdisc2+ -0.0287* -0.0224* -0.00770 -0.0225* -0.0257* -0.0291*
(0.00885) (0.00946) (0.00705) (0.00921) (0.0102) (0.0112)
gdisc3+ -0.0103 -0.00592 -0.00163 -0.00864 -0.00736 -0.00929
(0.0123) (0.00929) (0.00671) (0.00966) (0.0113) (0.0116)
gdisc4+ -0.0190* -0.00949 -0.00287 -0.0136+ -0.0155* -0.0162+
(0.00818) (0.00731) (0.00690) (0.00741) (0.00752) (0.00835)
inst1∗gdisc1+ 0.0152* 0.00500 0.00325 0.00791+ 0.0108+ 0.0102*
(0.00529) (0.00371) (0.00409) (0.00436) (0.00574) (0.00472)
inst2∗gdisc2+ 0.0253* 0.0164* 0.0125* 0.0186* 0.0249* 0.0205*
(0.00655) (0.00516) (0.00538) (0.00603) (0.00866) (0.00657)
inst3∗gdisc3+ 0.00397 0.000328 -0.00247 0.00263 0.000432 0.00281
(0.0116) (0.00671) (0.00649) (0.00776) (0.0116) (0.00861)
inst4∗gdisc4+ 0.0157* 0.00734* 0.00134 0.00972* 0.0135* 0.0111*
(0.00435) (0.00247) (0.00323) (0.00285) (0.00451) (0.00355)
gdisc1− -0.00223 0.00221 0.00502+ 0.000466 -0.00749 0.000346
(0.00399) (0.00315) (0.00263) (0.00322) (0.00679) (0.00357)
gdisc2− -0.00607 -0.00681 -0.00524 -0.00475 -0.00832 -0.00456
(0.00643) (0.00562) (0.00392) (0.00518) (0.00686) (0.00601)
gdisc3− -0.00455 -0.00418 -0.00539 -0.00438 -0.00198 -0.00398
(0.00442) (0.00380) (0.00323) (0.00380) (0.00537) (0.00394)
gdisc4− 0.00443 0.00288 -0.00205 0.00310 0.00254 0.00408
(0.00750) (0.00578) (0.00363) (0.00626) (0.00965) (0.00632)
inst1∗gdisc1− 0.00950* 0.00500* 0.0109* 0.00663* 0.0128* 0.00646*
(0.00353) (0.00189) (0.00405) (0.00232) (0.00616) (0.00249)
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inst2∗gdisc2− -0.00109 -0.000107 -0.00442 -0.00195 0.00137 -0.00201
(0.00388) (0.00239) (0.00339) (0.00239) (0.00442) (0.00291)
inst3∗gdisc3− 0.000792 0.00000429 0.00180 0.000300 -0.00242 -0.000125
(0.00241) (0.00156) (0.00243) (0.00179) (0.00365) (0.00180)
inst4∗gdisc4− -0.00591 -0.00445 -0.00126 -0.00424 -0.00408 -0.00517
(0.00573) (0.00365) (0.00500) (0.00408) (0.00691) (0.00396)
inst1 -0.153 0.700 1.246* -0.853 -1.012* -0.171
(0.719) (0.434) (0.290) (0.853) (0.448) (0.497)
inst2 0.990 -0.639 -0.804+ 1.823+ 1.856 0.531
(0.907) (0.870) (0.402) (1.014) (1.179) (0.695)
inst3 0.0419 0.595 0.417 -1.430 -0.918 0.107
(0.738) (0.705) (0.659) (1.070) (1.136) (0.498)
inst4 -1.022 -0.317 -0.341 0.140 0.557 -0.0915
(0.784) (0.646) (0.612) (0.499) (0.563) (0.275)
trend -0.0258* -0.0242* -0.0274* -0.0252* -0.0245* -0.0247*
(0.00794) (0.00809) (0.00913) (0.00794) (0.00834) (0.00794)
open1 1.494 1.484 1.557 1.481 1.496 1.504
(1.148) (1.160) (1.184) (1.160) (1.192) (1.143)
open2 -1.769 -1.861 -1.934 -1.796 -1.825 -1.784
(1.687) (1.693) (1.742) (1.702) (1.717) (1.707)
open3 0.951 0.970 0.893 0.935 0.834 0.944
(0.972) (0.986) (0.919) (0.992) (0.945) (0.986)
open4 -0.608 -0.639 -0.560 -0.651 -0.619 -0.624
(0.607) (0.612) (0.550) (0.611) (0.575) (0.595)
open1∗gdisc1+ -0.00246 -0.00152 -0.00414 -0.00166 -0.000575 -0.00107
(0.00572) (0.00591) (0.00553) (0.00604) (0.00606) (0.00554)
open2∗gdisc2+ -0.0000378 0.00349 0.000884 0.00256 0.00253 0.00376
(0.00645) (0.00712) (0.00693) (0.00676) (0.00616) (0.00699)
open3∗gdisc3+ -0.00164 -0.00112 -0.00400 -0.000968 0.000870 -0.00115
(0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0110) (0.0104) (0.0101) (0.0102)
open4∗gdisc4+ 0.00585 0.00581 0.00714 0.00803 0.00866 0.00714
(0.00731) (0.00770) (0.00812) (0.00798) (0.00779) (0.00770)
open1∗gdisc1− 0.00202 0.00312+ 0.00144 0.00332* 0.00614* 0.00297+
(0.00199) (0.00170) (0.00215) (0.00160) (0.00125) (0.00163)
open2∗gdisc2− -0.00265 -0.00293 -0.00222 -0.00287 -0.00293+ -0.00275
(0.00209) (0.00188) (0.00161) (0.00180) (0.00165) (0.00178)
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open3∗gdisc3− 0.000212 0.000760 0.000801 0.000532 0.000585 0.000625
(0.00134) (0.00139) (0.00168) (0.00139) (0.00145) (0.00143)
open4∗gdisc4− 0.000951 0.000771 0.000506 0.000237 -0.000518 0.000673
(0.00132) (0.00116) (0.00152) (0.00119) (0.00193) (0.00113)
Constant 1.248+ 0.897+ 1.065* 1.449* 0.832 0.764
(0.661) (0.486) (0.512) (0.561) (0.621) (0.469)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0731 -0.0423 -0.00957 -0.0517 -0.0584 -0.0666
[0.000271] [0.00636] [0.214] [0.00126] [0.00184] [0.00160]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0602 0.0290 0.0146 0.0389 0.0496 0.0446
[0.000992] [0.0122] [0.136] [0.00407] [0.00546] [0.00383]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.00842 -0.00589 -0.00766 -0.00557 -0.0153 -0.00411
[0.383] [0.419] [0.260] [0.451] [0.248] [0.585]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00329 0.000441 0.00706 0.000743 0.00766 -0.000850
[0.597] [0.911] [0.104] [0.849] [0.381] [0.841]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.130 0.141 0.111 0.139 0.140 0.138
[0.282] [0.246] [0.370] [0.257] [0.248] [0.256]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0840 -0.0493 -0.0108 -0.0600 -0.0679 -0.0772
[0.005] [0.022] [0.228] [0.009] [0.007] [0.013]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0692 0.0338 0.0165 0.0451 0.0577 0.0518
[0.011] [0.039] [0.161] [0.020] [0.018] [0.023]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.00968 -0.00687 -0.00862 -0.00646 -0.0177 -0.00477
[0.406] [0.441] [0.302] [0.475] [0.273] [0.596]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00378 0.000514 0.00794 0.000862 0.00891 -0.000987
[0.598] [0.910] [0.108] [0.849] [0.383] [0.842]
N 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822
within R2 0.1254 0.1209 0.1234 0.1222 0.1246 0.1224
Results estimated for equation 2. The number after each variable name represents the lag j specified
in equation 2. The variable open is openness, as detailed in the table A.3. Total effects are presented
in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend was
not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and Kraay
standard errors.
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Table A.12 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Fixed-Effects Regressions with 4 Lags and Openness - Evaluating
Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0437
(0.0295)
-1.5 -0.0355
(0.0239)
-1 -0.153* -0.0831* -0.0272 -0.105* -0.126* -0.129*
(0.0537) (0.0361) (0.0184) (0.0403) (0.0472) (0.0516)
-0.5 -0.119* -0.0662* -0.0190 -0.0826* -0.0968* -0.103*
(0.0409) (0.0284) (0.0132) (0.0311) (0.0356) (0.0407)
0 -0.0840* -0.0493* -0.0108 -0.0600* -0.0679* -0.0772*
(0.0283) (0.0209) (0.00883) (0.0221) (0.0243) (0.0300)
0.5 -0.0494* -0.0324* -0.00253 -0.0374* -0.0391* -0.0513*
(0.0165) (0.0139) (0.00696) (0.0136) (0.0138) (0.0195)
1 -0.0148 -0.0155+ 0.00571 -0.0149+ -0.0102 -0.0254*
(0.00906) (0.00893) (0.00928) (0.00762) (0.00807) (0.0105)
1.5 0.0198 0.00140 0.0140 0.00771 0.0186 0.000452
(0.0153) (0.00967) (0.0138) (0.0105) (0.0147) (0.00904)
2 0.0545* 0.0183 0.0303 0.0475+ 0.0263
(0.0270) (0.0153) (0.0184) (0.0254) (0.0172)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0245
(0.0153)
-1.5 -0.0205
(0.0132)
-1 -0.0135 -0.00738 -0.0166 -0.00732 -0.0267 -0.00378
(0.0176) (0.0121) (0.0113) (0.0122) (0.0255) (0.0126)
-0.5 -0.0116 -0.00712 -0.0126 -0.00689 -0.0222 -0.00427
(0.0145) (0.0103) (0.00960) (0.0105) (0.0207) (0.0106)
0 -0.00968 -0.00687 -0.00862 -0.00646 -0.0177 -0.00477
(0.0115) (0.00885) (0.00826) (0.00897) (0.0160) (0.00894)
0.5 -0.00779 -0.00661 -0.00465 -0.00603 -0.0133 -0.00526
(0.00911) (0.00776) (0.00749) (0.00784) (0.0117) (0.00769)
1 -0.00590 -0.00635 -0.000676 -0.00560 -0.00883 -0.00575
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(0.00762) (0.00724) (0.00746) (0.00726) (0.00838) (0.00710)
1.5 -0.00401 -0.00610 0.00329 -0.00517 -0.00438 -0.00625
(0.00766) (0.00741) (0.00818) (0.00736) (0.00735) (0.00733)
2 -0.00211 -0.00584 -0.00474 0.0000805 -0.00674
(0.00920) (0.00823) (0.00811) (0.00945) (0.00832)
N 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822 1822
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.11 (equation 2).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.13 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors - 8
Lags with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0763 0.0881 0.0714 0.0822 0.0800 0.0814
(0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.101) (0.102) (0.101)
gy2 0.161* 0.165* 0.153* 0.162* 0.167* 0.163*
(0.0474) (0.0473) (0.0476) (0.0486) (0.0470) (0.0478)
gy3 -0.00500 -0.0109 -0.0223 -0.00548 -0.00327 -0.00476
(0.0248) (0.0236) (0.0251) (0.0248) (0.0250) (0.0249)
gy4 -0.100* -0.104+ -0.115* -0.101+ -0.0997* -0.102*
(0.0478) (0.0525) (0.0525) (0.0511) (0.0495) (0.0496)
gy5 0.101+ 0.0976+ 0.0893+ 0.101+ 0.103+ 0.0997+
(0.0537) (0.0510) (0.0528) (0.0538) (0.0534) (0.0528)
gy6 -0.00684 -0.0105 -0.0197 -0.00919 -0.00710 -0.00868
(0.0376) (0.0364) (0.0381) (0.0379) (0.0377) (0.0373)
gy7 -0.0358 -0.0429 -0.0501 -0.0363 -0.0390 -0.0359
(0.0623) (0.0659) (0.0636) (0.0650) (0.0649) (0.0641)
gy8 -0.196* -0.201* -0.206* -0.200* -0.198* -0.198*
(0.0395) (0.0413) (0.0384) (0.0407) (0.0406) (0.0405)
gdisc1+ -0.00688 0.00239 0.00581 -0.00148 -0.00671 -0.00555
(0.00721) (0.00659) (0.00541) (0.00763) (0.00770) (0.00794)
gdisc2+ -0.0297* -0.0252* -0.00779 -0.0239* -0.0278* -0.0314*
(0.00908) (0.00983) (0.00797) (0.00896) (0.00985) (0.0119)
gdisc3+ -0.00796 -0.00374 -0.00180 -0.00608 -0.00303 -0.00538
(0.0148) (0.0112) (0.00790) (0.0116) (0.0138) (0.0143)
gdisc4+ -0.0119* -0.00254 0.00187 -0.00909+ -0.00605 -0.0104+
(0.00580) (0.00573) (0.00654) (0.00494) (0.00676) (0.00546)
gdisc5+ -0.00346 0.00194 0.0123 0.00378 -0.00827 0.000876
(0.0126) (0.00791) (0.00772) (0.00819) (0.0158) (0.0118)
gdisc6+ -0.00978 -0.00510 -0.00243 -0.00803 -0.00346 -0.0104
(0.00922) (0.00652) (0.00502) (0.00674) (0.0102) (0.00972)
gdisc7+ -0.00363 -0.00881 -0.0143* -0.00937 -0.000518 -0.00810
(0.0112) (0.00808) (0.00535) (0.00969) (0.0116) (0.0114)
gdisc8+ 0.00282 -0.00632 -0.00897+ -0.00414 -0.00160 -0.00227
(0.00708) (0.00672) (0.00477) (0.00734) (0.00878) (0.00710)
inst1∗gdisc1+ 0.00838* 0.000544 0.00206 0.00392 0.00714 0.00550+
(0.00388) (0.00231) (0.00341) (0.00282) (0.00438) (0.00305)
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inst2∗gdisc2+ 0.0261* 0.0179* 0.0140* 0.0204* 0.0277* 0.0223*
(0.00649) (0.00533) (0.00487) (0.00593) (0.00905) (0.00682)
inst3∗gdisc3+ 0.00206 -0.000306 -0.00520 0.000697 -0.00219 0.00127
(0.0117) (0.00712) (0.00702) (0.00762) (0.0118) (0.00879)
inst4∗gdisc4+ 0.0100+ 0.00293 -0.00366 0.00626+ 0.00481 0.00694+
(0.00507) (0.00303) (0.00478) (0.00357) (0.00715) (0.00399)
inst5∗gdisc5+ 0.0136 0.00876 0.00797 0.00836 0.0205 0.00893
(0.0118) (0.00643) (0.0107) (0.00663) (0.0191) (0.00883)
inst6∗gdisc6+ 0.00856 0.00559 0.00482 0.00702 0.00347 0.00804
(0.00930) (0.00554) (0.00564) (0.00578) (0.0122) (0.00710)
inst7∗gdisc7+ -0.0141 -0.00773 -0.0124* -0.00876 -0.0177 -0.00785
(0.0105) (0.00601) (0.00522) (0.00731) (0.0114) (0.00779)
inst8∗gdisc8+ -0.0159* -0.00517 -0.00709 -0.00862+ -0.0107+ -0.00802+
(0.00671) (0.00375) (0.00463) (0.00455) (0.00631) (0.00448)
gdisc1− -0.00675 -0.00123 0.00126 -0.00399 -0.0127+ -0.00408
(0.00445) (0.00306) (0.00228) (0.00326) (0.00694) (0.00336)
gdisc2− -0.00649 -0.00619 -0.00425 -0.00401 -0.00762 -0.00464
(0.00540) (0.00518) (0.00405) (0.00474) (0.00677) (0.00582)
gdisc3− -0.00674 -0.00611 -0.00808* -0.00688+ -0.00360 -0.00649
(0.00432) (0.00399) (0.00301) (0.00409) (0.00578) (0.00425)
gdisc4− 0.00565 0.00392 -0.00213 0.00419 0.00271 0.00469
(0.00847) (0.00637) (0.00353) (0.00682) (0.00998) (0.00700)
gdisc5− -0.00275 -0.00581 -0.00605* -0.00399 -0.00558 -0.00357
(0.00468) (0.00348) (0.00239) (0.00366) (0.00555) (0.00367)
gdisc6− -0.00166 -0.00137 -0.00261 -0.00308 -0.00225 -0.00227
(0.00413) (0.00253) (0.00181) (0.00339) (0.00438) (0.00337)
gdisc7− 0.00640 0.00394 0.000518 0.00564 0.00562 0.00567
(0.00672) (0.00514) (0.00370) (0.00604) (0.00768) (0.00614)
gdisc8− -0.000562 0.00236 0.000146 0.000554 -0.00269 0.000651
(0.00395) (0.00281) (0.00212) (0.00338) (0.00485) (0.00390)
inst1∗gdisc1− 0.0104* 0.00536* 0.0116* 0.00732* 0.0142* 0.00707*
(0.00390) (0.00183) (0.00402) (0.00244) (0.00605) (0.00238)
inst2∗gdisc2− -0.000405 -0.000583 -0.00541 -0.00211 0.00128 -0.00175
(0.00375) (0.00261) (0.00342) (0.00239) (0.00445) (0.00321)
inst3∗gdisc3− 0.00143 0.000616 0.00325 0.00102 -0.00251 0.000501
(0.00258) (0.00188) (0.00285) (0.00209) (0.00406) (0.00237)
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inst4∗gdisc4− -0.00603 -0.00481 -0.000876 -0.00419 -0.00341 -0.00491
(0.00638) (0.00399) (0.00488) (0.00444) (0.00707) (0.00440)
inst5∗gdisc5− -0.00217 0.000343 0.00172 -0.00122 -0.000152 -0.00154
(0.00339) (0.00199) (0.00269) (0.00238) (0.00390) (0.00230)
inst6∗gdisc6− 0.000448 0.0000494 0.00116 0.00112 0.000121 0.000183
(0.00324) (0.00171) (0.00358) (0.00232) (0.00322) (0.00238)
inst7∗gdisc7− -0.00399 -0.00262 -0.000265 -0.00338 -0.00345 -0.00340
(0.00362) (0.00228) (0.00272) (0.00294) (0.00411) (0.00293)
inst8∗gdisc8− 0.00347 0.000376 0.00190 0.00181 0.00431 0.00155
(0.00333) (0.00232) (0.00264) (0.00286) (0.00416) (0.00330)
inst1 0.498 0.264 1.449* 0.252 -0.663* 0.141
(0.717) (0.495) (0.376) (0.861) (0.306) (0.455)
inst2 0.180 0.407 -1.064* 0.432 0.413 -0.0444
(0.951) (0.753) (0.528) (0.958) (0.344) (0.568)
inst3 0.301 0.196 0.802 -1.072 0.0737 0.401
(0.787) (0.695) (0.622) (1.291) (0.418) (0.456)
inst4 -0.528 0.872 0.595 -0.254 0.369 -0.459
(0.770) (0.612) (0.572) (1.485) (0.946) (0.634)
inst5 -1.116 -2.762* -1.014 0.649 0.363 -0.372
(0.765) (0.746) (0.781) (1.461) (1.052) (0.698)
inst6 0.00166 1.980* 0.712 -0.451 -0.478 1.059+
(0.551) (0.835) (0.470) (0.905) (0.599) (0.572)
inst7 0.696 -0.126 -0.0479 0.298 -0.0347 -0.111
(0.897) (0.949) (0.340) (0.846) (0.828) (0.561)
inst8 0.0414 -0.458 -0.822* -0.261 0.510 0.0262
(0.916) (0.428) (0.326) (0.944) (0.627) (0.517)
trend -0.0376* -0.0370* -0.0464* -0.0374* -0.0363* -0.0360*
(0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0128) (0.0107) (0.0108) (0.0102)
open1 1.829 1.680 1.670 1.762 1.722 1.758
(1.577) (1.538) (1.577) (1.559) (1.598) (1.527)
open2 -4.155 -4.073 -4.226 -4.113 -4.173 -4.080
(2.914) (2.907) (2.895) (2.913) (2.928) (2.925)
open3 1.364 1.328 1.315 1.414 1.287 1.408
(1.993) (2.038) (1.951) (2.060) (1.985) (2.048)
open4 0.0350 0.0741 -0.0539 -0.103 -0.111 0.000913
(0.895) (0.892) (0.912) (0.907) (0.867) (0.877)
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open5 0.986 1.018 1.281 1.087 1.160 1.059
(0.685) (0.715) (0.773) (0.717) (0.732) (0.716)
open6 1.737 1.792 1.871 1.666 1.702 1.720
(1.856) (1.822) (1.815) (1.847) (1.824) (1.841)
open7 0.298 0.228 0.119 0.277 0.244 0.279
(1.883) (1.813) (1.929) (1.903) (1.872) (1.865)
open8 -2.568+ -2.546+ -2.309+ -2.574+ -2.527+ -2.596+
(1.379) (1.333) (1.353) (1.386) (1.410) (1.381)
open1∗gdisc1+ -0.00188 -0.00134 -0.00412 -0.00149 0.00142 -0.000433
(0.00472) (0.00436) (0.00476) (0.00462) (0.00467) (0.00450)
open2∗gdisc2+ 0.000914 0.00607 0.000603 0.00366 0.00380 0.00510
(0.00814) (0.00884) (0.00912) (0.00834) (0.00712) (0.00841)
open3∗gdisc3+ -0.000187 -0.000655 -0.00220 0.000259 -0.000418 -0.000641
(0.00959) (0.00929) (0.00922) (0.00895) (0.00841) (0.00934)
open4∗gdisc4+ 0.00395 0.00302 0.00525 0.00636 0.00555 0.00590
(0.00662) (0.00661) (0.00605) (0.00604) (0.00698) (0.00634)
open5∗gdisc5+ -0.00711 -0.00575 -0.0106 -0.00737 -0.00370 -0.00680
(0.0136) (0.0134) (0.0150) (0.0146) (0.0122) (0.0135)
open6∗gdisc6+ 0.00783 0.00718 0.00798 0.00898 0.00780 0.00851
(0.00755) (0.00739) (0.00683) (0.00756) (0.00809) (0.00731)
open7∗gdisc7+ 0.0112 0.0105 0.0148* 0.0116+ 0.00952 0.0108
(0.00755) (0.00735) (0.00584) (0.00689) (0.00797) (0.00749)
open8∗gdisc8+ 0.0105 0.00992 0.00939 0.00994 0.00861 0.00892
(0.00769) (0.00823) (0.00711) (0.00793) (0.00969) (0.00760)
open1∗gdisc1− 0.00181 0.00277 0.00132 0.00319+ 0.00633* 0.00293
(0.00231) (0.00195) (0.00247) (0.00175) (0.00125) (0.00185)
open2∗gdisc2− -0.00477+ -0.00466+ -0.00399+ -0.00500+ -0.00499+ -0.00468+
(0.00283) (0.00272) (0.00216) (0.00261) (0.00259) (0.00255)
open3∗gdisc3− 0.00182 0.00220 0.00258 0.00208 0.00221 0.00225
(0.00154) (0.00166) (0.00175) (0.00156) (0.00162) (0.00166)
open4∗gdisc4− 0.000896 0.00107 0.00111 0.0000272 -0.000386 0.000591
(0.00174) (0.00147) (0.00169) (0.00148) (0.00190) (0.00137)
open5∗gdisc5− 0.00131 0.000994 0.000956 0.00119 0.00138 0.00127
(0.000788) (0.000892) (0.000997) (0.000858) (0.00134) (0.000928)
open6∗gdisc6− -0.00425* -0.00416+ -0.00414+ -0.00425* -0.00397* -0.00410*
(0.00204) (0.00210) (0.00224) (0.00191) (0.00189) (0.00200)
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open7∗gdisc7− -0.000998 -0.00133 -0.00176 -0.00165 -0.00247 -0.00150
(0.00157) (0.00167) (0.00170) (0.00173) (0.00257) (0.00176)
open8∗gdisc8− -0.00667* -0.00585* -0.00605* -0.00614* -0.00504* -0.00610*
(0.00245) (0.00235) (0.00200) (0.00227) (0.00205) (0.00244)
Constant 1.868* 1.629* 1.820* 2.344* 1.608* 1.251*
(0.827) (0.571) (0.704) (0.834) (0.773) (0.521)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0705 -0.0473 -0.0153 -0.0583 -0.0574 -0.0727
[0.00611] [0.0223] [0.234] [0.00623] [0.0285] [0.00559]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0387 0.0225 0.000561 0.0293 0.0330 0.0371
[0.0132] [0.0257] [0.953] [0.0103] [0.0842] [0.00384]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0129 -0.0105 -0.0212 -0.0116 -0.0261 -0.0100
[0.424] [0.362] [0.0192] [0.320] [0.160] [0.423]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00319 -0.00127 0.0130 0.000380 0.0104 -0.00230
[0.747] [0.824] [0.0100] [0.948] [0.379] [0.726]
∑Jj=1 γ j -0.00598 -0.0186 -0.0998 -0.00691 0.00274 -0.00426
[0.967] [0.899] [0.515] [0.963] [0.985] [0.977]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0701 -0.0465 -0.0139 -0.0579 -0.0576 -0.0724
[0.005] [0.020] [0.255] [0.003] [0.023] [0.007]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0385 0.0221 0.000510 0.0291 0.0331 0.0370
[0.013] [0.033] [0.954] [0.008] [0.088] [0.008]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0128 -0.0103 -0.0193 -0.0115 -0.0262 -0.01000
[0.416] [0.338] [0.011] [0.309] [0.136] [0.407]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00317 -0.00124 0.0119 0.000377 0.0104 -0.00229
[0.746] [0.826] [0.007] [0.948] [0.356] [0.730]
N 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610
within R2 0.2002 0.2021 0.2113 0.1969 0.2012 0.1973
Results estimated for equation 2. The number after each variable name represents the lag j specified
in equation 2. The variable open is openness, as detailed in the table A.3. Total effects are presented
in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend was
not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and Kraay
standard errors.
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Table A.14 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Fixed-Effects Regressions with 8 Lags and Openness - Evaluating
Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0149
(0.0272)
-1.5 -0.0147
(0.0231)
-1 -0.109* -0.0685* -0.0144 -0.0870* -0.0906* -0.109*
(0.0375) (0.0283) (0.0191) (0.0280) (0.0421) (0.0383)
-0.5 -0.0893* -0.0575* -0.0142 -0.0725* -0.0741* -0.0909*
(0.0304) (0.0237) (0.0154) (0.0232) (0.0331) (0.0319)
0 -0.0701* -0.0465* -0.0139 -0.0579* -0.0576* -0.0724*
(0.0236) (0.0193) (0.0121) (0.0186) (0.0245) (0.0257)
0.5 -0.0508* -0.0354* -0.0137 -0.0434* -0.0411* -0.0539*
(0.0173) (0.0154) (0.00967) (0.0145) (0.0169) (0.0197)
1 -0.0316* -0.0244+ -0.0134 -0.0288* -0.0245+ -0.0354*
(0.0123) (0.0122) (0.00887) (0.0113) (0.0123) (0.0145)
1.5 -0.0124 -0.0134 -0.0132 -0.0143 -0.00800 -0.0169
(0.0107) (0.0106) (0.0101) (0.0101) (0.0141) (0.0109)
2 0.00687 -0.00233 0.000262 0.00852 0.00155
(0.0137) (0.0113) (0.0114) (0.0206) (0.0109)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0430*
(0.0123)
-1.5 -0.0370*
(0.0106)
-1 -0.0160 -0.00904 -0.0311* -0.0119 -0.0366 -0.00771
(0.0249) (0.0156) (0.00915) (0.0163) (0.0281) (0.0179)
-0.5 -0.0144 -0.00967 -0.0252* -0.0117 -0.0314 -0.00885
(0.0202) (0.0131) (0.00798) (0.0137) (0.0227) (0.0149)
0 -0.0128 -0.0103 -0.0193* -0.0115 -0.0262 -0.01000
(0.0156) (0.0106) (0.00725) (0.0112) (0.0173) (0.0120)
0.5 -0.0112 -0.0109 -0.0133+ -0.0113 -0.0210+ -0.0111
(0.0113) (0.00843) (0.00710) (0.00888) (0.0122) (0.00933)
1 -0.00965 -0.0115+ -0.00740 -0.0111 -0.0158* -0.0123+
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(0.00759) (0.00672) (0.00757) (0.00705) (0.00767) (0.00726)
1.5 -0.00806 -0.0122* -0.00147 -0.0109+ -0.0106+ -0.0134*
(0.00598) (0.00592) (0.00855) (0.00609) (0.00565) (0.00633)
2 -0.00648 -0.0128+ -0.0107 -0.00539 -0.0146*
(0.00784) (0.00639) (0.00641) (0.00822) (0.00701)
N 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610 1610
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.13 (equation 2).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.15 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors -
with Openness and Financial Development - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0768 0.0863 0.0582 0.0808 0.0855 0.0807
(0.108) (0.111) (0.0968) (0.110) (0.115) (0.109)
gy2 0.165* 0.173* 0.147* 0.165* 0.178* 0.167*
(0.0437) (0.0448) (0.0498) (0.0455) (0.0431) (0.0441)
gy3 -0.0402* -0.0506* -0.0169 -0.0409* -0.0566* -0.0386*
(0.0186) (0.0210) (0.0272) (0.0187) (0.0203) (0.0188)
gy4 -0.0734+ -0.0819+ -0.135* -0.0739 -0.0670 -0.0723+
(0.0427) (0.0458) (0.0539) (0.0444) (0.0441) (0.0428)
gy5 0.118* 0.105* 0.0757 0.116* 0.120* 0.118*
(0.0524) (0.0512) (0.0505) (0.0520) (0.0527) (0.0515)
gy6 -0.0283
(0.0416)
gy7 -0.0419
(0.0776)
gy8 -0.207*
(0.0478)
gdisc1+ -0.01000 0.00165 0.00580 -0.00290 -0.00727 -0.00493
(0.00892) (0.00789) (0.00390) (0.00923) (0.00769) (0.00897)
gdisc2+ -0.0318* -0.0209* -0.00876 -0.0256* -0.0257* -0.0321*
(0.0109) (0.00971) (0.0103) (0.0113) (0.00958) (0.0138)
gdisc3+ -0.00742 0.000624 0.00309 -0.00413 -0.00423 -0.00569
(0.0146) (0.0112) (0.00891) (0.0114) (0.0143) (0.0135)
gdisc4+ -0.0157* -0.00484 0.00659 -0.0129+ -0.00451 -0.0150+
(0.00720) (0.00739) (0.00931) (0.00750) (0.00804) (0.00817)
gdisc5+ -0.00112 0.00113 0.0183* 0.000649 -0.0157 -0.0000365
(0.00628) (0.00670) (0.00826) (0.00542) (0.0185) (0.00684)
gdisc6+ -0.00769
(0.00769)
gdisc7+ -0.00804
(0.00583)
gdisc8+ -0.00624
(0.00471)
inst1∗gdisc1+ 0.0106 -0.00500 -0.000943 0.00219 0.00854 0.00353
(0.00707) (0.00541) (0.00419) (0.00519) (0.00515) (0.00555)
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inst2∗gdisc2+ 0.0323* 0.0213* 0.0129* 0.0238* 0.0277* 0.0258*
(0.00895) (0.00645) (0.00452) (0.00738) (0.0104) (0.00900)
inst3∗gdisc3+ 0.00502 0.000272 -0.00624 0.00274 -0.00184 0.00328
(0.0167) (0.00952) (0.00801) (0.0110) (0.0121) (0.0122)
inst4∗gdisc4+ 0.0167* 0.00509 -0.00188 0.0117* 0.00724 0.0133*
(0.00652) (0.00312) (0.00456) (0.00367) (0.00597) (0.00437)
inst5∗gdisc5+ 0.00469 0.00200 -0.00287 0.00298 0.0181 0.00372
(0.00575) (0.00254) (0.00506) (0.00428) (0.0174) (0.00457)
inst6∗gdisc6+ 0.00817
(0.00506)
inst7∗gdisc7+ -0.0101+
(0.00510)
inst8∗gdisc8+ -0.00515
(0.00438)
gdisc1− -0.00530 0.00201 0.000124 -0.00147 -0.00796 -0.00269
(0.00530) (0.00315) (0.00325) (0.00377) (0.00563) (0.00355)
gdisc2− -0.00619 -0.0119+ -0.00700+ -0.00614 -0.0122+ -0.00521
(0.00502) (0.00684) (0.00361) (0.00417) (0.00661) (0.00484)
gdisc3− -0.00214 -0.00535 -0.00900* -0.00358 -0.00345 -0.00280
(0.00372) (0.00382) (0.00368) (0.00334) (0.00350) (0.00354)
gdisc4− 0.00117 0.00162 -0.00287 0.000590 0.00168 0.00122
(0.00682) (0.00611) (0.00388) (0.00593) (0.00717) (0.00574)
gdisc5− -0.00416 -0.00639 -0.00793* -0.00610 -0.00724+ -0.00496
(0.00491) (0.00446) (0.00352) (0.00481) (0.00364) (0.00527)
gdisc6− -0.00377+
(0.00189)
gdisc7− -0.00344
(0.00349)
gdisc8− -0.000810
(0.00276)
inst1∗gdisc1− 0.0124* 0.00648* 0.0127* 0.00819* 0.0131* 0.00889*
(0.00478) (0.00225) (0.00291) (0.00291) (0.00563) (0.00289)
inst2∗gdisc2− -0.00346 -0.000191 -0.00482 -0.00309 0.00235 -0.00388
(0.00375) (0.00224) (0.00310) (0.00224) (0.00412) (0.00248)
inst3∗gdisc3− -0.00397+ -0.00150 0.00155 -0.00247+ -0.00127 -0.00345+
(0.00202) (0.00139) (0.00202) (0.00133) (0.00302) (0.00172)
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inst4∗gdisc4− -0.00420 -0.00336 -0.00140 -0.00302 -0.00408 -0.00368
(0.00545) (0.00393) (0.00469) (0.00385) (0.00651) (0.00358)
inst5∗gdisc5− -0.00356 -0.000397 0.00162 -0.00148 -0.000125 -0.00255
(0.00341) (0.00172) (0.00189) (0.00205) (0.00241) (0.00233)
inst6∗gdisc6− 0.00205
(0.00304)
inst7∗gdisc7− -0.000628
(0.00219)
inst8∗gdisc8− -0.000622
(0.00214)
inst1 -0.378 0.421 1.525* -1.289 -1.361* -0.0311
(0.766) (0.397) (0.345) (0.957) (0.541) (0.454)
inst2 1.064 -0.669 -1.224* 1.882+ 1.997 0.402
(0.973) (0.888) (0.569) (0.981) (1.208) (0.611)
inst3 -0.0716 0.694 1.341* -1.586 -0.972 0.0320
(0.730) (0.789) (0.638) (1.038) (1.120) (0.380)
inst4 -0.564 0.853 0.333 -0.0721 0.323 -0.640
(0.775) (0.545) (0.638) (1.329) (1.018) (0.580)
inst5 -0.585 -1.183* -0.945 0.331 0.284 0.469
(0.595) (0.479) (0.773) (1.244) (0.907) (0.589)
inst6 0.468
(0.421)
inst7 -0.00395
(0.360)
inst8 -1.007*
(0.278)
trend -0.0253+ -0.0274+ -0.0621* -0.0248+ -0.0240* -0.0247+
(0.0138) (0.0151) (0.0239) (0.0139) (0.00916) (0.0138)
open1 2.096+ 0.331 2.033 2.104+ -0.0299 2.150*
(1.081) (0.466) (1.559) (1.055) (0.451) (1.054)
open2 -2.522 -4.547 -2.534 -2.519
(1.865) (3.093) (1.876) (1.884)
open3 1.183 1.869 1.184 1.181
(1.153) (2.248) (1.164) (1.154)
open4 -1.529+ -0.937 -1.599+ -1.519+
(0.811) (0.946) (0.809) (0.812)
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open5 0.455 1.653+ 0.406 0.375
(0.479) (0.876) (0.498) (0.508)
open6 1.661
(2.166)
open7 0.299
(2.294)
open8 -1.958
(1.181)
open1∗gdisc1+ -0.00504 -0.00759 -0.00905 -0.00593 -0.00244 -0.00590
(0.00617) (0.00670) (0.00578) (0.00636) (0.00567) (0.00600)
open2∗gdisc2+ 0.00492 0.00361 0.00832 0.00922
(0.00916) (0.0118) (0.00951) (0.0101)
open3∗gdisc3+ 0.00617 0.00194 0.00688 0.00634
(0.0109) (0.0104) (0.0105) (0.0104)
open4∗gdisc4+ 0.00401 0.00509 0.00766 0.00715
(0.00648) (0.00689) (0.00721) (0.00676)
open5∗gdisc5+ 0.00650 0.00237 0.00667 0.00677
(0.00880) (0.0103) (0.00959) (0.00938)
open6∗gdisc6+ 0.00125
(0.00757)
open7∗gdisc7+ 0.0125*
(0.00543)
open8∗gdisc8+ 0.00972
(0.00963)
open1∗gdisc1− 0.00747* 0.00567* 0.00400* 0.00821* 0.00689* 0.00769*
(0.00256) (0.00147) (0.00192) (0.00293) (0.000917) (0.00277)
open2∗gdisc2− -0.00890 -0.00953+ -0.00929 -0.00957
(0.00564) (0.00568) (0.00580) (0.00574)
open3∗gdisc3− -0.00298+ -0.00224 -0.00342* -0.00302+
(0.00155) (0.00292) (0.00158) (0.00161)
open4∗gdisc4− 0.00149 0.00437 0.00141 0.00109
(0.00318) (0.00392) (0.00294) (0.00311)
open5∗gdisc5− -0.00000282 0.00230 0.0000561 -0.000199
(0.00260) (0.00194) (0.00273) (0.00266)
open6∗gdisc6− -0.0107*
(0.00388)
176
Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors - with Openness
and Financial Development - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I - Continued
open7∗gdisc7− -0.00213
(0.00341)
open8∗gdisc8− -0.00785
(0.00538)
f d1 -0.137 -0.135 0.729 -0.206 -0.253
(0.925) (0.888) (1.432) (0.919) (0.921)
f d2 0.337 0.445 -0.135 0.401 0.386
(1.165) (1.046) (1.093) (1.121) (1.142)
f d3 -1.153 -0.342 -3.302* -1.143 -1.159
(1.213) (0.594) (1.100) (1.234) (1.206)
f d4 1.990 3.381+ 1.802 1.885
(2.582) (1.899) (2.495) (2.482)
f d5 -0.728 -3.625 -0.586 -0.678
(2.009) (2.491) (1.939) (1.957)
f d6 1.879
(1.983)
f d7 1.694
(1.508)
f d8 -0.697
(0.864)
f d1∗gdisc1+ 0.00531 0.0201 0.0197 0.0112 0.0102
(0.0196) (0.0199) (0.0156) (0.0191) (0.0190)
f d2∗gdisc2+ -0.00629 0.00387 0.00989 -0.00262 -0.00514
(0.0124) (0.0117) (0.0142) (0.0100) (0.0103)
f d3∗gdisc3+ -0.0140 -0.00896 -0.00386 -0.0153 -0.0132
(0.0199) (0.0197) (0.0138) (0.0194) (0.0205)
f d4∗gdisc4+ -0.0143 -0.0143 -0.0140 -0.0176
(0.0126) (0.0127) (0.0103) (0.0112)
f d5∗gdisc5+ -0.0161 -0.0115 -0.0152 -0.0168
(0.0163) (0.0182) (0.0164) (0.0159)
f d6∗gdisc6+ 0.0255
(0.0194)
f d7∗gdisc7+ -0.0129
(0.00990)
f d8∗gdisc8+ -0.00475
(0.0118)
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f d1∗gdisc1− -0.0139+ -0.00565 -0.00507 -0.0112 -0.0113
(0.00779) (0.00613) (0.00574) (0.00765) (0.00757)
f d2∗gdisc2− 0.0159 0.00249 0.0112 0.0154 0.0167
(0.0106) (0.00286) (0.00925) (0.0108) (0.0108)
f d3∗gdisc3− 0.0121* 0.00605* 0.0118* 0.0120* 0.0120*
(0.00467) (0.00278) (0.00447) (0.00446) (0.00463)
f d4∗gdisc4− -0.00165 -0.00789 -0.00276 -0.00149
(0.00812) (0.00855) (0.00825) (0.00835)
f d5∗gdisc5− 0.00556 -0.000508 0.00419 0.00529
(0.00637) (0.00562) (0.00594) (0.00579)
f d6∗gdisc6− 0.0144*
(0.00648)
f d7∗gdisc7− 0.00352
(0.00575)
f d8∗gdisc8− 0.00427
(0.00940)
Constant 1.678* 0.686 1.739* 1.895* 0.807* 1.004
(0.824) (0.557) (0.754) (0.724) (0.364) (0.668)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0660 -0.0223 0.00302 -0.0449 -0.0574 -0.0577
[0.00165] [0.0358] [0.843] [0.00776] [0.0218] [0.00603]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0693 0.0237 -0.00611 0.0434 0.0598 0.0496
[0.00282] [0.0321] [0.586] [0.0131] [0.0107] [0.0111]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0166 -0.0200 -0.0347 -0.0167 -0.0292 -0.0144
[0.210] [0.142] [0.0405] [0.151] [0.0532] [0.205]
∑Jj=1ψ j -0.00277 0.00103 0.0104 -0.00188 0.00999 -0.00467
[0.740] [0.854] [0.0254] [0.732] [0.341] [0.412]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.246 0.231 -0.148 0.247 0.260 0.255
[0.0733] [0.0837] [0.406] [0.0724] [0.0615] [0.0618]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0876 -0.0290 0.00263 -0.0596 -0.0776 -0.0775
[0.011] [0.037] [0.841] [0.023] [0.041] [0.030]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0920 0.0308 -0.00532 0.0576 0.0808 0.0666
[0.020] [0.069] [0.573] [0.041] [0.029] [0.048]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0220 -0.0260 -0.0302 -0.0222 -0.0395 -0.0194
[0.255] [0.191] [0.016] [0.209] [0.095] [0.254]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.00368 0.00134 0.00908 -0.00249 0.0135 -0.00627
[0.742] [0.854] [0.013] [0.734] [0.351] [0.427]
N 1619 1619 1460 1619 1769 1619
within R2 0.1479 0.1333 0.2295 0.1461 0.1344 0.1445
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Results estimated for equation 2. The number after each variable name represents the lag j specified
in equation 2. The variable open is openness and the variable fd is financial development, as detailed
in the table A.3. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend was
not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and Kraay
standard errors.
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Table A.16 Estimated Total Effect for Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Fixed-Effects Regressions with Openness and Financial
Development - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - I
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 0.0133
(0.0270)
-1.5 0.0106
(0.0229)
-1 -0.180* -0.0598* 0.00796 -0.117* -0.158* -0.144*
(0.0702) (0.0242) (0.0190) (0.0513) (0.0713) (0.0664)
-0.5 -0.134* -0.0444* 0.00530 -0.0884* -0.118* -0.111*
(0.0514) (0.0178) (0.0156) (0.0381) (0.0539) (0.0504)
0 -0.0876* -0.0290* 0.00263 -0.0596* -0.0776* -0.0775*
(0.0332) (0.0136) (0.0131) (0.0255) (0.0371) (0.0348)
0.5 -0.0416* -0.0136 -0.0000281 -0.0308* -0.0372+ -0.0442*
(0.0172) (0.0138) (0.0119) (0.0149) (0.0220) (0.0206)
1 0.00439 0.00178 -0.00269 -0.00203 0.00319 -0.0109
(0.0151) (0.0182) (0.0125) (0.0132) (0.0153) (0.0133)
1.5 0.0504+ 0.0172 -0.00535 0.0268 0.0436+ 0.0224
(0.0299) (0.0247) (0.0147) (0.0225) (0.0251) (0.0217)
2 0.0964* 0.0326 0.0556 0.0840* 0.0556
(0.0480) (0.0321) (0.0348) (0.0408) (0.0361)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0484*
(0.0172)
-1.5 -0.0438*
(0.0158)
-1 -0.0184 -0.0273 -0.0393* -0.0197 -0.0530 -0.0131
(0.0257) (0.0239) (0.0145) (0.0206) (0.0362) (0.0198)
-0.5 -0.0202 -0.0267 -0.0348* -0.0209 -0.0462 -0.0163
(0.0220) (0.0216) (0.0132) (0.0187) (0.0295) (0.0180)
0 -0.0220 -0.0260 -0.0302* -0.0222 -0.0395+ -0.0194
(0.0191) (0.0196) (0.0121) (0.0174) (0.0232) (0.0168)
0.5 -0.0239 -0.0253 -0.0257* -0.0234 -0.0327+ -0.0225
(0.0176) (0.0182) (0.0111) (0.0169) (0.0175) (0.0165)
1 -0.0257 -0.0247 -0.0211* -0.0247 -0.0260+ -0.0257
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(0.0178) (0.0175) (0.0104) (0.0171) (0.0134) (0.0171)
1.5 -0.0275 -0.0240 -0.0166 -0.0259 -0.0192 -0.0288
(0.0196) (0.0175) (0.00995) (0.0180) (0.0123) (0.0186)
2 -0.0294 -0.0233 -0.0272 -0.0125 -0.0319
(0.0227) (0.0182) (0.0196) (0.0151) (0.0207)
N 1619 1619 1460 1619 1769 1619
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.15 (equation 2).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of
law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.17 A First Alternative Measure for the
Discount Rate Growth Variable
gdisc
gdisc1 0.238*
(0.0534)
gy1 1.821*
(0.354)
gy2 0.945*
(0.267)
in f l1 2.406*
(0.433)
in f l2 -1.606*
(0.473)
Constant -4.368*
(0.729)
N 1932
within R2 0.155
Results estimated for equation 3. The number after each
variable name represents the lag j specified in equation 3.
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
The Stata command xtreg, f e vce(cluster) was used to
estimate the fixed-effects regression with standard errors
that are robust to disturbances being heteroscedastic and
autocorrelated.
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Table A.18 Choosing the Number of Lags - Evaluation of Hypotheses 2
and 3 - II
Lags AIC=-2lnL+2k N=Number of AICn=(-2lnL+2k)/N Model
Observations Selection
regulatory quality
4 6387.618 1719 3.715892 1
5 6198.241 1666 3.720433
6 6034.923 1613 3.741428
7 5878.41 1560 3.768212
8 5659.469 1507 3.755454
control of corruption
4 6389.156 1719 3.716787 1
5 6193.355 1666 3.717500
6 6024.814 1613 3.735161
7 5865.249 1560 3.759775
8 5647.066 1507 3.747224
political stability
4 6382.889 1719 3.713141
5 6184.139 1666 3.711968 1
6 6021.059 1613 3.732833
7 5859.752 1560 3.756251
8 5634.64 1507 3.738978
rule of law
4 6391.963 1719 3.718419 1
5 6201.46 1666 3.722365
6 6039.028 1613 3.743973
7 5882.216 1560 3.770651
8 5663.076 1507 3.757847
voice and accountability
4 6391.03 1719 3.717877 1
5 6200.653 1666 3.721881
6 6037.792 1613 3.743206
7 5879.234 1560 3.768740
8 5663.575 1507 3.758179
government effectiveness
4 6389.015 1719 3.716704 1
5 6197.599 1666 3.720047
6 6033.398 1613 3.740482
7 5875.04 1560 3.766051
8 5655.286 1507 3.752678
The AIC criterion is not appropriate because the models do not have the same number of
observations. The AICn criterion is appropriate for our case because it penalizes the
loss of observations due to the inclusion of additional lags.
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Table A.19 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors -
with Openness and Financial Development - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0736 0.0747 0.0841 0.0787 0.0809 0.0736
(0.113) (0.115) (0.109) (0.116) (0.117) (0.113)
gy2 0.172* 0.173* 0.160* 0.179* 0.180* 0.173*
(0.0479) (0.0478) (0.0511) (0.0461) (0.0462) (0.0475)
gy3 -0.0493 -0.0462 -0.0574+ -0.0450 -0.0441 -0.0489
(0.0372) (0.0364) (0.0289) (0.0308) (0.0299) (0.0365)
gy4 -0.103* -0.104* -0.107* -0.0904* -0.0900* -0.103*
(0.0435) (0.0449) (0.0438) (0.0414) (0.0402) (0.0433)
gy5 0.107*
(0.0523)
ω1+ -0.0195 -0.0168 -0.00805 -0.0132 -0.00937 -0.0257
(0.0149) (0.0151) (0.0126) (0.0146) (0.0121) (0.0170)
ω2+ 0.00450 0.00380 0.0114+ 0.00261 0.00630 0.00710
(0.00720) (0.00713) (0.00633) (0.00602) (0.00746) (0.00793)
ω3+ 0.00256 0.00840 0.00243 -0.00359 -0.00566 0.00554
(0.0244) (0.0179) (0.0134) (0.0176) (0.0209) (0.0227)
ω4+ -0.0228* -0.0109 -0.0106+ -0.0124* -0.0158* -0.0205*
(0.00791) (0.00694) (0.00561) (0.00565) (0.00708) (0.00755)
ω5+ 0.0119+
(0.00682)
inst1∗ω1+ 0.00433 0.00111 -0.00418 0.00941 0.00882 0.00873
(0.00898) (0.00596) (0.00614) (0.00580) (0.00588) (0.00768)
inst2∗ω2+ 0.00539 0.00722* 0.00638 0.00512* 0.00211 0.00185
(0.00503) (0.00214) (0.00433) (0.00250) (0.00446) (0.00327)
inst3∗ω3+ 0.00896 0.00236 -0.00106 0.000916 0.00338 0.00399
(0.0185) (0.0103) (0.00784) (0.0105) (0.0151) (0.0137)
inst4∗ω4+ 0.0193* 0.00761* 0.00235 0.00985* 0.0156* 0.0154*
(0.00463) (0.00239) (0.00535) (0.00282) (0.00484) (0.00259)
inst5∗ω5+ -0.00637
(0.00615)
ω1− 0.00952+ 0.0144* 0.0126* 0.0128* 0.0101 0.0136*
(0.00479) (0.00467) (0.00322) (0.00575) (0.00652) (0.00547)
ω2− -0.0186 -0.0193+ -0.0140* -0.0150 -0.0227+ -0.0202+
(0.0118) (0.0104) (0.00661) (0.00954) (0.0121) (0.0115)
ω3− -0.0113 -0.0117 -0.0107 -0.00863 -0.00570 -0.0108
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(0.0113) (0.0102) (0.00654) (0.00778) (0.00448) (0.0116)
ω4− 0.00819 0.00900 0.000370 0.00671 0.00543 0.00876
(0.0101) (0.00722) (0.00397) (0.00742) (0.00638) (0.00844)
ω5− -0.0143*
(0.00401)
inst1∗ω1− 0.00652* 0.00219 0.00927* 0.00140 0.00321 0.00265
(0.00303) (0.00180) (0.00232) (0.00242) (0.00541) (0.00267)
inst2∗ω2− 0.00295 0.00360 0.00163 0.00329 0.0115 0.00423
(0.00561) (0.00327) (0.00333) (0.00371) (0.00745) (0.00426)
inst3∗ω3− 0.000598 0.00111 -0.000607 0.00343 0.00118 -0.0000466
(0.00470) (0.00338) (0.00122) (0.00417) (0.00238) (0.00459)
inst4∗ω4− -0.00663 -0.00731 -0.00760 -0.00586 -0.00668 -0.00678
(0.00711) (0.00477) (0.00586) (0.00485) (0.00559) (0.00543)
inst5∗ω5− 0.00377+
(0.00220)
inst1 0.302 0.468 1.346* -0.135 -1.048* -0.114
(0.709) (0.506) (0.450) (0.784) (0.464) (0.510)
inst2 0.459 -0.561 -1.150* 0.934 1.608+ 0.442
(0.815) (0.958) (0.520) (0.655) (0.907) (0.577)
inst3 -0.0443 0.629 0.949 -1.398 -1.042 0.269
(0.678) (0.755) (0.622) (1.103) (1.087) (0.395)
inst4 -1.193 -0.316 0.406 0.342 0.592 -0.474+
(0.799) (0.620) (0.495) (0.595) (0.565) (0.267)
inst5 -1.278
(0.787)
trend -0.0316+ -0.0310+ -0.0344+ -0.0278* -0.0278* -0.0312+
(0.0159) (0.0158) (0.0175) (0.00947) (0.00966) (0.0161)
open1 0.0400 0.0433 1.936 -0.266 -0.294 0.0900
(0.557) (0.541) (1.214) (0.457) (0.477) (0.547)
open2 -2.877
(2.046)
open3 1.670
(1.074)
open4 -1.929*
(0.651)
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open5 0.603
(0.517)
open1∗ω1+ -0.00925 -0.00956 -0.0171* -0.00240 -0.00544 -0.00632
(0.00654) (0.00663) (0.00828) (0.00559) (0.00496) (0.00669)
open2∗ω2+ -0.00150
(0.00787)
open3∗ω3+ 0.0152+
(0.00822)
open4∗ω4+ 0.00780
(0.00593)
open5∗ω5+ 0.00749
(0.00646)
open1∗ω1− 0.0102* 0.0102* 0.00751* 0.00359* 0.00450* 0.0100*
(0.00282) (0.00288) (0.00254) (0.00148) (0.00154) (0.00282)
open2∗ω2− -0.00978
(0.00589)
open3∗ω3− -0.00360
(0.00227)
open4∗ω4− 0.00246
(0.00276)
open5∗ω5− 0.00384*
(0.00163)
f d1 0.237 0.208 -0.0521 0.212
(0.949) (0.915) (1.016) (0.941)
f d2 -0.0358 -0.00849 0.450 -0.0276
(1.135) (1.079) (1.325) (1.108)
f d3 -0.114 -0.160 -0.473 -0.164
(0.617) (0.589) (0.804) (0.597)
f d1∗ω1+ 0.0368 0.0379 0.0435+ 0.0320
(0.0269) (0.0262) (0.0258) (0.0241)
f d2∗ω2+ 0.00154 0.000182 -0.00442 0.00304
(0.0125) (0.00958) (0.00970) (0.0109)
f d3∗ω3+ -0.0186 -0.0166 -0.0174 -0.0149
(0.0148) (0.0132) (0.0182) (0.0125)
f d1∗ω1− -0.0192* -0.0167+ -0.0173+ -0.0166+
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(0.00843) (0.00871) (0.00895) (0.00827)
f d2∗ω2− 0.00568 0.00527 0.0168 0.00595
(0.00572) (0.00599) (0.0122) (0.00591)
f d3∗ω3− 0.0111* 0.0114* 0.0164* 0.0117*
(0.00522) (0.00562) (0.00734) (0.00528)
Constant 1.719* 1.104+ 1.638* 1.736* 1.442* 1.144
(0.807) (0.630) (0.805) (0.549) (0.435) (0.745)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0352 -0.0155 0.00706 -0.0266 -0.0246 -0.0336
[0.0235] [0.229] [0.593] [0.0320] [0.195] [0.0131]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0379 0.0183 -0.00288 0.0253 0.0299 0.0300
[0.0246] [0.0625] [0.740] [0.00585] [0.0452] [0.00380]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0122 -0.00757 -0.0260 -0.00408 -0.0129 -0.00852
[0.484] [0.597] [0.0772] [0.677] [0.388] [0.574]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00344 -0.000407 0.00646 0.00226 0.00924 0.0000510
[0.639] [0.933] [0.250] [0.624] [0.385] [0.992]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.0927 0.0975 0.186 0.123 0.127 0.0946
[0.416] [0.406] [0.123] [0.297] [0.286] [0.411]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0388 -0.0171 0.00867 -0.0303 -0.0281 -0.0371
[0.029] [0.209] [0.594] [0.030] [0.185] [0.013]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0418 0.0203 -0.00354 0.0288 0.0343 0.0331
[0.045] [0.072] [0.739] [0.016] [0.054] [0.012]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0134 -0.00839 -0.0320 -0.00464 -0.0148 -0.00941
[0.493] [0.601] [0.106] [0.684] [0.404] [0.580]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00379 -0.000451 0.00795 0.00257 0.0106 0.0000564
[0.643] [0.933] [0.282] [0.628] [0.394] [0.992]
N 1569 1569 1516 1719 1719 1569
within R2 0.1268 0.1256 0.1664 0.1140 0.1150 0.1251
Results estimated for equation 4. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 4. The variable open is openness and the variable fd is financial
development, as detailed in the table A.3. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend
was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and
Kraay standard errors.
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Table A.20 Estimated Total Effect at Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Fixed-Effects Regressions with Openness and Financial
Development - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 0.0158
(0.0306)
-1.5 0.0140
(0.0261)
-1 -0.0807* -0.0374* 0.0122 -0.0591* -0.0624+ -0.0702*
(0.0336) (0.0183) (0.0220) (0.0209) (0.0355) (0.0221)
-0.5 -0.0598* -0.0273+ 0.0104 -0.0447* -0.0452 -0.0536*
(0.0247) (0.0151) (0.0186) (0.0167) (0.0278) (0.0176)
0 -0.0388* -0.0171 0.00867 -0.0303* -0.0281 -0.0371*
(0.0173) (0.0135) (0.0162) (0.0136) (0.0209) (0.0145)
0.5 -0.0179 -0.00699 0.00690 -0.0159 -0.0110 -0.0206
(0.0140) (0.0140) (0.0152) (0.0125) (0.0159) (0.0138)
1 0.00298 0.00315 0.00513 -0.00146 0.00615 -0.00401
(0.0173) (0.0165) (0.0161) (0.0140) (0.0148) (0.0158)
1.5 0.0239 0.0133 0.00336 0.0130 0.0233 0.0125
(0.0247) (0.0202) (0.0185) (0.0173) (0.0183) (0.0198)
2 0.0448 0.0234 0.0274 0.0404 0.0291
(0.0335) (0.0246) (0.0217) (0.0245) (0.0247)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0479
(0.0293)
-1.5 -0.0439
(0.0264)
-1 -0.0172 -0.00793 -0.0399+ -0.00722 -0.0254 -0.00946
(0.0260) (0.0191) (0.0238) (0.0161) (0.0294) (0.0208)
-0.5 -0.0153 -0.00816 -0.0360+ -0.00593 -0.0201 -0.00944
(0.0226) (0.0174) (0.0214) (0.0137) (0.0234) (0.0187)
0 -0.0134 -0.00839 -0.0320 -0.00464 -0.0148 -0.00941
(0.0195) (0.0159) (0.0194) (0.0114) (0.0176) (0.0169)
0.5 -0.0115 -0.00861 -0.0280 -0.00336 -0.00951 -0.00938
(0.0167) (0.0148) (0.0180) (0.00921) (0.0121) (0.0153)
1 -0.00965 -0.00883 -0.0241 -0.00207 -0.00422 -0.00935
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(0.0146) (0.0142) (0.0172) (0.00739) (0.00766) (0.0142)
1.5 -0.00775 -0.00906 -0.0201 -0.000785 0.00107 -0.00932
(0.0134) (0.0139) (0.0172) (0.00621) (0.00683) (0.0135)
2 -0.00585 -0.00929 0.000502 0.00637 -0.00929
(0.0133) (0.0142) (0.00603) (0.0105) (0.0135)
N 1569 1569 1516 1719 1719 1569
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and
(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates
derived from table A.19 (equation 4).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality
(reg), control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol),
rule of law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.21 A Second Alternative Measure for
the Discount Rate Growth Variable
gdisc
gdisc1 0.245*
(0.0523)
gy1 1.820*
(0.366)
gy2 1.068*
(0.268)
Constant -3.720*
(0.452)
N 1932
within R2 0.130
Results estimated for equation 5. The number after each
variable name represents the lag j specified in equation 5.
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
The Stata command xtreg, f e vce(cluster) was used to
estimate the fixed-effects regression with standard errors
that are robust to disturbances being heteroscedastic and
autocorrelated.
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Table A.22 Choosing the Number of Lags - Evaluation of Hypotheses 2
and 3 - II - A Second Alternative Specification
Lags AIC=-2lnL+2k N=Number of AICn=(-2lnL+2k)/N Model
Observations Selection
regulatory quality
4 6385.07 1719 3.714410 1
5 6196.602 1666 3.719449
6 6033.103 1613 3.740299
7 5876.917 1560 3.767254
8 5659.766 1507 3.755651
control of corruption
4 6387.303 1719 3.715709 1
5 6191.843 1666 3.716592
6 6022.388 1613 3.733657
7 5862.799 1560 3.758204
8 5646.904 1507 3.747116
political stability
4 6380.292 1719 3.711630
5 6180.29 1666 3.709658 1
6 6016.75 1613 3.730161
7 5855.987 1560 3.753838
8 5629.754 1507 3.735736
rule of law
4 6389.983 1719 3.717268 1
5 6200.288 1666 3.721661
6 6037.969 1613 3.743316
7 5881.475 1560 3.770176
8 5663.766 1507 3.758305
voice and accountability
4 6389.04 1719 3.716719 1
5 6197.901 1666 3.720229
6 6035.037 1613 3.741498
7 5876.485 1560 3.766978
8 5661.143 1507 3.756565
government effectiveness
4 6388.094 1719 3.716169 1
5 6197.695 1666 3.720105
6 6033.314 1613 3.740430
7 5875.298 1560 3.766217
8 5658.166 1507 3.754589
The AIC criterion is not appropriate because the models do not have the same number of
observations. The AICn criterion is appropriate for our case because it penalizes the
loss of observations due to the inclusion of additional lags.
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Table A.23 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard Errors -
Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II - A Second Alternative Specification
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0751 0.0763 0.0888 0.0771 0.0790 0.0753
(0.115) (0.116) (0.116) (0.116) (0.117) (0.115)
gy2 0.170* 0.173* 0.175* 0.173* 0.175* 0.171*
(0.0457) (0.0453) (0.0482) (0.0460) (0.0457) (0.0453)
gy3 -0.0521 -0.0502 -0.0667* -0.0489 -0.0482 -0.0524
(0.0347) (0.0342) (0.0314) (0.0344) (0.0338) (0.0351)
gy4 -0.101* -0.103* -0.107* -0.0984* -0.0977* -0.101*
(0.0446) (0.0465) (0.0503) (0.0456) (0.0442) (0.0453)
gy5 0.0943
(0.0578)
ω1+ -0.0134 -0.0106 -0.00503 -0.0103 -0.0117 -0.0174+
(0.00802) (0.00792) (0.00595) (0.00755) (0.00799) (0.00896)
ω2+ -0.00960+ -0.00855+ -0.000140 -0.00696 -0.00259 -0.00812
(0.00572) (0.00429) (0.00532) (0.00461) (0.00454) (0.00583)
ω3+ -0.0204 -0.0137 -0.00672 -0.0150 -0.0168 -0.0197
(0.0177) (0.0120) (0.00848) (0.0126) (0.0160) (0.0153)
ω4+ -0.0147* -0.00561 0.00152 -0.00726 -0.00774 -0.0106+
(0.00558) (0.00490) (0.00534) (0.00535) (0.00720) (0.00566)
ω5+ 0.00786
(0.0105)
inst1∗ω1+ 0.00715+ 0.00408 0.0000280 0.00423 0.00539 0.00914*
(0.00386) (0.00328) (0.00406) (0.00325) (0.00469) (0.00345)
inst2∗ω2+ 0.0126* 0.0115* 0.00949+ 0.0105* 0.00754 0.0101*
(0.00554) (0.00315) (0.00477) (0.00416) (0.00484) (0.00471)
inst3∗ω3+ 0.0116 0.00545 -0.000489 0.00711 0.0103 0.00980
(0.0127) (0.00710) (0.00722) (0.00819) (0.0126) (0.00937)
inst4∗ω4+ 0.0137* 0.00516* -0.00232 0.00710* 0.00920* 0.00907*
(0.00385) (0.00187) (0.00507) (0.00252) (0.00451) (0.00274)
inst5∗ω5+ 0.00275
(0.00967)
ω1− 0.00669 0.0135* 0.0106* 0.0121* 0.0123* 0.0130*
(0.00575) (0.00410) (0.00288) (0.00410) (0.00533) (0.00460)
ω2− -0.0140 -0.0151+ -0.0122* -0.0138+ -0.0227* -0.0147
(0.00902) (0.00808) (0.00579) (0.00817) (0.0103) (0.00899)
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ω3− -0.00782 -0.00632 -0.00662* -0.00559 -0.00286 -0.00583
(0.00769) (0.00589) (0.00310) (0.00547) (0.00355) (0.00707)
ω4− 0.000320 0.00290 -0.00102 0.00155 0.0000792 0.00142
(0.00872) (0.00659) (0.00414) (0.00701) (0.00642) (0.00753)
ω5− -0.0122*
(0.00272)
inst1∗ω1− 0.00856* 0.00366 0.0119* 0.00492+ 0.00570 0.00394
(0.00391) (0.00236) (0.00403) (0.00264) (0.00548) (0.00279)
inst2∗ω2− 0.00224 0.00310 -0.000609 0.00212 0.0114+ 0.00286
(0.00379) (0.00252) (0.00345) (0.00297) (0.00647) (0.00335)
inst3∗ω3− 0.00341 0.00227 0.00225 0.00163 -0.00130 0.00180
(0.00459) (0.00304) (0.00188) (0.00290) (0.00202) (0.00398)
inst4∗ω4− -0.00188 -0.00400 -0.00353 -0.00293 -0.00291 -0.00266
(0.00587) (0.00407) (0.00570) (0.00460) (0.00555) (0.00460)
inst5∗ω5− 0.00523*
(0.00253)
inst1 0.237 0.271 1.343* -0.0895 -1.055* -0.195
(0.639) (0.478) (0.426) (0.835) (0.443) (0.506)
inst2 0.507 -0.308 -1.089* 0.976 1.683+ 0.465
(0.809) (0.920) (0.522) (0.686) (0.913) (0.639)
inst3 -0.0711 0.595 0.647 -1.399 -1.134 0.200
(0.696) (0.735) (0.676) (1.104) (1.111) (0.451)
inst4 -0.946 -0.349 0.692 0.256 0.636 -0.231
(0.760) (0.642) (0.588) (0.524) (0.518) (0.287)
inst5 -1.184
(0.797)
trend -0.0284* -0.0276* -0.0313* -0.0283* -0.0284* -0.0276*
(0.00961) (0.00945) (0.0114) (0.00953) (0.00952) (0.00957)
Constant 1.577* 1.146* 1.069* 1.531* 1.198* 1.103*
(0.380) (0.227) (0.210) (0.548) (0.423) (0.358)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0581 -0.0384 -0.00251 -0.0395 -0.0389 -0.0558
[0.00441] [0.00576] [0.882] [0.00186] [0.0142] [0.00157]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0451 0.0262 0.00945 0.0290 0.0324 0.0381
[0.00966] [0.00622] [0.476] [0.00838] [0.0344] [0.00344]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0148 -0.00504 -0.0214 -0.00579 -0.0131 -0.00614
[0.366] [0.664] [0.0501] [0.639] [0.373] [0.636]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.0123 0.00504 0.0152 0.00574 0.0129 0.00593
[0.130] [0.324] [0.00746] [0.286] [0.193] [0.326]
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∑Jj=1 γ j 0.0922 0.0967 0.184 0.103 0.108 0.0923
[0.413] [0.398] [0.149] [0.367] [0.343] [0.411]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0640 -0.0425 -0.00308 -0.0441 -0.0436 -0.0615
[0.017] [0.016] [0.882] [0.010] [0.030] [0.009]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0496 0.0290 0.0116 0.0323 0.0364 0.0420
[0.030] [0.022] [0.489] [0.026] [0.059] [0.016]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0163 -0.00557 -0.0263 -0.00646 -0.0147 -0.00677
[0.387] [0.670] [0.086] [0.648] [0.389] [0.643]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0136 0.00558 0.0186 0.00641 0.0144 0.00654
[0.153] [0.329] [0.014] [0.306] [0.202] [0.337]
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
within R2 0.1164 0.1152 0.1380 0.1139 0.1143 0.1148
Results estimated for equation 4. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 4. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic trend
was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and
Kraay standard errors.
194
Table A.24 Estimated Total Effect at Specific Values of Institutional Development -
Fixed-Effects Regressions - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II - A Second
Alternative Specification
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0263
(0.0508)
-1.5 -0.0205
(0.0428)
-1 -0.114* -0.0715* -0.0147 -0.0764* -0.0800* -0.103*
(0.0470) (0.0276) (0.0350) (0.0286) (0.0367) (0.0385)
-0.5 -0.0889* -0.0570* -0.00888 -0.0602* -0.0618* -0.0825*
(0.0363) (0.0221) (0.0275) (0.0222) (0.0278) (0.0305)
0 -0.0640* -0.0425* -0.00308 -0.0441* -0.0436* -0.0615*
(0.0260) (0.0171) (0.0207) (0.0164) (0.0195) (0.0228)
0.5 -0.0392* -0.0280* 0.00271 -0.0279* -0.0254+ -0.0405*
(0.0167) (0.0130) (0.0153) (0.0120) (0.0129) (0.0158)
1 -0.0144 -0.0135 0.00851 -0.0118 -0.00725 -0.0195+
(0.0113) (0.0111) (0.0135) (0.0109) (0.0113) (0.0113)
1.5 0.0104 0.000965 0.0143 0.00436 0.0109 0.00155
(0.0149) (0.0123) (0.0163) (0.0138) (0.0163) (0.0121)
2 0.0352 0.0155 0.0205 0.0291 0.0225
(0.0238) (0.0159) (0.0191) (0.0241) (0.0176)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0636*
(0.0281)
-1.5 -0.0542*
(0.0247)
-1 -0.0299 -0.0111 -0.0449* -0.0129 -0.0292 -0.0133
(0.0278) (0.0182) (0.0213) (0.0199) (0.0276) (0.0210)
-0.5 -0.0231 -0.00836 -0.0356+ -0.00966 -0.0220 -0.0100
(0.0233) (0.0156) (0.0181) (0.0170) (0.0222) (0.0177)
0 -0.0163 -0.00557 -0.0263+ -0.00646 -0.0147 -0.00677
(0.0187) (0.0130) (0.0150) (0.0141) (0.0170) (0.0145)
0.5 -0.00955 -0.00279 -0.0170 -0.00325 -0.00754 -0.00350
(0.0143) (0.0106) (0.0123) (0.0113) (0.0120) (0.0114)
1 -0.00276 -0.0000549 -0.00767 -0.0000513 -0.000327 -0.000231
195
Estimated Total Effect at Specific Values of Institutional Development -
Fixed-Effects Regressions - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II - A Second
Alternative Specification - Continued
(0.0101) (0.00846) (0.0101) (0.00867) (0.00782) (0.00858)
1.5 0.00403 0.00279 0.00165 0.00315 0.00688 0.00304
(0.00648) (0.00675) (0.00897) (0.00652) (0.00642) (0.00625)
2 0.0108* 0.00558 0.00636 0.0141 0.00631
(0.00516) (0.00602) (0.00540) (0.00913) (0.00521)
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.23 (equation 4).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.25 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard
Errors - with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II - A Second
Alternative Specification
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0751 0.0765 0.0900 0.0775 0.0794 0.0754
(0.115) (0.117) (0.114) (0.117) (0.118) (0.116)
gy2 0.170* 0.175* 0.169* 0.175* 0.177* 0.172*
(0.0457) (0.0460) (0.0494) (0.0467) (0.0465) (0.0458)
gy3 -0.0521 -0.0479 -0.0600* -0.0467 -0.0453 -0.0509
(0.0347) (0.0310) (0.0249) (0.0313) (0.0304) (0.0319)
gy4 -0.101* -0.0998* -0.104* -0.0955* -0.0940* -0.0989*
(0.0446) (0.0458) (0.0480) (0.0449) (0.0437) (0.0445)
gy5 0.109+
(0.0562)
ω1+ -0.0134 -0.00784 0.00346 -0.00699 -0.00298 -0.0151
(0.00802) (0.00976) (0.00631) (0.00930) (0.00801) (0.0106)
ω2+ -0.00960+ -0.00845* 0.00928+ -0.00681 -0.00235 -0.00797
(0.00572) (0.00420) (0.00481) (0.00452) (0.00447) (0.00564)
ω3+ -0.0204 -0.0138 -0.00699 -0.0152 -0.0178 -0.0196
(0.0177) (0.0121) (0.00858) (0.0126) (0.0159) (0.0153)
ω4+ -0.0147* -0.00563 -0.00779 -0.00729 -0.00821 -0.0106+
(0.00558) (0.00500) (0.00587) (0.00551) (0.00735) (0.00585)
ω5+ 0.00872
(0.00772)
inst1∗ω1+ 0.00715+ 0.00426 0.000331 0.00426 0.00313 0.00939*
(0.00386) (0.00317) (0.00405) (0.00316) (0.00517) (0.00343)
inst2∗ω2+ 0.0126* 0.0113* 0.00959* 0.0103* 0.00719 0.00991*
(0.00554) (0.00317) (0.00442) (0.00418) (0.00478) (0.00468)
inst3∗ω3+ 0.0116 0.00541 -0.000611 0.00704 0.0109 0.00968
(0.0127) (0.00706) (0.00714) (0.00807) (0.0123) (0.00927)
inst4∗ω4+ 0.0137* 0.00516* -0.00218 0.00713* 0.00963* 0.00910*
(0.00385) (0.00190) (0.00504) (0.00262) (0.00471) (0.00286)
inst5∗ω5+ 0.00304
(0.00983)
ω1− 0.00669 0.0108* 0.00834* 0.00885+ 0.00177 0.0107*
(0.00575) (0.00451) (0.00335) (0.00442) (0.00797) (0.00502)
ω2− -0.0140 -0.0149+ -0.00737 -0.0137+ -0.0225* -0.0147
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(0.00902) (0.00800) (0.00602) (0.00812) (0.0108) (0.00897)
ω3− -0.00782 -0.00615 -0.00625 -0.00540 -0.00262 -0.00574
(0.00769) (0.00590) (0.00378) (0.00536) (0.00347) (0.00703)
ω4− 0.000320 0.00301 -0.000683 0.00160 -0.000761 0.00153
(0.00872) (0.00655) (0.00382) (0.00693) (0.00623) (0.00748)
ω5− -0.0141*
(0.00289)
inst1∗ω1− 0.00856* 0.00257 0.0111* 0.00418 0.00949 0.00260
(0.00391) (0.00234) (0.00428) (0.00262) (0.00721) (0.00285)
inst2∗ω2− 0.00224 0.00317 0.000633 0.00225 0.0117+ 0.00302
(0.00379) (0.00265) (0.00338) (0.00306) (0.00679) (0.00354)
inst3∗ω3− 0.00341 0.00225 0.00107 0.00162 -0.00125 0.00181
(0.00459) (0.00301) (0.00192) (0.00283) (0.00204) (0.00395)
inst4∗ω4− -0.00188 -0.00414 -0.00361 -0.00304 -0.00232 -0.00282
(0.00587) (0.00412) (0.00583) (0.00461) (0.00537) (0.00464)
inst5∗ω5− 0.00413+
(0.00243)
inst1 0.237 0.269 1.340* -0.113 -1.084* -0.195
(0.639) (0.490) (0.421) (0.819) (0.452) (0.500)
inst2 0.507 -0.312 -1.127* 0.951 1.655+ 0.441
(0.809) (0.921) (0.524) (0.686) (0.915) (0.625)
inst3 -0.0711 0.580 0.659 -1.388 -1.073 0.196
(0.696) (0.734) (0.666) (1.114) (1.109) (0.448)
inst4 -0.946 -0.317 0.650 0.270 0.644 -0.208
(0.760) (0.617) (0.574) (0.540) (0.561) (0.284)
inst5 -1.147
(0.749)
trend -0.0284* -0.0268* -0.0290* -0.0275* -0.0275* -0.0271*
(0.00961) (0.00935) (0.0106) (0.00938) (0.00963) (0.00947)
open1 -0.225 1.254 -0.225 -0.253 -0.151
(0.443) (1.217) (0.447) (0.471) (0.442)
open2 -2.173
(1.788)
open3 1.292
(0.962)
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open4 -1.478*
(0.721)
open5 0.467
(0.476)
open1∗ω1+ -0.00302 -0.0103 -0.00339 -0.00686 -0.00269
(0.00703) (0.00754) (0.00663) (0.00553) (0.00653)
open2∗ω2+ -0.0113
(0.00726)
open3∗ω3+ 0.00168
(0.00984)
open4∗ω4+ 0.0107
(0.00663)
open5∗ω5+ -0.000797
(0.00722)
open1∗ω1− 0.00347* 0.00118 0.00345* 0.00577* 0.00345*
(0.00151) (0.00239) (0.00140) (0.00132) (0.00142)
open2∗ω2− -0.00589*
(0.00227)
open3∗ω3− -0.000285
(0.00247)
open4∗ω4− -0.000264
(0.00313)
open5∗ω5− 0.00399*
(0.00145)
Constant 1.577* 1.325* 1.606* 1.739* 1.395* 1.235*
(0.380) (0.444) (0.523) (0.546) (0.435) (0.498)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0581 -0.0357 0.00669 -0.0363 -0.0313 -0.0533
[0.00441] [0.00405] [0.553] [0.000816] [0.0351] [0.000376]
∑Jj=1 φ j 0.0451 0.0262 0.0102 0.0287 0.0308 0.0381
[0.00966] [0.00449] [0.450] [0.00652] [0.0396] [0.00216]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0148 -0.00727 -0.0200 -0.00860 -0.0242 -0.00823
[0.366] [0.477] [0.0511] [0.441] [0.186] [0.476]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.0123 0.00386 0.0133 0.00501 0.0176 0.00460
[0.130] [0.458] [0.0164] [0.349] [0.156] [0.439]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.0922 0.104 0.204 0.111 0.117 0.0976
[0.413] [0.368] [0.112] [0.337] [0.315] [0.389]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0640 -0.0399 0.00840 -0.0408 -0.0355 -0.0590
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[0.017] [0.008] [0.546] [0.003] [0.046] [0.003]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0496 0.0292 0.0128 0.0323 0.0349 0.0422
[0.030] [0.020] [0.466] [0.024] [0.064] [0.015]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0163 -0.00812 -0.0252 -0.00967 -0.0274 -0.00912
[0.387] [0.491] [0.093] [0.464] [0.216] [0.490]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0136 0.00431 0.0167 0.00563 0.0199 0.00510
[0.153] [0.458] [0.032] [0.366] [0.177] [0.444]
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
within R2 0.1164 0.1162 0.1476 0.1149 0.1169 0.1157
Results estimated for equation 4. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 4. The variable open is openness, as detailed in the table A.3. Total
effects are presented in the bottom of the table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of
law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic
trend was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll and
Kraay standard errors.
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Table A.26 Estimated Total Effect at Specific Values of Institutional Development
- Fixed-Effects Regressions with Openness - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II -
A Second Alternative Specification
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0171
(0.0456)
-1.5 -0.0108
(0.0371)
-1 -0.114* -0.0691* -0.00437 -0.0731* -0.0704* -0.101*
(0.0470) (0.0236) (0.0288) (0.0241) (0.0335) (0.0341)
-0.5 -0.0889* -0.0545* 0.00201 -0.0569* -0.0529* -0.0801*
(0.0363) (0.0186) (0.0209) (0.0181) (0.0250) (0.0264)
0 -0.0640* -0.0399* 0.00840 -0.0408* -0.0355* -0.0590*
(0.0260) (0.0144) (0.0138) (0.0131) (0.0173) (0.0191)
0.5 -0.0392* -0.0253* 0.0148 -0.0246* -0.0181 -0.0379*
(0.0167) (0.0120) (0.00985) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0132)
1 -0.0144 -0.0107 0.0212+ -0.00847 -0.000606 -0.0168
(0.0113) (0.0124) (0.0124) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0110)
1.5 0.0104 0.00393 0.0276 0.00768 0.0168 0.00426
(0.0149) (0.0154) (0.0191) (0.0168) (0.0183) (0.0144)
2 0.0352 0.0185 0.0238 0.0343 0.0254
(0.0238) (0.0199) (0.0226) (0.0262) (0.0208)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0586*
(0.0268)
-1.5 -0.0502*
(0.0234)
-1 -0.0299 -0.0124 -0.0419* -0.0153 -0.0473 -0.0142
(0.0278) (0.0168) (0.0202) (0.0188) (0.0360) (0.0193)
-0.5 -0.0231 -0.0103 -0.0335+ -0.0125 -0.0373 -0.0117
(0.0233) (0.0142) (0.0173) (0.0159) (0.0289) (0.0162)
0 -0.0163 -0.00812 -0.0252+ -0.00967 -0.0274 -0.00912
(0.0187) (0.0117) (0.0147) (0.0131) (0.0219) (0.0131)
0.5 -0.00955 -0.00596 -0.0168 -0.00685 -0.0174 -0.00657
(0.0143) (0.00946) (0.0127) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0103)
1 -0.00276 -0.00385 -0.00845 -0.00404 -0.00745 -0.00402
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(0.0101) (0.00769) (0.0117) (0.00806) (0.00901) (0.00783)
1.5 0.00403 -0.00166 -0.0000952 -0.00122 0.00251 -0.00147
(0.00648) (0.00666) (0.0119) (0.00636) (0.00642) (0.00621)
2 0.0108* 0.000495 0.00160 0.0125 0.00108
(0.00516) (0.00684) (0.00591) (0.0103) (0.00613)
N 1719 1719 1666 1719 1719 1719
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.25 (equation 4).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of law
(law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Table A.27 Fixed-Effects Regressions with Driscoll and Kraay Standard
Errors - with Openness and Financial Development - Evaluating Hypotheses 2
and 3 - II - A Second Alternative Specification
Dependent Variable: Real GDP Growth
reg cor pol law voice gov
gy1 0.0722 0.0746 0.0851 0.0775 0.0794 0.0730
(0.114) (0.116) (0.111) (0.117) (0.118) (0.114)
gy2 0.166* 0.168* 0.160* 0.175* 0.177* 0.168*
(0.0489) (0.0486) (0.0510) (0.0467) (0.0465) (0.0487)
gy3 -0.0509 -0.0488 -0.0597+ -0.0467 -0.0453 -0.0517
(0.0373) (0.0371) (0.0312) (0.0313) (0.0304) (0.0381)
gy4 -0.110* -0.111* -0.116* -0.0955* -0.0940* -0.110*
(0.0481) (0.0496) (0.0486) (0.0449) (0.0437) (0.0476)
gy5 0.103+
(0.0524)
ω1+ -0.00856 -0.00773 -0.00438 -0.00699 -0.00298 -0.0147
(0.00947) (0.0107) (0.0107) (0.00930) (0.00801) (0.0107)
ω2+ -0.00633 -0.00605 0.00823 -0.00681 -0.00235 -0.00530
(0.00706) (0.00729) (0.00516) (0.00452) (0.00447) (0.00777)
ω3+ -0.0173 -0.00840 -0.00502 -0.0152 -0.0178 -0.0126
(0.0188) (0.0122) (0.00982) (0.0126) (0.0159) (0.0160)
ω4+ -0.0154+ -0.00623 -0.00704 -0.00729 -0.00821 -0.0155*
(0.00816) (0.00787) (0.00652) (0.00551) (0.00735) (0.00765)
ω5+ 0.0123+
(0.00670)
inst1∗ω1+ -0.00531 -0.00597 -0.00582 0.00426 0.00313 -0.0000324
(0.0109) (0.00683) (0.00618) (0.00316) (0.00517) (0.00753)
inst2∗ω2+ 0.0105 0.0113* 0.00706 0.0103* 0.00719 0.00797
(0.00745) (0.00372) (0.00463) (0.00418) (0.00478) (0.00547)
inst3∗ω3+ 0.0171 0.00668 -0.00115 0.00704 0.0109 0.0129
(0.0169) (0.00945) (0.00750) (0.00807) (0.0123) (0.0117)
inst4∗ω4+ 0.0185* 0.00692* 0.000220 0.00713* 0.00963* 0.0128*
(0.00459) (0.00182) (0.00478) (0.00262) (0.00471) (0.00276)
inst5∗ω5+ -0.00606
(0.00523)
ω1− 0.00389 0.0104* 0.0102* 0.00885+ 0.00177 0.00867+
(0.00563) (0.00414) (0.00325) (0.00442) (0.00797) (0.00440)
ω2− -0.0170+ -0.0177+ -0.0132* -0.0137+ -0.0225* -0.0177+
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(0.00999) (0.00906) (0.00588) (0.00812) (0.0108) (0.00950)
ω3− -0.00627 -0.00784 -0.00847 -0.00540 -0.00262 -0.00622
(0.00811) (0.00790) (0.00543) (0.00536) (0.00347) (0.00815)
ω4− 0.000386 0.00153 -0.00228 0.00160 -0.000761 0.00217
(0.00997) (0.00776) (0.00396) (0.00693) (0.00623) (0.00807)
ω5− -0.0143*
(0.00397)
inst1∗ω1− 0.0114* 0.00542* 0.0120* 0.00418 0.00949 0.00606*
(0.00489) (0.00213) (0.00273) (0.00262) (0.00721) (0.00266)
inst2∗ω2− 0.00193 0.00262 0.00132 0.00225 0.0117+ 0.00280
(0.00521) (0.00292) (0.00308) (0.00306) (0.00679) (0.00367)
inst3∗ω3− -0.00237 -0.000457 -0.00137 0.00162 -0.00125 -0.00252
(0.00304) (0.00236) (0.00169) (0.00283) (0.00204) (0.00284)
inst4∗ω4− -0.00460 -0.00605 -0.00599 -0.00304 -0.00232 -0.00300
(0.00686) (0.00419) (0.00574) (0.00461) (0.00537) (0.00503)
inst5∗ω5− 0.00431*
(0.00207)
inst1 0.310 0.464 1.399* -0.113 -1.084* -0.0646
(0.712) (0.494) (0.428) (0.819) (0.452) (0.511)
inst2 0.514 -0.543 -1.250* 0.951 1.655+ 0.454
(0.843) (0.941) (0.550) (0.686) (0.915) (0.576)
inst3 -0.145 0.663 1.081 -1.388 -1.073 0.195
(0.706) (0.748) (0.685) (1.114) (1.109) (0.403)
inst4 -1.160 -0.333 0.386 0.270 0.644 -0.463+
(0.790) (0.580) (0.485) (0.540) (0.561) (0.255)
inst5 -1.300
(0.800)
trend -0.0319+ -0.0313+ -0.0358+ -0.0275* -0.0275* -0.0313+
(0.0160) (0.0157) (0.0180) (0.00938) (0.00963) (0.0162)
open1 0.139 0.149 1.918 -0.225 -0.253 0.147
(0.521) (0.509) (1.212) (0.447) (0.471) (0.513)
open2 -2.661
(1.985)
open3 1.727
(1.079)
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open4 -1.957*
(0.695)
open5 0.527
(0.509)
open1∗ω1+ -0.0112 -0.0127 -0.0168+ -0.00339 -0.00686 -0.00821
(0.00835) (0.00865) (0.00965) (0.00663) (0.00553) (0.00895)
open2∗ω2+ -0.00811
(0.00761)
open3∗ω3+ 0.00941
(0.00774)
open4∗ω4+ 0.00767
(0.00583)
open5∗ω5+ 0.00557
(0.00581)
open1∗ω1− 0.00923* 0.00911* 0.00645* 0.00345* 0.00577* 0.00942*
(0.00231) (0.00252) (0.00182) (0.00140) (0.00132) (0.00235)
open2∗ω2− -0.00987+
(0.00569)
open3∗ω3− -0.00405+
(0.00207)
open4∗ω4− 0.00250
(0.00272)
open5∗ω5− 0.00398*
(0.00152)
f d1 0.116 0.131 -0.0670 0.217
(0.980) (0.926) (1.056) (0.932)
f d2 -0.00764 0.0375 0.428 0.0131
(1.119) (1.070) (1.259) (1.107)
f d3 -0.999 -1.079 -0.461 -0.199
(1.047) (1.028) (0.737) (0.592)
f d4 1.059 0.991
(1.127) (1.066)
f d1∗ω1+ 0.0405 0.0418 0.0373+ 0.0346
(0.0273) (0.0264) (0.0219) (0.0248)
f d2∗ω2+ 0.00277 0.00158 0.00348 0.00448
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(0.0132) (0.0106) (0.00898) (0.0118)
f d3∗ω3+ -0.00372 0.000742 -0.00222 -0.00978
(0.0133) (0.0130) (0.0123) (0.0114)
f d4∗ω4+ -0.0117* -0.00501
(0.00526) (0.00484)
f d1∗ω1− -0.0196* -0.0161* -0.0150* -0.0159*
(0.00767) (0.00759) (0.00676) (0.00720)
f d2∗ω2− 0.00544 0.00473 0.0162 0.00541
(0.00518) (0.00520) (0.0100) (0.00530)
f d3∗ω3− 0.0107+ 0.00995+ 0.0146* 0.0116*
(0.00566) (0.00578) (0.00539) (0.00548)
f d4∗ω4− 0.00753* 0.00856*
0.00359) (0.00404)
Constant 1.644* 1.008 1.576+ 1.739* 1.395* 1.132
(0.789) (0.618) (0.790) (0.546) (0.435) (0.732)
∑Jj=1 φ j -0.0476 -0.0284 0.00413 -0.0363 -0.0313 -0.0481
[0.00305] [0.00792] [0.751] [0.000816] [0.0351] [0.000218]
∑Jj=1Θ j 0.0408 0.0190 -0.00576 0.0287 0.0308 0.0337
[0.0369] [0.0717] [0.576] [0.00652] [0.0396] [0.00489]
∑Jj=1λ j -0.0190 -0.0136 -0.0281 -0.00860 -0.0242 -0.0131
[0.329] [0.362] [0.0545] [0.441] [0.186] [0.407]
∑Jj=1ψ j 0.00641 0.00153 0.0102 0.00501 0.0176 0.00334
[0.440] [0.760] [0.0423] [0.349] [0.156] [0.572]
∑Jj=1 γ j 0.0776 0.0828 0.172 0.111 0.117 0.0791
[0.490] [0.475] [0.158] [0.337] [0.315] [0.484]
(∑Jj=1 φ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0516 -0.0310 0.00499 -0.0408 -0.0355 -0.0522
[0.009] [0.010] [0.751] [0.003] [0.046] [0.001]
(∑Jj=1Θ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.0443 0.0207 -0.00696 0.0323 0.0349 0.0366
[0.066] [0.099] [0.567] [0.024] [0.064] [0.018]
(∑Jj=1 λ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
-0.0206 -0.0148 -0.0339 -0.00967 -0.0274 -0.0142
[0.345] [0.376] [0.078] [0.464] [0.216] [0.420]
(∑Jj=1ψ j)
(1−∑Jj=1 γ j)
0.00695 0.00166 0.0124 0.00563 0.0199 0.00363
[0.451] [0.760] [0.071] [0.366] [0.177] [0.578]
N 1569 1569 1516 1719 1719 1569
within R2 0.1280 0.1260 0.1656 0.1149 0.1169 0.1238
Results estimated for equation 4. The number after each variable name represents the lag j
specified in equation 4. The variable open is openness and the variable fd is financial
development, as detailed in the table A.3. Total effects are presented in the bottom of the
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table.
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality
(reg), control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol),
rule of law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
P-values in brackets
A quadratic trend in time was also included in all models. In all regressions, the quadratic
trend was not significant and it was excluded.
The Stata command xtscc, f e was used to estimate fixed-effects regressions with Driscoll
and Kraay standard errors.
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Table A.28 Estimated Total Effect at Specific Values of Institutional
Development - Fixed-Effects Regressions with Openness and Financial
Development - Evaluating Hypotheses 2 and 3 - II - A Second Alternative
Specification
insti,t− j reg cor pol law voice gov(
∑Jj=1φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 0.0189
(0.0321)
-1.5 0.0154
(0.0269)
-1 -0.0959* -0.0516* 0.0119 -0.0731* -0.0704* -0.0888*
(0.0396) (0.0180) (0.0222) (0.0241) (0.0335) (0.0267)
-0.5 -0.0737* -0.0413* 0.00847 -0.0569* -0.0529* -0.0705*
(0.0288) (0.0139) (0.0182) (0.0181) (0.0250) (0.0204)
0 -0.0516* -0.0310* 0.00499 -0.0408* -0.0355* -0.0522*
(0.0191) (0.0116) (0.0157) (0.0131) (0.0173) (0.0153)
0.5 -0.0295* -0.0206 0.00151 -0.0246* -0.0181 -0.0339*
(0.0135) (0.0123) (0.0152) (0.0106) (0.0119) (0.0129)
1 -0.00735 -0.0103 -0.00197 -0.00847 -0.000606 -0.0157
(0.0165) (0.0157) (0.0171) (0.0122) (0.0124) (0.0146)
1.5 0.0148 0.0000401 -0.00545 0.00768 0.0168 0.00262
(0.0254) (0.0204) (0.0206) (0.0168) (0.0183) (0.0192)
2 0.0369 0.0104 0.0238 0.0343 0.0209
(0.0359) (0.0257) (0.0226) (0.0262) (0.0253)(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
-2 -0.0586*
(0.0278)
-1.5 -0.0525*
(0.0252)
-1 -0.0275 -0.0165 -0.0463* -0.0153 -0.0473 -0.0178
(0.0296) (0.0203) (0.0228) (0.0188) (0.0360) (0.0226)
-0.5 -0.0241 -0.0157 -0.0401+ -0.0125 -0.0373 -0.0160
(0.0255) (0.0183) (0.0206) (0.0159) (0.0289) (0.0199)
0 -0.0206 -0.0148 -0.0339+ -0.00967 -0.0274 -0.0142
(0.0216) (0.0166) (0.0189) (0.0131) (0.0219) (0.0175)
0.5 -0.0171 -0.0140 -0.0277 -0.00685 -0.0174 -0.0124
(0.0180) (0.0152) (0.0176) (0.0104) (0.0151) (0.0153)
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1 -0.0136 -0.0132 -0.0215 -0.00404 -0.00745 -0.0106
(0.0149) (0.0142) (0.0168) (0.00806) (0.00901) (0.0136)
1.5 -0.0102 -0.0124 -0.0153 -0.00122 0.00251 -0.00877
(0.0128) (0.0136) (0.0168) (0.00636) (0.00642) (0.0125)
2 -0.00670 -0.0115 0.00160 0.0125 -0.00696
(0.0121) (0.0135) (0.00591) (0.0103) (0.0123)
N 1569 1569 1516 1719 1719 1569
Total effect and standard error estimated for
(
∑Jj=1 φ j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
and(
∑Jj=1λ j +∑
J
j=1ψ jinsti,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
at different levels of insti,t− j. Estimates derived
from table A.27 (equation 4).
Standard errors in parentheses
+ p < 0.10, * p < 0.05
In each column a different institutional development indicator is used: regulatory quality (reg),
control of corruption (cor), political stability and absence of violence/terrorism (pol), rule of
law (law), voice and accountability (voice) and government effectiveness (gov).
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Figure B.1 Effect of Institutional Development on Real GDP Growth
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The total effects were derived from the fixed-effects model for the regulatory quality indicator
with five lags and openness as controls, first column of table 7. The total effect of a given
level of institutional development on real GDP growth is given by:(
∑Jj=1 τ jinsti,t− j +∑
J
j=1Θ jinsti,t− jgdisc
+
i,t− j
)
/
(
1−∑Jj=1 γ j
)
. The graph is composed by the
effects estimated for regulatory quality equal to -1, -0.5, 0.5 and 1 and assuming a 15%
increase in central bank discount rates. The estimated effects are significant at the 10% level.
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